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“When there is name-and-form, consciousness comes to be; consciousness has name-and-
form as its condition… it does not go further back than name-and-form.” 
 
(Samyutta Nikaya (Connected Discourses) 12:65, pp. 602. Cf. D. ii 32, pp.211, circa 500 BC, 
Siddhartha Gautama (the Historical Buddha), translated by Stephen Batchelor) 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction to experimental design 
 
1.1 Overview  
 
 This thesis explores the effects of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) on 
conscious perception and visual processing. Chapter 1 addresses issues of experimental 
design. Two broad classes of TMS intervention were used and are reported in separate 
chapters. Chapter 2 involves repetitive ‘off-line’ TMS combined with neuroimaging 
techniques. Chapter 3 employs ‘on-line’ TMS applied with temporal specificity to track the 
passage of information through early visual cortex. Chapter 4 is a general discussion 
primarily concerned with the issues encountered experiments oriented towards consciousness. 
 
 The area of interest in this research is conscious processing. One approach to this field 
is to contrast clear reports of awareness with perception explicitly lacking in consciousness. 
The neurological phenomenon of blindsight exemplifies this contrast. Blindsight can follow 
damage to the primary visual cortex and is expressed by subjects insisting that they are not 
consciously aware of stimuli while nevertheless being able to guess the stimulus 
characteristics above chance. Similar effects have previously been reported following TMS of 
early visual cortex in healthy observers. Like clinical blindsight, TMS-induced blindsight 
straddles the boundary between consciousness and perception lacking in consciousness. 
 
 Most of the experiments reported in this thesis exploited a similar behavioural 
paradigm in which subjects were presented with simple arrow stimuli and asked several 
questions. One set of questions was a forced choice discrimination decision which allowed 
for the tracking of perception independently of conscious criteria. Other questions, such as 
‘Did you consciously see the target?’ were employed to ascertain measures of the subjects’ 
conscious experience of the stimuli. As with clinical blindsight, independent changes in these 
measures illustrate the borders that surround conscious awareness, revealing the neuronal 
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processes that contribute to conscious processing in contrast to those responsible for 
perception lacking in consciousness.  
 
 The effects of off-line repetitive TMS can last for approximately one hour or longer 
and are explored in Chapter 2. This series of experiments initially aimed to use the 
suppressive after-effect of TMS to study the behavioural consequences of reducing cortical 
excitability in areas where lesions can cause blindsight. However, contrary to expectations, a 
repetitive TMS protocol that suppresses cortical excitability was found to enhance rather than 
impair a measure of subjects’ conscious experience. This finding contradicted the hypothesis 
and warranted further investigation. The experimental configuration and initial results were 
therefore replicated (2.6.1) in conjunction with magnetoencephalography (MEG) and other 
experimental manipulations (2.6). In addition, magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) was 
employed to measure corresponding biochemical changes induced by TMS (2.5). The overall 
conclusion of the off-line experiments was that repetitive TMS increased conscious detection 
of stimuli, and that this intervention potentiated mechanisms of gating through inhibition.  
 
 Chapter 3 reports a series of experiments involving on-line (or event-related) occipital 
TMS, in which single pulses or short bursts of stimulation are delivered at varying intervals 
relative to visual stimuli. This approach allowed for mapping the time course and role of 
activity that is causally constitutive for visual perception and awareness. Visual stimulus 
characteristics were also manipulated to permit conclusions concerning the role of specific 
anatomical pathways in perception and awareness. Two main on-line studies experiments 
were conducted: a between-subjects study (3.3) and a single-subject case study (3.4-3.7). The 
single-subject case study included three independent experiments (3.5-3.7) that considered 
the role of different phases of occipital activity and different anatomical pathways in 
perception. The between-subjects experiment employed similar interventions to those of the 
single-subject study but with lower resolution. Overall, the on-line TMS experiments suggest 
that conscious awareness of stimuli depends on visual cortical activity from approximately 
100ms after stimulus onset, and that it may benefit from input through retinotectal and/or 
magnocellular pathways during the very early and very late stages of processing. In contrast 
the preserved ‘unseen’ abilities during TMS-induced blindsight did not appear to rely on such 
input, contrary to previous suggestions, and may instead depend on geniculostriate activity 
and activity subsequent to the 100ms epoch that is central to conscious processing.  
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 In sum, the experiments described here explored the neural basis of consciousness. By 
analysing changes in reported awareness of stimuli following different experimental 
interventions, it has been possible to link various neuronal substrates to distinct aspects of 
visual processing. 
 
1.2 General background  
 
1.2.1 Philosophical context 
 
 This section will explore some of the background considerations and aims that 
informed the experimental design. 
  
The philosophical strategy adopted for this research has been that of 
Neurophenomenology (Lutz, 2003; Varela, 1996; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). This 
framework seeks to explore the coupling between physiology and phenomenology1. Subjects’ 
phenomenological experiences of experiments were quantified predominantly through 
psychophysical methods, and related to physiological changes assessed through the use of 
neuro-interventional and neuroimaging techniques.  
 
The principal technique used in all experiments was TMS. This method perturbs 
neuronal activity and can also have phenomenological consequences (e.g. Boyer, Harrison, & 
Ro, 2005). TMS thus has a unique advantage over the more traditional or common cognitive 
neuroscience techniques: it allows us to move beyond the correlation of brain-behaviour 
states to assess their causal relationship (Campbell, 2007; Chambers & Mattingley, 2005; 
Walsh & Cowey, 2000). 
 
                                                            
1 Phenomenology can be understood as the study of the first person subjective element of 
consciousness and experience. It is commonly linked with the ‘what it is like’ (Nagel, 1974) aspect to 
experience and the notion of ‘qualia’ (Lewis, 1929). Historically it derives from the work of 
continental philosophers such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but it can also be attributed to the 
investigations of Hume and eastern traditions. 
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 The investigation of differences between states of consciousness - that is, differences 
in content - appears to be a perfectly valid approach to the investigation of consciousness 
(e.g. Lutz, Lachaux, Martinerie, & Varela, 2002) but it is not the one adopted here (some of 
these alternative approaches are considered in Chapter 4). Rather, my approach has been to 
consider the presence versus lack of subjective awareness. This can be thought of as a border 
that surrounds conscious experience. This framework conveys an understanding of what is 
involved in conscious experience in contrast to processes closely related but not involved, 
thus drawing what Dehaene calls a ‘negative picture’ (pp13 Dehaene & Changeux, 2004). 
This contrast between perception and explicit conscious awareness is also discussed by 
Dretske (2000) as one of the few viable directions for investigations that isolate, and 
therefore operationally define, consciousness. 
 
 There is scope within this contrast between conscious processing and perception 
lacking consciousness to look at differences that are uninformative in terms of the conscious 
experiences in question. For example, the processes of the circulatory system are necessary 
for, and coupled to, conscious experience, but the contrasts between a functioning and a non-
functioning heart are not particularly informative about consciousness. Likewise, 
inflammatory responses due to skin contact with poisonous plants can be described as a form 
of perception, but again the utility of this as a contrast state would be uninformative due to 
vast differences between the inflammatory system and the systems that support consciousness 
(Dretske, 2000). There is, therefore, a need to be as ‘minimal’ (Chalmers, 2000) or tight 
around this border as possible.  
 
In order to frame an optimally informative contrast, we require both states of 
conscious experience and states in which all things are equal except for the conscious 
experience. Blindsight (Sanders, Warrington, Marshall, & Wieskrantz, 1974) is deemed to be 
just such a state (Holt, 2003). Subjects with blindsight are able to respond veridically to the 
environment (in a manner that in other circumstances might be credited with conscious 
awareness) but insist that they are not aware of the environmental stimuli being presented. 
Hence, what they lack is specifically conscious experience (Holt, 2003). This is why 
blindsight, and in particular, TMS-induced blindsight (e.g. Boyer, et al., 2005) forms the 
focus of this thesis.  
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1.2.2 Blindsight 
 
 Blindsight classically arises following lesions to primary visual cortices and has been 
defined as “visual capacity in a field defect in the absence of acknowledged awareness” 
(pp166 Weiskrantz, 1986). Blindsight patients demonstrate perception insofar as their 
performance in forced choice tasks is greater than expected by chance, yet at the same time 
will not acknowledge awareness of the stimuli having been presented, often insisting that 
they are guessing (Weiskrantz, 1986). These demonstrable abilities, in the presence of a 
negative report of awareness, include localisation, orientation, colour, and lexical 
discrimination (Cowey, 2010; Weiskrantz, 1986). Residual abilities in blindsight are most 
often demonstrated using forced choice tasks (e.g. Sanders, et al., 1974). However, blindsight 
has also been shown indirectly where a cue presented within a subject’s ‘blind field’ may not 
be acknowledged but still affects other motor responses (e.g. Kentridge, Heywood, & 
Weiskrantz, 1999). Blindsight therefore corresponds to a dissociation or disjunction between 
conscious detection and perceptual abilities (Weiskrantz, 1986, 2001, 2009). Although 
Weiskrantz was the principal investigator on the paper that coined the term (Sanders, et al., 
1974), and remains a central figure in blindsight literature, it is worth noting that a 
dissociation between subjects reporting not having ‘seen’ stimuli despite above-chance 
performance was first documented over 100 years ago (Sidis, 1898).  
 
Blindsight is a controversial phenomenon; its very existence has been questioned 
(Campion, Latto, & Smith, 1983) and its implications and interpretations are diverse 
(compare Block, 1995; Chalmers, 1996; Dennett, 1991). Some of these issues are dealt with 
in the general discussion (Chapter 4). For now, it need only be acknowledged that blindsight 
illustrates a condition in which subjective conscious awareness is suppressed while 
perceptual performance without acknowledged awareness is relatively preserved; this is a 
relatively uncontroversial claim around which the current project was conceived. 
Experiments were therefore required to be capable of tracking subjects’ awareness of stimuli 
and, independently, subjects’ perceptual abilities when they reported a lack of awareness.  
Hence experiments should be capable of illustrating the dissociations between conscious 
experience and response abilities, i.e. blindsight type effects. As in previous studies, the 
general rationale for using blindsight in the current investigation of consciousness is that it 
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offers a set of contrast states where all things are equal except, specifically, conscious 
awareness.  
 
1.2.3 TMS-induced blindsight 
 
 During TMS a strong current (~1.8 kV, 7kA) briefly (~250 μs) is passed through a 
coil to induce a time-varying magnetic field (~2 tesla) (Magstim Company Limited, 
Carmarthenshire; stimulator specifications; Wagner, Rushmore, Eden, & Valero-Cabre, 
2009). When applied over the head this time-varying magnetic field induces an electrical 
field in the underlying cortex, resulting in the activation of nerve cells (Barker, Jalinous, & 
Freeston, 1985). 
  
Under certain circumstances, disruption to ongoing activity caused by TMS has been 
seen as analogous to lesions (Pascual-Leone, Walsh, & Rothwell, 2000). Given the existence 
of lesion-based blindsight, TMS-induced blindsight was therefore a natural progression for 
experimentation. Although electromagnetic disruption of visual perception has been known 
about for over 100 years (d'Arsonval, 1896) it was not until 1989 that such disruption was 
clearly linked with visual cortical processes (Amassian et al., 1989). In 2004 the first study 
used the term blindsight to describe a disruption of visual areas caused by TMS (Ro, Shelton, 
Lee, & Chang, 2004). Ro and colleagues used TMS to reduce subjects’ reported awareness of 
centrally presented distracters and showed that the distracter, even though it was reportedly 
beyond awareness, increased response times during a saccadic but not manual response task 
(Ro, et al., 2004). The distracter was thus described as being rendered ‘unaware’ by the TMS, 
even though it still had a measurable perceptual effect – a ‘blindsight type’ effect. 
 
 It is possible to argue that oculomotor mechanisms are somewhat lower down the 
cognitive scale from the perceptual abilities common in the most influential demonstrations 
of classic blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1986), due to their governance, at least in part, being 
reflexive (de No, 1933). Hence, influence over saccades might be expected to function 
independently of effects on conscious awareness and therefore might not be considered 
relevant to blindsight. However, Ro and colleagues went on to demonstrate different aspects 
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of TMS induced blindsight, including those involving higher, more complex, perceptual 
abilities such as colour and orientation discrimination (Boyer, et al., 2005). 
  
 Using a variety of tasks, investigators have been able to demonstrate that different 
perceptual abilities can be dissociated from conscious awareness. This has involved the 
application of TMS to attenuate measures of awareness relative to measures of perceptual 
ability. For example, Jolij et al (2005) claimed to uncover ‘affective blindsight’ by showing 
that occipital TMS applied 110ms after target onset impaired reportedly conscious 
localisation of targets without degrading the emotional content of targets (cartoon faces). 
Others have shown that deflections in grasping action can result from distracters for which 
awareness is suppressed by occipital TMS (Christensen, Kristiansen, Rowe, & Nielsen, 
2008). 
 
 Apart from its reversible nature, a great advantage of TMS-induced blindsight over 
classic blindsight is the opportunity it affords to explore the time course of the dissociation 
between conscious and unconscious vision. Pulses can be applied and activity disrupted at 
specific times relative to visual stimuli (on-line), and periods of activity may therefore be 
revealed which can be related to phenomenal and behavioural consequences. TMS-induced 
blindsight thus contributes to a wider literature where TMS is used to elucidate the timing 
and role of visual cortical activity (see section 3.1.2). One of the main aims of the work 
described here has been to disrupt activity in a temporally precise manner and relate this to 
the contrast involving consciousness. Similar reasoning and experiments have led to the 
proposal that there is an early feedforward sweep of activity that is ‘unconscious’ and 
preserved in classic blindsight, which is then followed by a recurrent phase of processing that 
confers conscious awareness (Lamme, 2001, 2006b; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000).  Probing 
this theory was a major aim of the experiments undertaken here, particularly the ‘on-line’ 
experiments. The research which inspired, and is therefore most relevant to, the experiments 
described here are previous demonstrations of TMS induced blindsight (Boyer, et al., 2005; 
Christensen, et al., 2008; Jolij & Lamme, 2005; Ro, et al., 2004), all of which involve on-line 
TMS. These are considered in greater depth in Chapter 3. 
 
 The off-line TMS experiments (Chapter 2) focused instead on the neuronal correlates 
of changes in conscious awareness following repetitive TMS. In particular, these experiments 
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studied the oscillatory and neurochemical changes that might govern the conscious detection 
of visual stimuli.   
 
1.2.4 Types of blindsight and the pathways involved 
 
 Blindsight has been divided into sub-classes. The most commonly discussed 
differentiation is between type I and type II (Weiskrantz, 1997). Type I corresponds to an 
absolute absence of awareness, whereas type II demonstrates a markedly reduced form of 
awareness. Type II subjects are not reflectively aware of the precise content of a presented 
stimulus yet can guess as to its character and had a minimal sense that something was 
presented to them (as in ‘agnosopsia’, not knowing what one sees Danckert & Rossetti, 
2005). A similar phenomenon that has been considered akin to type II blindsight is Riddoch 
syndrome, where a subject may be aware of moving but not stationary visual stimuli in the 
blind field. This ability has been related to pathways that bypass the primary visual cortex 
and directly innervate the motion sensitive area V5/middle temporal cortex (MT+) (Zeki & 
Ffytche, 1998). 
 
Danckert and Rossetti (2005) offer a further distinction between ‘action’ vs 
‘attentional’ blindsight (as well as agnosopsia). However, this differentiation does not seem 
to have been widely adopted, perhaps because it attempts to reflect differences in underlying 
neuronal pathways that remain unproven: action blindsight is assumed to involve direct 
innovation of posterior parietal cortex, whereas attention blindsight is assumed to rely on 
extrastriate visual areas, including V5/MT+. The distinction may also blur the categorisation 
between blindsight and widely accepted neurological disorders, such as neglect and visual 
agnosia.  
 
In terms of the nature of classic blindsight (type I and II), a frequently overlooked 
point is that subjects with blindsight express their condition in only a portion of their visual 
field; they are often normally sighted across the bulk of their field. The straightforward 
possibility of light being scattered from retinal locations corresponding to the blind field into 
their sighted field has been raised as an explanation that trivialises blindsight (Campion, et 
al., 1983). Proponents of blindsight have gone to great lengths in order to demonstrate that 
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this is not the case (e.g. Kentridge, Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 1997). Another aspect, again 
often overlooked, is the role of the intact visual cortex and plasticity in supporting residual 
guessing abilities, although this has been suggested (Campion, et al., 1983 commentary by 
Bach-y-Rita, P.)   
 
In addition to debates over the nature and interpretation of blindsight, the physiology 
that facilitates the residual abilities is one of the most keenly debated aspects in the literature 
(Cowey, 2010), driven by compelling evidence for opposing points of view (cf. Leh, Mullen, 
& Ptito, 2006; Schmid et al., 2010). There are broadly two theories or positions for the 
pathways that facilitate blindsight type abilities. Some advocate a role for spared projections 
from the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) (Schmid, et al., 2010) which mainly projects to the 
primary visual cortex and is consistent with there being ‘spared islands’ of primary visual 
cortex that facilitate residual perception (Radoeva, Prasad, Brainard, & Aguirre, 2008). An 
opposing view is that the residual abilities of blindsight are supported by pathways that 
mainly bypass the striate cortex, primarily via the retinotectal route that includes the superior 
colliculus (e.g. Leh et al 2006, 2009). In terms of classic blindsight, the majority of studies 
favour the latter interpretation, although the matter is by no means settled (see section 3.1.3, 
and figure 3.1.3.1). Moreover, in terms of the relatively new phenomenon of TMS-induced 
blindsight, the question of which pathway supports these perceptual abilities is still very 
much open. It could be the case that the pathways which support the positive abilities seen in 
classic blindsight are not the same as those found to mediate abilities seen in TMS-induced 
blindsight, or possibly that no single pathway underlies the spared abilities of blindsight. 
Rather, the pathways that support the spared abilities of blindsight may be dependent on the 
task used to quantify the residual abilities and method of neurological intervention.  
 
 These accounts were contrasted in Chapter 3 (see section 3.1.3), exploiting the 
observation that the retinotectal and magnocellular pathways of the LGN do not appear to 
receive colour opponent input from short wave cones of the retina (Sumner, Adamjee, & 
Mollon, 2002). A key aim of these on-line experiments was to adjudicate between competing 
theories of blindsight by combining time-locked TMS with stimuli that were calibrated to 
activate or bypass specific anatomical pathways. 
 
18 
 
1.2.5 Summary of background and aims 
 
 The broadest aim of this research has been to study the relationship between 
physiological and phenomenological measures (Varela, 1996), with a view to elucidating 
neural mechanisms of visual awareness in the human brain. In doing so the experiments 
focused on TMS-induced blindsight to investigate the mechanisms of consciousness and 
phenomenology through a contrast between explicit conscious awareness and states 
specifically lacking in consciousness. The next section focuses on establishing a reliable 
method for deriving phenomenologically-related measures that allow this contrast. Chapters 2 
and 3 address the physiological side of these relationships. Specifically, Chapter 2 makes use 
of several imaging and interventional modalities to probe the physiological mechanisms that 
may underlie modulation of conscious awareness, with a particular focus on biochemical and 
oscillatory effects of TMS. Chapter 3 aims to elucidate the time course and pathways of early 
visual processing that support conscious awareness and perception lacking in consciousness. 
 
1.3 Tasks, measures and stimuli 
 
 This section provides a general overview of the stimuli and behavioural measures 
employed in this project. It focuses on the stimuli and tasks originally developed and 
deployed in the off-line TMS experiments and the reasons for their use. Issues arising and 
subsequent adaptations are covered in the discussion of the off-line experiments (2.8) and 
introduction to the on-line experiments (3.2). 
 
 Fred Dretske has pointed to the utility of comparing at least two tasks which give 
access to the subjective experience of subjects, in contrast with those that probe raw 
perceptual abilities (Dretske, 2000). This is also what is required to demonstrate the 
dissociation of blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1986) and a principle upon which these experiments 
were designed.  
 
 There are many perceptual responses to stimuli that have the potential to reveal 
blindsight type abilities. Here an explicit question, ‘Did you consciously see the stimulus?’ 
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was posed in conjunction with a non-speeded forced choice discrimination judgement about 
the stimulus. Subjects’ forced choice discrimination ability, specifically when they reported 
not having seen the stimulus, served as a measure of their perceptual ability, explicitly 
lacking in conscious awareness. This design was intended to reflect the principal components 
of the classic demonstrations of blindsight by Weiskrantz and colleagues (1986). It was also 
partly inspired by the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) of Overgaard and colleagues, which 
has been used to compare the confidence subjects place in a judgment with their objective 
performance (Overgaard, 2003; Ramsoy. T.Z., 2004). 
 
 Reaction times, manual response effects in terms of speeded cueing, saccadic effects 
and indirect measures in general are also capable of demonstrating blindsight type effects 
(e.g. Leh, Mullen, et al., 2006; Ro, et al., 2004; Weiskrantz, 1996). However, these were not 
used in the studies presented here for the following three related reasons. First, there are 
statistical considerations: forced choice discrimination performance can be more 
straightforwardly equated with detection performance than can effects on reaction times or 
movement deflections. Thus, dissociations between two forced choice measures are easier to 
interpret and are less likely to be conflated by differential sensitivity of very different 
measures to cortical interference. Second, and more importantly, if blindsight is to be used to 
reveal consciousness through a comparison with perceptual states lacking in awareness, then 
the differences between the perceptual and awareness probes should be minimised in all other 
respects (Chalmers, 2000; Marcel, 1983). Intuitively and phenomenally, detection tasks have 
more in common with overt forced choice discrimination tasks than with cueing tasks and 
other more indirect measures. Relatedly, it seems entirely possible that the neuronal 
architecture underlying cueing might be quite different from that underlying perceptual 
abilities involved in higher perceptual discriminations; thus the use of cueing as a contrast 
state might reveal something quite different, and possibly less informative. It is also possible 
that abilities demonstrated with different tasks (cueing vs. forced choice discrimination) 
could reflect different types of blindsight (e.g. attentional vs. action). Third, one of the 
questions we wished to pose was in relation to the role of the superior colliculus, so we 
required a probe that could operate via this route but did not necessarily require such input 
under normal conditions. If we had chosen a probe that had previously been shown to depend 
critically upon the superior colliculus under normal conditions, such as saccadic dynamics 
(Lee, Rohrer, & Sparks, 1988; Ro, et al., 2004), then the capacity of experiments to reveal 
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whether or not residual abilities of blindsight depend on the superior colliculus would be 
compromised.  
 
1.3.1 Stimuli and questions 
 
 The visual stimuli were arrows (see figure 1.3.1.1). At least two tasks or probes are 
required to track the borders between conscious perception and perception that is independent 
of, or lacking in, awareness (Dretske, 2000). One task is required to be capable of tracking 
subjective phenomenal experience of presented stimuli. The second task must be capable of 
illustrating perception and of being modulated independently of the first task. Two questions 
were therefore applied to each trial: i) ‘Was the arrow pointing left or right?’ (prompted by 
the display of ‘L/R’) – a forced choice discrimination judgement that is capable of revealing 
perception even when the subject reports not being aware of the stimulus (Kolb & Braun, 
1995); and  ii) ‘Did you consciously see the arrow? Yes or No’ (prompted by ‘Y/N’) – a 
question designed to track the subject’s reflective experience of the stimulus2. 
 
 
Figure 1.3.1.1. A left arrow, approximately as presented to subjects. The surrounding 
bars are the luminance noise, which alternated every 20ms with a range of 10cd/m2.  
 
                                                            
2 To minimise the influence of the two questions upon one another, the (‘L/R’) discrimination 
question was posed prior to the detection (‘Y/N’) question. This was because, intuitively, the 
reflection upon the detection question could affect the subject’s response to the discrimination 
judgment through the adjustment of criteria, whereas the effect of the discrimination task had upon 
the detection judgement was likely to be less influential. Therefore the discrimination question was 
presented first.   
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Arrows were chosen because their presence can be detected and they can be 
discriminated between. Several other features of arrows also encouraged their use. Most 
importantly they have particularly strong cueing properties (e.g. Ristic & Kingstone, 2006). 
This meant that they were thought likely to elicit above chance responses in the forced choice 
tasks at or below thresholds of awareness, as was confirmed in preliminary piloting. They 
also offered the possibility of examining the cueing or indirect elements of blindsight 
abilities, which are an ongoing aspect of this series of experiments not covered in this thesis.  
 
Arrows were sometimes presented (stimulus-present) and sometimes not (stimulus-
absent) in order to facilitate the use of Signal Detection Theory (SDT section 1.3.2) in 
relation to the conscious detection question. The luminance of the arrow was titrated for each 
subject so that, in the absence of TMS, it was detected on approximately half of stimulus-
present trials. This level of detection was deemed low enough to be susceptible to TMS, yet 
was high enough to be capable of demonstrating a range of response changes. 
 
A key feature of the stimuli was the luminance noise, which alternated at candela 
intervals over a range of ~10 cd/m2 with the same periodicity as the stimulus presentation 
(20ms). Noise is a required feature of the ‘s-cone’ stimuli used in Chapter 3 to isolate the 
collicular pathways (see section 3.1.3 and 3.2.1). Because this manipulation was a possibility 
in all experiments the noise was present during all stimuli presentations (although it was only 
exploited in the on-line experiments). An additional advantage of using a noisy background 
for stimuli is that it might increase ‘false alarm rates’, which aided the application of SDT to 
the detection task (see below 1.3.2.1). It is worth noting that the level of luminance of the 
arrows (or saturation of s-cone / purple colour in the case of the pathway-specific stimuli) 
was always greater than the range of the noise. Thus stimulus-present conditions always 
differed physically from stimulus-absent conditions. Noise was presented beyond the edge of 
the central region where the arrows were presented (see figure 1.3.1.1); this allowed the 
arrow to be presented at different locations within the noise (a manipulation not used in the 
final experiments). The special distribution of the noise also reduced the illusory appearance 
of arrows within the noise during stimulus-absent conditions, an effect which became 
apparent during preliminary piloting and development of the stimuli.  
 
 As with the choice of probes / questions, the intention in the design of the stimuli was 
to develop a task that required perception with a degree of abstraction or higher order 
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processing. If responses to stimuli are reflexive then it may not be appropriate to use them in 
the construction of a contrast state to reveal consciousness (Dretske, 2000). It was felt that the 
detection and discrimination of arrows required a sufficient level of abstraction (syntax) to 
draw on mechanisms of cognitive control and thus minimise the contribution of reflexive 
processes to performance.  
 
 Non-lateralised foveal stimuli allowed for foveally targeted TMS, avoiding potential 
inconsistencies in the lateralisation of TMS’s effects (e.g. Corthout, Hallett, & Cowey, 2002). 
Additionally ‘S-cones’ (see section 3.1.3) are distributed more densely and consistently 
within the fovea than at the periphery (Sumner, 2000), additionally suggesting foveal 
presentation.  
 
1.3.2 Derivation of measures 
 
 As mentioned, in order to illustrate blindsight type effects we require a measure of 
conscious detection and perceptual ability revealed by a discrimination judgement. This 
section describes the rationale and methodology for deriving these measures.  
 
1.3.2.1 Detection 
 
A major criticism of approaches that attempt to tackle measures of awareness, and 
phenomenologically led approaches in general, is that a subject’s response criteria might 
fluctuate independently of changes in the conscious experience (e.g. Campion, et al., 1983; 
Eriksen, 1960; Nisbett, 1977). This concern of ‘response bias’ will be returned to in greater 
depth in Chapter 4. For now, it is sufficient to note that the application of Signal Detection 
Theory (SDT)(see Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 1990) to the ‘Did you 
consciously see?’ question allows us to compute measures of bias, and of conscious 
sensitivity largely independent of bias. In this context, the measure of sensitivity (e.g. d’, 
Tanner & Swets, 1954) reflects the difference between subjects’ propensity to say they saw 
the stimulus when it was present, and their propensity to say they saw it when it was absent. 
That is, it denotes the subject’s acknowledged detection of, or explicit sensitivity to, external 
stimuli. Bias measures (e.g. β, Green & Swets, 1966) are expressions of the propensity of 
subjects to say they saw the stimuli independently of what was presented.  The application of 
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such measures to blindsight type phenomena was first explored in the original case study by 
Weiskrantz (1986). 
 
In SDT a positive response to a presented stimulus is a ‘Hit’, while a positive 
response when the stimulus is absent is a ‘False Alarm’. If a stimulus is present but reported 
as unseen then the trial is classed as a ‘Miss’, whereas the same negative response to an 
absent stimulus is a ‘Correct Rejection’. This stimulus-response mapping can be represented 
as follows: 
 
Table 1.3.2.1.1. SDT classification used in the derivation of measures of conscious 
detection and bias in detection. 
 Hit 
False 
Alarm 
Correct 
Rejection Miss 
Stimulus Present Absent Absent Present 
Response ‘Yes’ ‘Yes’ ‘No’ ‘No’ 
 
In the current studies, the occurrence of these conditions and responses was computed 
into hit rates and false alarm rates, forming the basic units from which the measures of 
sensitivity and bias were derived. Hit Rates (HR eq1.1) are the number of hits divided by the 
number of stimulus-present trials. False Alarms Rates (FAR eq1.2) are the number of false 
alarms divided by the number of stimulus-absent trials. There are however several different 
sensitivity and bias measures available to the experimenter; these form the focus of the next 
section. 
 
HR ൌ  
Hits
ሺHits ൅ Missesሻ
 
         eq1.1 
FAR ൌ
False Alarms
ሺFalse Alarms ൅ Correct Rejectionsሻ
 
         eq1.2 
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1.3.2.2 Which SDT measures? 
 
Early piloting revealed that the conscious detection question, as opposed to the forced 
choice discrimination question, was subject to bias. This bias manifested conservatively as a 
preponderance toward saying ‘No, I have not seen it’, leading to low false alarm rates. 
Subjects often adopt conservative criteria in comparable ‘yes/no’ tasks (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 1990). The cause and interpretation of this phenomenon is considered in greater 
depth in Chapter 4. Here, the criterion has consequences for the choice of which SDT 
measures to apply.  
 
Parametric versions of SDT such as the classic d’, C or β involve z normalising HR 
and FAR (eq 1.3 to 1.5). If either of these rates is 1 or 0 then this is not possible. So where 
FAR is 0, classic SDT cannot be straightforwardly applied, which may often be the case in 
the context of such conservative criteria. Some transforms allow for extreme responses, 
including the 1/2n adjustment.  The 1/2n calculation assumes that when extreme responses 
are found (e.g. FAR=0) the number of false alarms actually lies between 0 and 1 over the 
number of trials, i.e. 1/2n (Hautus, 1995; Macmillan & Kaplan, 1985). 
 
d’ ൌ  zሺHRሻ െ  zሺFARሻ 
         eq1.3 
c ൌ  െ0.5ሺzሺHRሻ  ൅  zሺFARሻሻ 
         eq1.4 
β ൌ  e୸
మሺFARሻି୸మሺHRሻ
ଶ  
         eq1.5 
 
   Formulae taken from Wright, Horry, & Skagerberg (2009)  
 
An additional concern is the central assumption of classic SDT that the distributions 
of signal (from which hits result) and noise (from which false alarms result) are both normal 
and equal in their variance (pp140 Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). The low incidence of false 
alarms suggested that this assumption may not have been valid, as did likely imbalances of 
trial numbers in the stimulus-present vs. stimulus-absent conditions (e.g. owing to trials being 
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excluded owing to TMS-induced blinks or different classes of stimuli). For these reasons a 
non-parametric form of SDT was employed throughout these experiments (Corwin, 1994).  
 
Although A’ and B” (Pollack & Norman, 1964; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999 ; eq 1.6 
and 1.7) are non-parametric SDT measures and thus not subject to parametric assumptions of 
d’ and β, they nevertheless cope poorly with zero FARs or maximal HRs, again because such 
levels of detection would require division by 0 (see eq 1.6 and eq 1.7). For this reason, the 
simpler measures of Pr and Br (Corwin, 1994, eq 1.8. and 1.9) were used here as they are 
appropriate for low FARs, make fewer statistical assumptions, and have a far greater 
tolerance to imbalances in the ratio of stimulus-present to stimulus-absent trials (Corwin, 
1994). Here Pr was used as an alternative to d’ that is range-compatible with the proportion 
of correct ‘unseen’ discriminations in the forced choice task (1.3.2.3). The measure Br was 
adopted for bias, being approximately equivalent to β or C. 
 
if  HR≥FAR  
Aᇱ ൌ  0.5 ൅ 
ሺሺHR െ FARሻሺ1 ൅ HR െ FARሻሻ
ሺ4HRሺ1 െ FARሻሻ
 
else 
Aᇱ ൌ  0.5 െ 
ሺሺFAR െ HRሻሺ1 ൅ FAR െ HRሻሻ
4FARሺ1 െ HRሻ
 
         eq 1.6 
 
if HR≥FAR  
Bᇱᇱ ൌ  
ሺHRሺ1 െ HRሻ െ FARሺ1 െ FARሻሻ
ሺHRሺ1 െ HRሻ ൅ FARሺ1 െ FARሻሻ
 
else 
Bᇱᇱ ൌ  
ሺFARሺ1 െ FARሻ െ HRሺ1 െ HRሻሻ
ሺFARሺ1 െ FARሻ ൅ HRሺ1 െ HRሻሻ
 
         eq 1.7 
Pr ൌ HR െ FAR 
         eq 1.8  
Br ൌ  
FAR
ሺ1 െ ሺHR െ FARሻሻ
 
         eq 1.9  
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Eq 1.6 and 1.7 taken from Snodgrass & Corwin, (1988). Eq 1.8 and 1.9 taken from 
Corwin, (1994). 
 
 
 
1.3.2.3 Discrimination 
 
In deciding which discrimination judgments to incorporate in the measures of 
capacity which may persist when consciousness is suppressed, there two options are 
available. The first approach is to analyse all discrimination judgments; the alternative is to 
focus exclusively only on discrimination performance when subjects report the target as 
‘unseen’. Both approaches have been previously adopted. Classic blindsight studies (e.g. 
Weiskrantz, 1986) often opt for the use of all forced choice discrimination trials. However, 
since subjects rarely, if ever, report awareness in classic blindsight, the two measures would 
be expected to produce equivalent results. Studies of subliminal processing also often use all 
available trials to demonstrate perceptual abilities but may also assess the absence of 
awareness separately (e.g. Sumner, Tsai, Yu, & Nachev, 2006, for review see Kouider & 
Dehaene, 2007). The use of all discrimination trials has also been applied to the closely 
related, yet distinct, contrast between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ measures of detection (e.g. 
de Graaf, Goebel, & Sack, 2012); this distinction is discussed in section 4.4 and appendix A6. 
TMS-induced blindsight studies, which contrast conscious awareness with perception lacking 
in awareness, tend to use ‘unseen’ trials only in the demonstration of preserved abilities 
(Boyer, et al., 2005; Ro, et al., 2004). 
 
Discrimination ability on reportedly ‘seen’ trials is arguably uninformative because 
subjects are invariably at ceiling; mean percentage correct for ‘seen’ discrimination in the 
first off-line TMS experiment (section 2.1) was 97.7% ± 0.53% (SD). This positive aspect of 
a report is unsurprising – if a subject sees an arrow and is aware of the experience, they tend 
correctly to judge its direction. Moreover, if the measure of discrimination includes 
conditions in which subjects are aware of the stimulus, then a genuine dissociation between 
detection and discrimination would be obscured because ‘seeing’ the stimulus more (or less) 
often would coincide with an increase (or decrease) in discrimination ability. Thus, the key 
measure of perception independent of consciousness is required to be discrimination on 
‘unseen’ trials. In addition, to ensure that discrimination performance indexes perceptual 
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processing, reportedly ‘unseen’ performance must remain above chance in the control 
conditions (as was confirmed for these stimuli during pilot experiments). For these reasons 
discrimination responses were categorised according to whether or not they occurred on trials 
when the subject reported having seen the stimulus (‘seen’ or ‘unseen’). ‘Seen’ trials were 
then removed from the analysis to produce a measure of ‘unseen’ discrimination. 
 
The categorisation of the discrimination judgment according to the detection question 
has consequences for inferential statistical power: within any set number of trials, the greater 
the proportion of conscious detections then the lower the proportion of ‘unseen’ 
discriminations. This discrepancy between the measures can often be overcome by increasing 
the numbers of trials, although this adjustment is subject to limitations (as discussed in 
Chapter 2). Statistical tests can also be applied to confirm that the two measures are 
appropriately comparable in power. One such approach is to compare the variance of the two 
measures based on these trial numbers (Keppel, 1982). In particular, Keppel recommends that 
the ratio of standard error estimates should not exceed 3:1 if the measures are to be 
considered comparable. This approach was used in the on-line experiments in particular (e.g. 
see section 3.3).  
 
With these considerations in mind, the number of trials per cell of the study design 
was determined by calculating the number of trials required to demonstrate above chance 
performance on ‘unseen’ trials. To determine this, a power analysis was applied based on a χ2 
distribution of performance on ‘unseen’ trials. As can be seen in figure 1.3.2.3.1, the benefit 
in terms of the likelihood of demonstrating above chance performance, conferred by adding 
additional trials, began to plateau from ~25 trials. Subjects were thresholded to detection 
levels at which they reported not having seen the arrow on approximately 25% of all trials. 
Therefore, the number of trials required for any one experimental condition was 
approximately 100 trials, which was usually rounded up to ~120 trials. 
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Figure 1.3.2.3.1 Illustration of the performance (proportion correct ratio) required to 
demonstrate above chance performance (α = 0.05), given the number of ‘unseen’ 
trials, using a χ2 test. 
 
SDT can also be applied to the forced choice discrimination questions (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 1990) by calculating detection sensitivity to left arrows and bias towards saying 
‘left’, or likewise for right arrows. For example, in terms of left arrows, the number of hits, 
false alarms, correct rejections and misses can be calculated according to Table 1.3.2.3.1 
(below). These calculations were only used to ensure that subjects were performing the task 
as instructed (i.e. not simply giving the same response on all trials during which they felt they 
could not see the arrow). The measure used to quantify ‘unseen’ abilities in these experiments 
(PcU) was the proportion-correct performance of the ‘left/right’ decision, when subjects 
reported not having seen the arrow.  
 
Table 1.3.2.3.1 Table of SDT classification used to ensure subjects performance. 
 Hit 
False 
alarm 
Correct 
Rejection Miss 
Response ‘Left’ ‘Left’ ‘Right’ ‘Right’ 
Stimulus Left Right Right Left 
 
It is worth noting that describing these abilities as unseen in the literal sense is 
potentially misleading and can be considered incorrect because the fact that subjects perform 
above chance means they still see the stimuli (Dretske, 2000). This is why, throughout the 
thesis, ‘unseen’ is used as the bracketing or epoché, which qualifies the term as referring to 
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the subjective state of the subject (Dapraz, 1999; Dennett, 1991; Lutz, 2003; Varela, et al., 
1991). That is, objectively the stimuli are seen / perceived, but in terms of the subjective 1st 
person perspective they are ‘unseen’. Bracketing moves the subjective report into the 3rd 
person domain. There is also the possibility of describing these abilities in terms of 
unconscious or subliminal processing, which is perfectly acceptable (see Dehaene, Changeux, 
Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006 for synopsis), but describing them as lacking in 
consciousness and reportedly ‘unseen’ is less controversial and captures the important 
elements of the task performance. 
 
 
1.3.3 What do we define as blindsight?  
 
 What pattern of responses should we consider corresponds to TMS-induced 
blindsight? In classic lesion-based blindsight, where the suppression of conscious awareness 
is essentially permanent and absolute, subjects’ conscious detection of stimuli will always 
approximate to a d’ (eq 1.3) or Pr (eq 1.8) of 0, and their forced choice discrimination ability 
(which demonstrates blindsight) will dissociate and be greater than 0 (Cowey, 2010; 
Weiskrantz, 1986). TMS-induced blindsight, on the other hand, is a relative state revealed by 
the difference between active and control conditions. As such, the way in which blindsight 
manifests upon the measure of conscious detection is one of differential suppression between 
experimental conditions, with reportedly ‘unseen’ discrimination remaining above chance 
and relatively unaffected by TMS (Weiskrantz, 2001, 2009).  
 
 The possibility of reducing conscious detection to a d’ or Pr of 0 is clearly preferable 
in terms of interpretation, as it allows greater confidence that the concurrent ‘unseen’ ability 
approaches a complete lack of awareness (Eriksen, 1960). However, such a conservative 
definition of blindsight is neither necessary nor practical: a dissociable effect of TMS on the 
two measures can be demonstrated independently of whether detection is fully abolished. 
Furthermore, simply reporting the stimuli as ‘unseen’ indicates that subjects were less 
consciously aware of the stimuli than when ‘seen’, highlighting the relative difference upon 
which the experiments are based. Finally, to my knowledge, none of the previous 
demonstrations of TMS-induced blindsight have reported complete elimination of conscious 
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detection (Boyer, et al., 2005; Christensen, et al., 2008; Jolij & Lamme, 2005; Ro, et al., 
2004). 
 
 Demonstrations of blindsight in ‘normal observers’ are often based on masking 
paradigms which dissociate consciousness and performance (e.g. Lau & Passingham, 2006). 
However, whether or not this dissociation is complete and should be termed blindsight is 
controversial (for contrasting interpretations of data compare (Kolb & Braun, 1995; Lau & 
Passingham, 2006) to (Morgan, Mason, & Solomon, 1997; Robichaud & Stelmach, 2003)). 
Independently of whether or not these experiments failed or succeeded in demonstrating 
blindsight in ‘normal observers’, they all have a common approach; they do not seek to 
obtain complete suppressions of conscious detection type measures (Kolb & Braun, 1995; 
Lau & Passingham, 2006; Morgan, et al., 1997; Robichaud & Stelmach, 2003), but rather 
seek to demonstrate blindsight through a relative dissociation between subjective detection 
and accuracy performance under a task condition such as masking or rivalry. 
  
 Defining TMS-induced blindsight as a complete absence of conscious detection (i.e. 
Pr ~ 0 criteria) does not take account of baseline levels of performance. That is, if the levels 
of performance in the baseline condition were relatively high, then even large suppressions 
specific to conscious awareness might not be classed as blindsight. On the other hand, were 
baseline performance to be lower, much smaller effects would be classed as blindsight. 
Hence what is classed as blindsight might only depend upon the baseline condition. I 
therefore adopted the relative functional definition of blindsight as a statistically significant 
drop in the measure of conscious detection, while under the same experimental conditions, 
subjects’ reportedly ‘unseen’ performance was unaffected or differentially affected, but 
above chance. 
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Chapter 2. Off-line experiments 
The effects of continuous Theta Burst Stimulation on gating 
consciousness: a combined TMS, MEG and MRS study. 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
 These experiments originally aimed to demonstrate blindsight type effects following a 
repetitive TMS (rTMS) protocol that is thought to reduce cortical excitability, in areas similar 
to those affected by lesions in classic blindsight. However, results indicated that rTMS had 
the opposite effect to that predicted: conscious detection increased (section 2.2). This 
counterintuitive finding therefore merited replication and further investigation. Subsequent 
experiments included the same behavioural and TMS paradigm in combination with 
magnetoencephalographic (MEG) recording and magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) to 
investigate the electrophysiological and neurochemical basis of the observed effects.  
 This chapter begins with the report of the initial behavioural experiment (2A section 
2.2) which is followed by a preliminary discussion of the effects on vision (2.3). Subsequent 
experiments to uncover the basis of these behavioural effects are then described (sections 2.4-
6). Collectively, these comprised three experiments: a study of how rTMS influences the 
excitability of the visual cortex, (2B section 2.4), an MRS experiment to study how rTMS 
influences neurochemistry (2C section 2.5) and an MEG experiment (2D section 2.6), that 
includes a behavioural replication of the initial finding (2.6.1). These are then followed by a 
section-specific general discussion (2.7) that encompasses all of the off-line TMS 
experiments. Finally, I discuss the limitations of the behavioural paradigm (2.8), which 
informed modifications to the design in the subsequent on-line TMS experiments (Chapter 3). 
Additional analyses and relationships between measures are reported in appendix A1-3. 
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2.2 Behavioural experiment (2A) 
 
2.2.1 Introduction  
 
Blindsight has been one of the most informative conditions in recent investigations of 
consciousness (e.g. Block, 1995; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Lamme, 2001; Lau & 
Passingham, 2006). As previously described (1.2.2) patients with blindsight typically present 
with lesions to their early visual cortex and do not acknowledge conscious awareness of 
stimuli presented, yet can demonstrate residual perceptual abilities in forced choice tasks 
(Sanders, et al., 1974; Weiskrantz, 1986). Blindsight thus corresponds to a lack of conscious 
awareness that dissociates from residual perceptual abilities, highlighting the role of the 
affected brain regions in conscious processing. 
 Previous demonstrations of TMS-induced blindsight are based upon the application of 
single- or double-pulse TMS, which have been used to disrupt conscious processing through 
disruption of early visual areas at various times relative to stimulus onset (e.g. Boyer, et al., 
2005). Continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) is an alternative ‘off-line’ repetitive TMS 
protocol that is thought to reduce cortical excitability and alter GABAergic function for 
approximately one hour (Franca, Koch, Mochizuki, Huang, & Rothwell, 2006; Huang, 
Edwards, Rounis, Bhatia, & Rothwell, 2005; Stagg et al., 2009). Following application of 
cTBS to motor areas the TMS intensity required to elicit a motor twitch for the same motor 
area, has been shown to increase (Huang, et al., 2005).  
Here we sought to simulate an occipital lesion using cTBS within a behavioural 
paradigm capable of demonstrating blindsight-type effects. To this end we presented subjects 
with arrows and asked them in which direction the arrows were pointing and whether or not 
they were consciously aware of having seen the arrows (figure 2.2.1.1). From this was 
derived a measure of subjects’ conscious detection of the arrows (PrC, section 1.3) and their 
forced choice discrimination ability, specifically, on trials where they reported not having 
seen the arrow (PcU). A blindsight-type effect, resulting from the cTBS-induced reduction in 
cortical excitability, was expected to manifest as a reduction in conscious detection while 
leaving reportedly ‘unseen’ discrimination ability above chance and relatively intact.  
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Using a related cTBS protocol over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, Rounis et al 
(2010) demonstrated the impairment of meta-cognitive confidence judgments (Rounis, 
Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010). In addition, a suppression of similar 
capacities has been reported in a conference abstract when applying TBS to visual cortical 
areas (see Rahnev, Bahdo, Munneke, de Lange, & Lau, 2010). 
 
Figure 2.2.1.1. Experimental Design. 
A. Example of arrow stimuli, noise (stimulus-absent) and the questions. The questions 
presented on every trial were ‘Was the arrow pointing left or right?’ denoted by ‘L/R’ 
and ‘Did you see the arrow? Yes or No’ denoted by ‘Y/N’.   
B. Time course of each trial. Fixation was followed by noise alternating at 50Hz with 
a stimulus frame (20ms) displayed at 800ms on half of the trials. Responses to 
questions followed after a further 400ms of noise and were not speeded. Questions 
commenced with the ‘L/R?’ decision. 
C. Time course of the experiment. Behavioural and MEG acquisition blocks of eight 
minutes (Experiment 2A and 2D) were collapsed into 16-minute analysis blocks, to 
align with the acquisition of MRS (Experiment 2C) and phosphene threshold data 
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(Experiment 2B) acquisitions. Pre-TBS blocks were used to baseline the data (see 
section 2.2.2 for details). Active and control TMS were applied in separate sessions. 
 
2.2.2 Methods  
 
Sixteen neurologically healthy subjects participated in the first experiment, for which 
they were paid £10 per hour (5 female and 11 male, aged 22 to 35 mean 28). I was one of the 
subjects (see section 4.8.2). All provided informed consent and were screened for medical 
contraindications to TMS, including personal or family history of epilepsy (Maizey, In Press). 
This research was approved by the Ethics Committee at Cardiff University School of 
Psychology. 
Visual stimuli were presented using a Cambridge Research Systems (CRS) Visage 
and Real Time Sequencer system on a Matlab platform, via a Mitsubishi Diamond Pro 
2070sb monitor, refreshing at 100Hz, which was degaussed and regularly gamma-corrected. 
Infra-red eye tracking was carried out using a CRS 250Hz eye-tracker. Eye movements and 
pupil diameter were recorded. Two subjects were excluded from this analysis of eye-tracking 
data owing to failure of the eye-tracker to record reliable pupillometry data. Trials in which 
the subject blinked during the stimuli presentation, identified by a vertical shift in signal 
followed by a transitory loss of signal coincident with the stimuli presentation, were removed 
from the analysis. Across all subjects, this criterion resulted in the exclusion of 72 trials from 
a possible 25,600. 
 The arrow target stimulus was a 20ms increase in luminance amongst luminance noise 
(figure 2.2.1.1). Noise started 800ms prior to the target and continued for 400ms afterwards 
against a black background, alternating every 20ms within a range of 17.5 to 32.5 cd/m2.  Left 
and right arrows were presented singularly and in equal proportions, with equivalent 
luminance at the fixation point subtending the vertical meridian. The noise occupied 1.97o × 
1.97o of the visual angle and the target arrow subtended 0.90° × 1.34°. On half the trials 
(stimulus-absent condition) a noise frame supplemented the target stimulus. On each trial, 
subjects were first asked in which direction the arrow was pointing (L/R?) and then whether 
or not they were consciously aware of having seen the arrow (Y/N?) (figure 2.2.1.1). From 
these questions three measures were derived: (a) their conscious detection of the arrow (PrC); 
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(b) their discrimination ability specifically when they reported not having seen the arrow 
(PcU); and (c) their response bias (BrC, see statistical methods below). 
  The luminance of the target was titrated in a separate session prior to experimental 
days, so that subjects were consciously detecting the target at Pr = 0.6. Following a period of 
familiarisation with the task and stimuli, this involved adjusting the luminance of the stimuli 
in 20-trial runs of 80-trial blocks and repeating for approximately 15 blocks. This produced a 
psychophysical function to which a linear or sigmoidal curve was fitted (depending on 
goodness of fit), which was then solved for the threshold value. A block consisting of 80 
trials at the derived luminance value were then completed to confirm the threshold values, 
and small adjustments were made as required if performance exceeded a tolerance of ± 0.15 
Pr units. If adjustments were made, blocks were repeated at the new luminance value. For 
experimental sessions, if the performance over baseline ‘pre’ TBS blocks (see figure 
2.2.1.1.C) exceeded the tolerance, similar small adjustments were made to the luminance of 
the stimuli and the blocks repeated to maintain performance.  If performance exceeded the 
criteria after 4 blocks then the experimental session was abandoned in order to avoid 
additional fatigue effects, and the session rescheduled.  
Blocks consisted of 80 trials in a randomised order. Ten blocks were undertaken in 
each session, including two blocks prior to the application of the TBS to provide a baseline, 
and eight blocks following. Eight minutes were allocated for each block; as blocks took 
approximately 5 minutes to complete, a short rest period was included. The first block started 
1 minute 20 seconds after TBS had ended, such that data was collected up to 66 minutes after 
the TBS had started.  After every trial, subjects were asked two questions which were 
explained to them prior to testing. The two questions were: ‘Was the arrow pointing Left or 
Right?’ (the discrimination question for which they were prompted ‘L/R’), and ‘Did you 
consciously see the arrow?’ (the detection question, for which they were prompted ‘Y/N’). 
Questions were posed in that order to reduce the impact the later question might have upon 
the former. Responses were recorded via key press on a standard keyboard (response 
mapping is the same as in the participant inscriptions for the on-line studies: appendix A4). 
A round coil (Magstim High Power 90mm Coil and Magstim biphasic Ripid2 
stimulator) was used, delivering 600 pulses over 40 seconds (following Huang, et al., 2005) at 
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an intensity of 80% of the subjects’ resting motor threshold3; this corresponded to a mean 
TMS intensity of 41.7% stimulator output (± 3.6% SD). Motor threshold was established 
using the observation of movement method, and was calculated as the average across 
hemispheres (Stokes et al., 2005; Varnava, Stokes, & Chambers, 2011). Positioning was 
achieved using a miniBIRD system (Ascension Technology Corp) in conjunction with 
MRIcro, MRIreg software (Chris Rorden) and structural MRI scans (Rorden & Brett, 2000). 
TMS was targeted at the striate cortex (V1); that is, the closest scalp coordinate to the mid-
hemispheric termination of the left and right calcarine sulci, calculated with Surface 
Extraction Tool software (Version 2, Chris Chambers and Mark Stokes). However, because 
of the relatively diffuse effect of a round coil and consistent with the work of Thielscher et al 
(2010), the direct effect of this intervention in terms of magnetic induction can only 
definitively be said to be across occipital cortices (and not selectively V1). In the active cTBS 
condition the rim of the coil was positioned 2cm below the closest scalp coordinate to V1, 
which centred the rim over V1, with the handle pointing upward and side ‘B’ facing away 
from the subject. The position was closely matched in sham (control) conditions except that 
the coil was oriented horizontally and a 9mm spacer was placed between scalp and coil to 
replicate the contact artefact. The two conditions (active and sham) occurred on different 
days, the order of which was counter balanced between subjects. This protocol was used in all 
subsequent applications of TBS. 
Statistical methods.  
Behavioural blocks of 8 minutes were concatenated into blocks of 16 minutes to 
improve the power / reliability of individual data points and to align the behavioural 
experiment with subsequent MRS acquisitions (see Experiment 2C, section 2.5). 
The behavioural measures were obtained via the application of non-parametric SDT to 
the subjects’ responses (Corwin, 1994; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). 
Non-parametric SDT was used because of imbalances in stimulus conditions and response 
profiles, which violated the assumptions of classic SDT (Corwin, 1994). The measure of 
subjects’ conscious detection (PrC) was taken as the veridical acknowledged sensitivity to the 
                                                            
3 The motor thresholds used were collected by members of Cardiff University TMS-group according 
to the methods set out in (Stokes et al., 2005; Varnava, Stokes, & Chambers, 2011) and the Cardiff 
University TMS lab manual. Contributors to the motor threshold database therefore may include, 
myself, Alice Varnava, Chris Chambers, Frederick Verbruggen, Leah Maizey, Mark Stokes, Martynas 
Dervinis, Michail Kozlov and Rachel Adams. 
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arrow’s presence. The application of SDT was therefore as follows: acknowledged awareness 
in the presence of an arrow was a ‘hit’; acknowledged awareness when no arrow was 
presented was a ‘false alarm’; denial of awareness when no arrow was presented was a 
‘correct rejection’; and denial of awareness when there was an arrow present was a ‘miss’. 
The same allocations of SDT classes were used in the measure of response bias in conscious 
detection (BrC). The measure of ‘unseen’ discrimination ability was derived from the 
subject’s left/right proportion correct performance, only when subjects reported not having 
seen the arrow (PcU). Bias in left/right discrimination was also calculated (for left bias) but 
this measure was only used to ensure that subjects were performing the task as instructed. 
Effects of cTBS were assessed using repeated measures ANOVAs for each measure in 
the analysis. The dependent variable therefore consisted of the measure of interest for each 
post TBS block baselined to pre TBS levels. The factors for the ANOVA were TMS site (2 
levels, active vs. control) and time since the TMS (4 levels, 2-18, 18-34, 34-50, 50-66 
minutes). The experimental hypotheses are represented by the factor of TMS site. Of 
secondary concern was the development of these effects over the course of the experiment 
(TMS site × TMS time) and the purely time-dependent effects. For this reason the effects of 
TMS ‘site’ are reported in the first instance. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p values are 
reported. The analyses were applied to measures separately as they informed independent 
hypotheses. All subsequent analyses of other dependent variables conform to this structure, 
unless otherwise stated. 
 ‘Unseen’ performance was compared to chance using  single sample t-tests applied to 
each block and appropriate Holm-Bonferroni corrections applied for the multiple blocks / 
comparisons (Holm, 1979). 
Outliers were identified and excluded on the basis of Chauvenet’s criterion (Taylor, 
1997), applied to the dependent variable capable of representing a TMS dependent effect. 
Specifically, a vector was constructed that included active cTBS minus control (sham) cTBS, 
averaged across post-TBS blocks and further subtracted from the pre-TBS baseline. This 
provided a single measure per subject representing the distribution in effect sizes following 
cTBS. If the probability of any subject’s data within this group vector, times the number of 
samples in that group, was less than 0.5 then the subject’s data was excluded from the 
analysis of that measure. This resulted in the exclusion of a single subject’s data from the 
analyses involving PrC, BrC and PcU.  
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2.2.3 Results  
 
 To reiterate, the experimental hypothesis was that conscious detection should be 
suppressed by the application of the cTBS to the occipital lobe; in other words, there should 
be a reduction in PrC following active TMS compared to control TMS. If concurrent ‘unseen’ 
abilities remain above chance but unaffected by disruption, this would fit the expected profile 
of a blindsight type effect.  The central measures for this experiment were therefore conscious 
detection and ‘unseen’ discrimination. Both dependent variables were initially baselined to 
pre-TBS levels within session, thus taking into account day-to-day differences in 
performance. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, conscious detection of stimuli increased following 
application of cTBS relative to sham (site effect: F(1,14) =14.015, p=0.002, figure 2.2.3.1). The 
ability to discriminate the arrow’s direction on trials when the subject reported not having 
seen the arrow, remained above chance over all experimental blocks (all t(15) >7.170, all 
p<0.001, relative to a initial Holm-Bonferroni corrected alpha level of 0.005). This ‘unseen’ 
discrimination ability appeared to be unaffected by the application of the cTBS (site effect: 
F(1,14) =0.041, p=0.843, figure 2.2.3.2). The effect, being specific to the measure of conscious 
detection, in contrast to above chance ‘unseen’ discrimination ability, is of the same class as 
TMS-induced blindsight (e.g. Ro, et al., 2004) but is in the opposite direction: subjects were 
more aware of the arrow stimuli following a neuronally suppressive intervention. This was 
the central finding of Experiment 2A. 
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Figure 2.2.3.1. Effects of cortical stimulation on conscious detection (PrC) in 
Experiment 2A. The dependent variable is the change in PrC from the pre-TBS 
baseline following cTBS and control (sham) stimulation, illustrating the increase in 
PrC following cTBS relative to control. Error bars are within-subject standard error 
(Loftus & Masson, 1994; Masson & Loftus, 2003). Time corresponds to the 4 analysis 
blocks collected after the TBS was applied. All subsequent line plots in this chapter 
conform to this structure. 
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Figure 2.2.3.2. Change in proportion correct in ‘unseen’ discrimination (PcU) in 
Experiment 2A from pre-TBS baseline following cTBS and control (sham) 
stimulation. 
The critical effect in terms of the hypothesis was the main effect of TMS site. 
However it is possible that this effect could evolve over the course of the experiment as 
illustrated by a potential site × time interaction. Since the effects of cTBS are thought to last 
for approximately the full course of the experiment, no predictions were cast in terms of the 
evolution of TMS over time and no corresponding interactions were observed on the main 
measures (PrC site × time interaction: F(3,42) =0.369, p=0.755; PcU site × time interaction: 
F(3,42) = 0.352, p=0.729). However, following both control and active stimulation, a 
significant decline in conscious detection performance throughout the course of the 
experiment was observed (PrC time effect: F(3,42) =6.511, p=0.002). No time-dependent 
change was observed for ‘unseen’ discrimination (PcU time effect: F(3,42) =1.738, p=0.195). 
The drop in detection over the course of the experiment suggests fatigue, as did the discursive 
reports made by the subjects following the experiment. Consistent with this interpretation, 
which does not inform the main experimental hypothesis, are changes observed upon other 
measures associated with fatigue detailed in section 2.6.2 and appendix A2. 
 Asking subjects whether or not they were subjectively aware of stimuli, together with 
knowledge of stimulus presence/absence, enabled us to look at another secondary aspect of 
the subject’s experience of the task, in addition to the contrast between conscious detection 
and perception lacking in awareness. That is, their response criteria or bias, quantified here as 
BrC (Corwin, 1994). Interpretations of what changes in bias refer to are diverse and 
controversial (cf. Campion, et al., 1983; Weiskrantz, 2001, discussed further in section 4.3 to 
4.4). However, it seems to have been generally accepted that removing bias from measures of 
conscious detection makes changes in measures simpler to interpret, as was implemented here 
for the PrC measure.  
Subjects reported seeing the stimuli more often irrespective of stimulus 
presence/absence following active TMS relative to sham (TMS site effect on the measure of 
bias in conscious detection: F(1,14) =6.772, p=0.021, see figure 2.2.3.3). There was also a 
general tendency to respond positively less often towards the end of the experiment (time 
effect: F(3,42) =5.585, p=0.015), again suggestive of fatigue. This change did not interact with 
the TMS dependent effect (site × time interaction: F(3,42) =1.386, p=0.267). One subject, 
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expressing a shift toward reporting ‘no’ more often following the application of the TMS, was 
excluded as an outlier from this analysis according to Chauvenet’s criterion.  
 
 
Figure 2.2.3.3. Change in response criteria / bias in conscious report (BrC), from pre-
TBS baseline following cTBS and control (sham) stimulation. 
 
2.3 Preliminary discussion and introduction to 
subsequent experiments 
 
Contrary to the initial hypothesis, conscious detection of the stimuli increased 
following the application of cTBS relative to the sham control condition. ‘Unseen’ 
discrimination remained above chance but appeared to be unaffected by the TMS. The 
increase in conscious detection as a result of suppression was counterintuitive and thus 
warranted replication and further exploration (sections 2.4-6).  
A common assumption is that increased activity in sensory cortical areas indicates 
increased conscious representations (e.g. Polonsky, Blake, Braun, & Heeger, 2000). 
However, it is possible that of equal importance is the negative aspect, that is, active 
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suppression of sensory representations relative to others is crucial for consciousness. That is, 
the quieting down or active inhibition of neuronal processes may be conducive to optimal 
detection. We hypothesised that this negative aspect of selection in the determination or 
gating of conscious percepts might explain the increase in detection, whilst being consistent 
with cTBS being a suppressive protocol. This is henceforth denoted as the gating-by-
inhibition hypothesis. This hypothesis therefore became the focus of the subsequent 
investigation, in which we also replicated the original effect and explored alternative 
explanations, such as increased arousal and increased cortical excitability.  
We applied the behavioural and TMS paradigms in the context of 
magnetoencephalographic (MEG) recording (Experiment 2D). Of particular interest were 
changes in oscillatory activity in the alpha band (6-12Hz). The alpha band has been 
associated with the active suppression of task irrelevant and superfluous activity (Foxe & 
Snyder, 2011; Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; Varela, Toro, John, & Schwartz, 1981). The 
principal induced oscillatory response in the alpha band is the Event Related 
Desynchronisation (ERD; Pfurtscheller, Neuper, & Mohl, 1994) which can be seen as 
representative of a gating mechanism (Pfurtscheller, 1992): it is a shift from a synchronised 
state, where suppression is imposed by the alpha oscillation, to a less synchronised state 
following the presentation of stimuli. The gating by inhibition hypothesis therefore predicts 
that the ERD might be facilitated following the application of cTBS (section 2.6.4). 
Active suppression almost certainly involves the principle inhibitory neurotransmitter 
Gamma-Aminobutyric Acid (GABA).  Magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) can quantify 
in vivo GABA concentration and has previously been used to demonstrate that levels of 
GABA increase following the application of cTBS to motor areas (Stagg, et al., 2009). 
Replication of this functional change in GABA over occipital areas would be consistent both 
with cTBS having a neuronally suppressive effect and with the gating by inhibition 
hypothesis for the increase in conscious detection (Experiment 2C section 2.5). 
The ERD and GABA measures were therefore designed to provide evidence which 
informed the gating by inhibition hypothesis. Three further independent hypotheses were 
probed with additional measures. First, replication in the MEG allowed us to probe the 
possibility that cTBS might be effective in increasing neuronal responses to stimuli, rather 
than in suppressing neuronal noise (the increased response hypothesis). Later evoked 
responses were collected and have previously been associated with the processing of 
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conscious signals (Del Cul, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2007; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003; Melloni 
et al., 2007; Niedeggen, Wichmann, & Stoerig, 2001; Quiroga, Mukamel, Isham, Malach, & 
Fried, 2008).Therefore cTBS increasing late evoked responses might be taken as evidence for 
increased excitatory signals and responses, contrary to the gating hypothesis (detailed in 
section 2.6.3).  
Another alternative hypothesis for the mechanism by which cTBS might be affecting 
conscious detection was the possibility that cTBS may increase general cortical excitability 
and possibly add noise to the affected regions. This could lead to an increased probability of 
any particular representation crossing a threshold for detection, as it would be boosted by the 
increased background activity. This would be a ‘stochastic resonance’ type effect and has 
previously been suggested as the mechanism by which on-line TMS can enhance visual 
detection (Schwarzkopf, Silvanto, & Rees, 2011). Such an interpretation of increasing the 
likelihood of crossing a threshold for detection, irrespective of the stimulus condition, may 
also be consistent with the finding that response criteria was more liberal following the 
application of cTBS. In order to quantify levels of cortical excitability a separate experiment 
probed the effect of cTBS on the intensity of subsequent occipital TMS in eliciting visual 
perceptions known as phosphenes. The gating-by-inhibition hypothesis would predict an 
increased phosphene threshold (PT) following cTBS (Franca, et al., 2006) and a stochastic 
resonance or increased excitability based explanation might predict a reduction (Experiment 
2B, section 2.4).  
The final alternative explanation for the mechanism by which cTBS was affecting 
conscious detection was the possibility of it increasing levels of arousal. According to the 
arousal hypothesis, this could arise owing to the subject’s expectations of cTBS and the 
generally ineffective blinding of active vs. sham conditions in TMS designs. Such a ‘reactive’ 
process (Ericsson, 2003, see section 4.3 for clarification) might operate independently of the 
direct neuronal effects of the TMS. We quantified arousal in both the original and replication 
of the behavioural effects through the concurrent measurement of pupil diameter commonly 
linked with autonomic arousal (Bradshaw, 1967). If the enhancement of conscious vision was 
caused by a general arousal effect then cTBS should increase pupil diameter relative to sham 
(section 2.6.2). 
To anticipate, the ERD and GABA concentration were each potentiated following the 
application of the cTBS, whereas the three other hypotheses received no support. 
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Collectively, these experiments indicated that selection via inhibition is an important element 
in determining the conscious fate of representations. 
 
2.4 Phosphene threshold experiment (2B) 
 
2.4.1 Introduction  
 
 Phosphenes are percepts generated by activation of neurons in the visual cortex. To 
test the suppressive effect of cTBS at the neuronal level we used the stimulator intensity 
required to elicit phosphenes, known as phosphene threshold (PT), as a measure of intrinsic 
cortical excitability (Franca, et al., 2006). Although cTBS has been previously shown 
suppressive effects (Franca, et al., 2006; Huang, et al., 2005), it is possible that the cTBS 
applied here had the opposite effect; reversals of the expected effect (from suppression to 
facilitation) have been demonstrated when the levels of TMS used have been lowered 
(Abrahamyan, Clifford, Arabzadeh, & Harris, 2011). Here, the absolute stimulator output 
used was (42.42% of maximum ±7.35SD), which is less than those of previously reported 
suppressions  by cTBS (45.68% of maximum ±10.88SD, Franca, et al., 2006).  
 
2.4.2 Methods 
  
 Twelve subjects participated in Experiment 2B (aged 20 to 41, mean age=24, 7 
females), three of whom also participated in behavioural experiments. The apparatus for this 
experiment is as described in the preceding section (2.2.2) unless otherwise stated. 
 The intensity of a single TMS pulse required to elicit a phosphene (PT) depends on 
the levels of cortical excitability within that region. The method used here resembled that of 
Franca et al., (2006). First, we assessed subjects’ susceptibility to phosphenes within safety 
limits (160% of motor threshold, MT). The coil was initially positioned using the miniBird 
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system and tripod as in the main experiment, with single pulses applied at 120% of MT. If 
stimulation did not elicit phosphenes that the subject reported as being ‘reasonably clear’ the 
coil was moved until it did so, while minimising the distance to the original coil position. 
This location was recorded using a Brainsight system (Rogue Research Inc.) based on the 
subjects’ anatomical MRI scans (collected on a 3T whole-body General Electric scanner). An 
approximate PT was obtained using an up-down staircase method, applying single pulses 
approximately every 5 seconds, starting at 50% of maximum output and adjusting TMS 
intensity in steps of 5%, then 2%, then 1%, so that subjects verbally reported seeing 5 
phosphenes from 10 pulses. This level was then used as the basis of the more accurate 
thresholds where the number of reported phosphenes arising out of 10 pulses was recorded at 
-10, -5, 0, +5, +10 and +15% of the estimated PT. The orders of these sets of 10 pulses were 
randomised and the full range of intensities was repeated three times in separate runs 
separated by short breaks. The coil was repositioned at the start of each run. Averaging across 
runs yielded a function representing the number of phosphenes out of 10 over a range of 
intensities, to which a curve was fitted (sigmoid or linear depending on goodness of fit). 
Solving this curve for 5/10 phosphenes thus provided the PT.  
 These sets of three runs comprised a block of data, collected over 16 minutes, 
corresponding to the timing of the MRS acquisition (section 2.5.2) where one block was 
taken before the cTBS and three were acquired afterward. Three rather than four post-cTBS 
blocks were completed because, even with three post cTBS blocks, the quantity of TMS 
applied approached the limit permitted by the local ethics committee (based on Wassermann, 
1998 and Maizey et al, In Press). Again, sham and active cTBS were applied on separate 
days, the order of which was counterbalanced across subjects. The mean intensity at which 
the cTBS was applied for this group was 42.4% ± 7.4 SD. 
 
2.4.3 Results  
 
 The TMS intensity required to elicit phosphenes increased significantly following the 
application of cTBS relative to controls (site effect: F(1,11) =5.395, p=0.040, figure. 2.4.3.1).  
No time dependent effects were observed (site × time interaction: F(2,22) =1.59, p=0.23, time 
effect: F(2,22) =1.59, p=0.23). 
46 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.3.1. Change in phosphene threshold from pre-TBS levels, in Experiment 
2B, following occipital cTBS and control stimulation.  
 
 These results are consistent with the expected inhibitory effect of cTBS, replicating 
previous observations (Franca, et al., 2006; Huang, et al., 2005). An explanation of the cTBS-
induced enhancement of awareness in Experiment 2A according to increased excitability or 
stochastic resonance is therefore inconsistent with this data. The relationship between 
increased phosphene threshold and decreased threshold for conscious detection is discussed in 
section 2.7. 
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2.5 Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy 
experiment (2C) 
 
2.5.1 Introduction 
 
 Critical to the balance between neuronal excitation and suppression is the inhibitory 
neurotransmitter GABA. For example, many drugs used in the control of epilepsy target the 
GABAergic system, and its dysfunction appears to be the cause of some forms of epilepsy 
(Baulac et al., 2001). At the molecular / synaptic level, GABA increases chlorine flux across 
the neuronal membrane, hyperpolarising cells, making them less susceptible to excitatory 
input. 
  The GABA molecule (H3N+CH2CH2CH2COO-) has a magnetic resonance signature 
that can be measured using magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS). The pairs of carbon 
bound hydrogens occupy an almost (see methods) unique electromagnetic environment. The 
relaxation of their alignment with a strong magnetic field, following a radio frequency pulse,  
produces a response in the magnetic response spectra at 1.9, 2.3 and 3 ppm (parts per million 
of the proton frequency). The magnitude of the response, following editing (see methods), is 
proportional to levels of GABA concentration (see Puts & Edden, 2012). 
 This technique has revealed an increase in GABA concentration following cTBS of 
the motor cortex (Stagg, et al., 2009), raising the question of whether such effects are 
reproducible in non-motor cortical areas. Furthermore, the MRS applied to functional changes 
in GABA is a relatively new and unconfirmed approach, the implementation of which can 
differ widely between laboratories.  For example, Stagg et al., calibrated their quantification 
of GABA according to in situ N-acetylaspartate levels, whereas here, as in many previous 
MRS studies (Puts & Edden, 2012), GABA concentration was normalised relative to water. 
Therefore, the reliability of MRS in terms of reproducibility of effects is central to the 
development and trustworthiness of the technique as a whole.  
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 The measurement of GABA offers the opportunity to assess the brain’s governance of 
the balance between excitation and inhibition. In addition to testing the replicability and 
generalizability of the findings by Stagg et al., the current experiment sought to contrast two 
competing hypotheses as to the effect cTBS might have. If the application of cTBS increases 
excitability, with the increase in conscious detection possibly operating through a stochastic 
resonance mechanism, then an overall decrease in occipital GABA concentration might be 
expected. In contrast, if the same TMS protocol that increased conscious detection also leads 
to an increase in GABA concentration, then the results would favour an explanation in terms 
of a potentiated inhibitory gating system.  
 
2.5.2 Methods  
  
 Data was collected from 18 subjects (aged 21 to 40, mean 26, 7 female), of whom 12 
participated in the behavioural experiment (2A), and 10 in the MEG experiment (2D).  
 MRS data were acquired on a GE 3 Tesla MRI scanner over two separate sessions 
corresponding to cTBS and sham control conditions, which were counterbalanced across 
subjects. The mean TMS intensity used was 40.8% ± 5.0SD. 
 Four MRS acquisitions were undertaken per session, the first prior to cTBS to provide 
a within-subject, within-session baseline.  The three following cTBS ran consecutively, 
commencing 2 minutes 40 seconds after the start of the cTBS. Before the pre-cTBS MRS 
acquisition, subjects’ T1-weighted anatomical scan (1 mm3 isotropic resolution) were 
collected. This allowed positioning of the MRS voxel, which was a 3cm × 3cm × 3cm volume 
centred over V1 defined by the calcarine sulcus, as with TMS targeting. The voxel was then 
moved toward the centre of the head in order to avoid non-brain tissue, and dorsally, so that 
the lower edge followed the cortical surface and did not enter the cerebellum (figure 2.5.2.1). 
This voxel position was recorded relative to anatomical landmarks in three dimensions using 
a screen shot and repeated for subsequent acquisitions. The cTBS was performed in the MRI 
control room and the subject was then immediately transferred to the scanner. The first MRS 
acquisition commenced 3 minutes 40 seconds after the start of the TBS and was preceded by 
localisation and calibration scans (1 minute), allowing repositioning of the voxel. Each MRS 
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acquisition lasted 16 minutes and comprised a MEGA-PRESS (Mescher, Merkle, Kirsch, 
Garwood, & Gruetter, 1998) spectral sequence consisting of 512 transients (TE = 68ms, TR = 
1800) and 8 unsuppressed water transients (PRESS). During the MEGA-PRESS sequence 
Gaussian GABA editing pulses (alternating at 1.9 and 7.5 ppm) were applied to the standard 
magnetic resonance spectra in order to isolate the spine coupling of the GABA molecule from 
the response due to glutamate, glutamine, creatine and N-acetyl aspartate, which lie at 
approximately the same position on the chemical shift spectra (Puts & Edden, 2012). During 
the MRS acquisitions all subjects watched the same film and did not perform any behavioural 
task. 
 GABA concentration was quantified using the Gannet analysis tool kit (Puts & Edden, 
2012) applied to the MEGA-PRESS edited spectra (figure 2.5.2.2). This involved fitting a 
Gaussian curve to the GABA peak at 3ppm with a liner baseline component, where the area 
under the curve, relative to that of water, allowed quantification of GABA concentration in 
institutional units (see Mescher, et al., 1998).   
 Sessions containing clearly low quality data were repeated (2 sessions, owing to 
subject movement during acquisition). Fit quality was improved by manual phasing of the 
spectra where the experimenter was blind to the TMS condition.  Because I was aware in 
some cases of which spectra corresponded to which condition, and because the manual 
phasing technique is developed with practice, it was completed by Dr C J Evans (MRI lab 
manager, CUBRIC). 
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Figure 2.5.2.1. Illustration of the typical MRS voxel placement in Experiment 2C, as 
shown in the sagittal view of one participant. 
 
Figure 2.5.2.2. Illustration of model fitting applied to MEGA-PRESS edited spectra 
that allowed for quantification of GABA concentration. Units are parts per million 
(ppm) of proton frequency. Glx is the combined glutamate and glutamine peak. 
NAA is the peak caused by N-acetyl aspartate.  
 
2.5.3 Results  
 
Baseline-corrected GABA concentration in occipital cortex increased significantly 
following the application of occipital cTBS relative to sham cTBS (site effect: F(1,16) =5.347, 
p= 0.034, figure 2.5.3.1). No time-dependent effects were observed (site × time interaction: 
F(2,22) =0.416, p=0.603, time effect: F(2,32) =0.347, p=0.656). One outlier was rejected from this 
data set on the basis of Chauvenet’s criterion. 
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Figure 2.5.3.1. Change in GABA concentration in Experiment 2C. The ordinate 
indicates change in GABA in institutional units (i.u) relative to the pre-TBS baseline, 
plotted according to the TMS condition (occipital cTBS vs. Sham control) and time 
after stimulation (mins). 
 
 These findings replicate the increase in GABA concentration in motor cortex 
following cTBS of M1 (Stagg, et al., 2009) and, moreover, are consistent with the hypothesis 
that an increase in inhibitory processes may underlie the enhancement of conscious detection 
following occipital cTBS. As with Experiment 2B, the results run counter to the hypothesis 
that cTBS increases cortical excitability.   
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2.6 Magnetoencephalography experiment (2D) 
 
 This section includes four sub-sections that report the outcome of different questions 
addressed in Experiment 2D. The first section (2.6.1) describes the replication of the 
behavioural effects of cTBS, carried out inside the MEG scanner. The second section (2.6.2) 
analyses the eye tracking data with a view to probing the arousal hypothesis. The third and 
fourth sections concern the MEG data specifically, with section 2.6.3 addressing the evoked 
responses to stimuli that reflect of the increased signal hypothesis, section 2.6.4 reporting the 
induced oscillatory response in the alpha band associated with gating. 
 
2.6.1 Behavioural replication 
 
2.6.1.1 Methodological adaptations 
 
Eighteen subjects (aged 20 to 32; mean age 26; 7 female) participated in Experiment 
2D, four of whom had participated in the initial cTBS behavioural experiment (2A).  
 Subjects were thresholded to a level of Pr = 0.5 (as opposed to 0.6 in Experiment 2A) 
in order to optimise the sensitivity to detect both increases and decreases in detection ability. 
The ratio of stimuli-present to stimulus-absent was changed from 50:50 to 60:40 in favour of 
stimulus-present trials to optimise the power for the analysis of the stimulus-evoked 
electrophysiological response.  
 Responses were collected via a LUMItouchTM response pad. Owing to the need to 
change rooms (TMS conducted outside the MEG magnetically sealed room) and the delay 
caused by the requirement to localise the subject’s head before recording MEG data, 3 
minutes were allocated between the termination of cTBS and commencement of the 
behavioural task.  The mean TMS intensity was 42.1% stimulator output (± 4.6 SD). 
A potential criticism of Experiment 2A (section 2.2) is that subjects were clearly 
aware of the difference between sham and cTBS conditions. The increase in conscious 
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detection might therefore have arisen due to a reactive response (Ericsson, 2003) by the 
subjects to the active TMS (see section 4.3 for further discussion). One alternative to sham 
TMS is the selection of an appropriate control site to replicate the auditory and tactile 
artefacts of stimulation. However, owing to the geometry of the round coil and the relatively 
broad distribution of the induced electric field in the brain, this approach was discounted in 
the current experiments: wherever the coil was placed, this relative lack of focality could be 
sufficient to disruption perceptual or cognitive processes.  
Instead, we implemented intermittent theta burst stimulation (iTBS) as an alternative 
active control. During iTBS the same number of pulses is applied at the same intensity as 
cTBS but with a temporal profile that includes intermittent (8 second) gaps between 
continuous bursts of 2 second. In the motor cortex the physiological effect of iTBS opposes 
that of cTBS, reliably increasing cortical excitability (Huang, et al., 2005). For reasons that 
are not clear, this potentiating effect does not appear to be reproducible in the occipital cortex 
(Franca, et al., 2006). Nevertheless, evidence that iTBS produces either opposite or null 
effects on cortical excitability makes it an ideal occipital control condition to achieve 
effective participant blinding. The order of the different TBS conditions in Experiment 2D 
was thus counterbalanced across sessions between cTBS, iTBS and sham.  
 
2.6.1.2 Behavioural results 
 
The first question posed in the analysis of the behavioural results was whether iTBS is  
an appropriate control condition. As noted above, iTBS was implemented to address the 
concern that the effect of cTBS in Experiment 2A might be have resulted from subjects’ 
expectations and/or non-specific effects of the active cTBS protocol. The central effect of 
interest, around which other analyses were based, was upon conscious detection. The question 
of whether iTBS was an appropriate baseline was therefore tested by comparing iTBS with 
sham performance on the measure of conscious detection. There was no evidence of a reliable 
difference between the effects of iTBS and those of sham on the critical central measure of 
conscious detection (TMS site effect iTBS vs. sham: F(1,17) =0.24, p=0.63, site × time 
interaction: F(3,51) =1.24, p=0.31). Because the application of iTBS did not discernibly differ 
from sham in terms of the central measure of interest, and to reduce the number of statistical 
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comparisons, all subsequent analyses in Experiment 2D collapsed the iTBS and sham 
conditions to yield a single control condition (also see section 4.2 and appendix A3).  
The increase in conscious detection following cTBS relative to the control condition 
was replicated (site effect: F(1,17) =5.282, p=0.035, figure 2.6.1.2.1). Again ‘unseen’ 
discrimination ability appeared to be unaffected by cTBS (site effect: F(1,17) =0.458, p=0.508,  
figure 2.6.1.2.2) while, crucially, remaining above chance (all t(17)>6.747, all p<0.001).  
 
Figure 2.6.1.2.1 Change in the measure of conscious detection (PrC) from pre-TBS 
baseline following cTBS and control stimulation, in Experiment 2D. 
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Figure 2.6.1.2.2 Change in ‘unseen’ discrimination measure (PcU) from pre-TBS 
baseline following cTBS and control stimulation, in Experiment 2D. 
No interaction involving a change in conscious detection over the course of the 
experiment was observed (PrC site × time interaction: F(3,51) =1.318, p=0.281), and, although 
a general decline in detection was observed throughout the experiment (as in Experiment 2A; 
see figure 2.2.3.1), this effect was not significant (PrC time effect: F(3,51) =1.557, p=0.221).  
Changes in the measures of ‘unseen’ discrimination over the course of the experiment 
were observed (PcU time effect F(3,51) =5.787, p=0.003). This effect did not appear to depend 
upon the presence of active TMS (PcU site × time interaction F(3,51) =1.41, p=0.26) so does 
not relate to the experimental hypothesis. Given the ‘u’ shaped distribution of the change in 
PcU (see figure 2.6.1.2.2) it is possible to speculate that this effect might correspond to a 
combination of two effects: an initial fatigue effect, which the pupilometry data suggests had 
the greatest effect over the first two blocks (see figures 2.6.2.3.1 and 2.6.2.3.2), followed by a 
practice-driven improvement in performance towards the end of the sessions. 
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Figure 2.6.1.2.3. Change in response criteria / bias in conscious report (BrC) from 
pre-TBS baseline following cTBS and control stimulation, in Experiment 2D. 
The effect of cTBS upon response bias observed in Experiment 2A did not replicate 
(BrC site effect: F(1,17) =0.171, p=0.706, BrC site × time interaction: F(3,51) =0.347, p=0.684, 
figure 2.2.6.3). Because the change in bias failed to replicate, further probing the possibility 
of an effect across experiments was justified. For subjects who participated in both 
experiments averages were drawn across repetitions.  However, when the bias results from 
the original experiment were combined with the replication, no significant TMS effect was 
observed (site effect: F(1,26) =2.430, p=0.131). This lack of reproducibility indicates that little 
can be drawn from the data here in relation to response criteria/bias. A single subject’s data 
was excluded from the analysis of BrC as an outlier, in both Experiment 2D and the 
combined analysis. 
Overall, the central behavioural finding from Experiment 2D was that cTBS reliably 
increased conscious detection relative to the control condition, thus replicating the 
serendipitous effects observed in Experiment 2A. 
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2.6.2 Eye-tracking and arousal 
 
2.6.2.1 Introduction  
 
An alternative explanation for the effect of occipital cTBS on conscious detection is 
that it stems from enhanced arousal, potentially as part of a reaction (Ericsson, 2003) by 
subjects to active stimulation, and possibly independent of the direct neuronal effects of TMS. 
Pupil diameter is one of the most commonly used and reliable measures of autonomic arousal 
(Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008; Bradshaw, 1967). Pupil diameter has previously 
been shown to increase following application of repetitive TMS, where it can be attributed to 
arousal \ sympathetic activation (Niehaus, Guldin, & Meyer, 2001).We measured pupil 
diameter in both the original and replication experiments and took this to quantify arousal. If 
arousal increased following the application of the active cTBS condition then we would 
expect an increase in pupil diameter relative to the control condition. The following section 
considers pupilometry data collected in Experiments 2A and 2D. 
 
2.6.2.2 Methods  
 
 The original experiment (2A) made use of the CRS 250Hz chin mounted eye-tracker 
averaging pupil diameter collected on each trial into a block average. The MEG replication 
made use of a SensoMotoric Instruments infrared 50Hz eye tracking system mounted on a 
tripod. The replication did not divide the eye tracking data into trials, so averages were taken 
across blocks. This was because of the added time cost of relocating the subject into the 
magnetically sealed room following the TBS and head localisation procedures, preventing 
eye tracking calibration. This was also the reason for which the units of the replication are 
arbitrary rather than in mm and trials over which the subject blinked during stimuli 
presentation were not excluded in replication (the removal of such trials in the original 
experiment made no appreciable difference to the data and analysis). The data was filtered for 
losses of signal. Pupil diameter was averaged across blocks and the dependent variable was 
change in pupil diameter from pre-TBS baseline.  
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2.6.2.3 Results 
 
Figure 2.6.2.3.1. Change in pupil diameter in Experiment 2A, from pre-TBS baseline 
following cTBS and control stimulation. 
 
Figure 2.6.2.3.2. Change in pupil diameter in Experiment 2D, from pre-TBS baseline 
following cTBS and control stimulation. Units in replication are arbitrary (see 
methods) 
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In Experiment 2A, there was a trend towards a dissociation in the measure of pupil 
diameter between TMS conditions (site: F(1,13) =3.463, p=0.089, site × time interaction: F(3,39) 
=1.02, p=0.37) with arousal reduced following cTBS relative to sham (see figure 2.6.2.3.1). 
This direction of this trend suggests that the cTBS-induced increase in conscious detection in 
Experiment 2A is unlikely to have stemmed from increased arousal. In the replication 
experiment, average pupil diameter was instead greater following cTBS vs. control, although 
this difference was not statistically significant (site: F(1,16) =1.124, p=0.305, site × time 
interaction: F(3,48) =1.861, p=0.183, figure 2.6.2.3.2). A similar temporal profile in 
pupilometry was observed for both experiments: pupil diameter increased following the 
application of control and active TMS and then subsided throughout the course of the 
experiment, indicating its sensitivity to changes in arousal (original time effect on pupil 
diameter: F(3,39) =9.71, p <0.001, and in replication: F(3,48) =5.212, p=0.009, figure 2.6.2.3.1-
2). 
 Two subjects were excluded from the analysis in Experiment 2A due to the eye 
tracker failing to acquire reliable data. One subject was excluded from the analysis of 
Experiment 2D as an outlier. 
Because pupil diameter was not reliably affected by TMS, modulation of arousal is 
not a viable explanation for the effect of cTBS on conscious detection. Decreased arousal 
(fatigue) over the course of the experiment, may better explain many of the changes in the 
pupilometry data. Indeed, fatigue may also explain a number of other changes observed over 
the course of the experiments: there was a general increase in the power of alpha band 
oscillations throughout the course of the experiment (see appendix A2), which is consistent 
with increased fatigue (Boksem, Meijman, & Lorist, 2005).  Also, there was a drop in 
performance in the conscious detection task, over the course of the study, irrespective of the 
TMS condition (section 2.2.3).  
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2.6.3  Evoked Magnetoencephalography 
 
2.6.3.1 Introduction  
 
 Magnetoencephalography (MEG) offers the unique opportunity to observe a detailed 
and direct picture of how cTBS influences neural processing.  The MEG detects 
electromagnetic changes emitted from the scalp, which are thought to originate 
predominantly from the summation of post-synaptic activity of pyramidal cells (Hamalain, 
2002; Singh, 2006). 
 In addition to measuring the effect of cTBS on visual perception, Experiment 2D also 
tracked two aspects of the magnetic changes that have previously been associated with 
conscious processing. These are the evoked response to stimuli and the phase-independent 
oscillatory or induced changes (section 2.6.4). 
 The search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC; Crick, 1990) has become 
central to the scientific investigation of consciousness. Of the many correlates proposed, 
perhaps the most widely acknowledged NCC has been the correlation between conscious 
awareness and relatively late (>~100ms) cortical electromagnetic evoked responses to stimuli 
(Del Cul, et al., 2007; Kaernbach, Schroger, Jacobsen, & Roeber, 1999; Koivisto & 
Revonsuo, 2003; Quiroga, et al., 2008). One of the clearest demonstrations of this 
relationship and most relevant to the current studies is work carried out by Claire Sergent and 
colleagues using an attentional blink paradigm (Sergent, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2005).  They 
subtracted the electroencephalographic (EEG) trace in the absence of stimuli from those 
collected in the presence of stimuli and showed that both reportedly ‘seen’ and ‘unseen’ trials 
resulted in comparable early (P1 and N1) evoked responses, whereas the later N3/4 (~300ms) 
components were potentiated when the subjects reported the stimuli as ‘seen’, hence 
correlating the late evoked responses with specifically conscious processing.  
In contrast, there is some evidence that earlier potentials are also modulated according 
to the presence / absence of conscious processing (Kaernbach, et al., 1999; Marzi, Girelli, 
Miniussi, Smania, & Maravita, 2000; Schubert, Blankenburg, Lemm, Villringer, & Curio, 
2006; Vuilleumier et al., 2001), although these studies also demonstrated later awareness-
61 
 
dependent effects4. Therefore, there appears to be a broad consensus that beyond ~200ms the 
amplitude of evoked responses reflects the extent to which information is processed 
consciously (Babiloni, Vecchio, Miriello, Romani, & Rossini, 2006; Del Cul, et al., 2007; 
Kostandov & Arzumanov, 1977; Melloni, et al., 2007; Quiroga, et al., 2008). These processes 
may reflect the passage of conscious information in a recurrent occipital-frontal exchange 
(Del Cul, et al., 2007; Lamy, Salti, & Bar-Haim, 2009; Schubert, et al., 2006; Vuilleumier, et 
al., 2001).  
 The motivation for the quantification of late evoked responses applied here is in the 
service of the increased-response hypothesis. According this account, rather than suppressing 
superfluous representations, as posited by the gating-by-inhibition hypothesis, cTBS 
potentiated conscious representations directly. Late evoked responses may therefore be taken 
as representative of the conscious representation.  
2.6.3.2 Methods 
 
 
Figure 2.6.3.2.1. Illustration of example ERF produced from a single-subject, single 
analysis block, average across trials at the sensor level (peak channel selected) 
                                                            
4 The study here was incapable of probing early evoked components as they were not clearly 
observable across the group. This is likely to be due to the stimuli being presented at peri-threshold 
levels, combined with their foveal presentation resulting in the cancellation of early evoked responses 
across the two hemifields (Luck, 2005). 
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changes from the -0.5 sec baseline. Also illustrated is the time course of the 
presentation of the task.  
 MEG acquisition 
MEG was acquired on a 273-channel radial gradiometer system (CTF MEG, MEG 
International Services Ltd) sampled at 1200Hz, analysed as 3rd order synthetic gradiometers 
(Vrba & Robinson, 2001). Data sets were collected in single 8-minute blocks with head 
localization procedures applied at the beginning and end of each block. Pairs of 8-minute 
blocks were then concatenated into single analysis blocks, resulting in 16-minute data sets 
that were consistent with the MRS acquisition. Trials were epoched from -2.3 to +1 second 
relative to the stimuli onset and band passed filtered with a 1-300Hz Butterworth filter. This 
resulted in 15 datasets for each subject (pre, post 1, post 2, post 3, post 4 × three TMS 
conditions of cTBS, iTBS and sham). Following DC offset the data were visually inspected 
and clearly corrupted data (e.g. from movement) were removed on a trial-by-trial basis. 
Together with other data loss, this resulted in a mean of 152 trials per data set (±13 trials SD). 
The two control TMS conditions (iTBS and sham) were processed separately and then 
collapsed prior to the application of inferential statistics. 
Statistical analysis was conducted in sensor space and channels were clustered 
according to their CTF designation. All analyses were applied to the occipital / parietal 
cluster, unless otherwise stated, as these channels covered the region directly affected by the 
TMS. 
 Evoked response 
 The data was band pass filtered 1:40Hz (Butterworth). The baseline used was the 
mean field strength for each channel during the 500ms prior to the stimulus onset (see figure 
2.6.3.2.1). To summate opposing evoked components, traces were squared and rooted. 
Evoked responses for each data set were measured by the peak amplitude of deflection from 
baselines applied to data sets averaged across stimulus-present trials. The peak was defined as 
the maximum amplitude of any channel in the cluster between 100ms and 500ms post 
stimulus.  
 This peak measure was taken to represent a combination of later M3 and M4 
components which have been linked to conscious processing of a signal (Liddell, Williams, 
Rathjen, Shevrin, & Gordon, 2004; Sergent, et al., 2005). The mean latency for the peak was 
63 
 
320ms (± 101ms SD), indicating that this methodology largely targeted the M3 component of 
the evoked response.  
 
2.6.3.3 Results  
 
 Late evoked responses (Event Related Fields: ERFs) were reliably collected from 
stimulus-present trials but the peak amplitude did not appear to be affected by the application 
of cTBS (site effect: F(1,16) =1.938, p=0.183, figure 2.6.3.3.1-2). If peak amplitude had 
significantly increased then this would have lent weight to the alternative increased response 
hypothesis of the effect of cTBS on conscious detection. No time-dependent effects were 
observed (time: F(3,48) =0.20, p=0.87, site × time: F(3,48) =0.38, p=0.75). One outlier was 
excluded from this analysis. 
 
Figure 2.6.3.3.1. Group averaged evoked responses (ERF) following cTBS (blue) and 
control (yellow) stimulation, where shaded areas are one standard deviation across 
subjects. Plot derived from data averaged across post-TBS stimulus-present trials over 
occipital parietal clusters of channels. Δ refers to change from pre-stimulus baseline. 
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Figure 2.6.3.3.2. Change firm pre-TBS baseline in peak amplitude of evoked 
response following stimuli presentation for occipital / parietal channels. Active and 
control conditions are shown. 
 These results provides no conclusive evidence that occipital cTBS potentiates late 
evoked responses. Were there to have been such a demonstration, this would have provided 
evidence against the idea that the regulatory gating mechanisms, alone, were affected by the 
cTBS, favouring an explanation in terms of potentiation of conscious signals (the increased 
response hypothesis). However, it is worth emphasising that an absence of a statistically 
discernible effect should not be taken as evidence for or against any interpretation, especially 
given that there is a weak trend for increased evoked response following cTBS relative to 
controls as is apparent in figure 2.6.3.3.2.  It is entirely possible that the measure of peak 
amplitude applied here was simply insensitive to the underlying changes, which, on the basis 
of the effect size in the measure of conscious detection (~8%5), may have been subtle.  
 
 
                                                            
5 The mean difference between active and control conditions in the relevant MEG replication was 
0.043 Pr units for the conscious detection measure. The maximum possible range of this measure was 
0.5 Pr units. Therefore the effect size was roughly 8%. 
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2.6.4 Induced Magnetoencephalography 
 
2.6.4.1 Introduction 
 
 Oscillations in magnetic activity at the scalp have been associated with a variety of 
brain processes, dissociable according to frequency. Higher frequencies, such as those in the 
gamma range (~30-100Hz) have been linked with the passage of explicit information 
throughout the brain (Crick, 1990, see appendix A2). Lower frequencies, particularly in the 
alpha band (~6-12Hz), been linked with the active suppression of superfluous information 
(Foxe & Snyder, 2011), gating (Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010) and idling (Pfurtscheller, 1992). 
Idling here refers to processes that occur during periods of inactivity or non-functionality. 
Alpha rhythms act to impose suppression in a temporal manner, such that suppression is 
maximal when the oscillation peaks; therefore it can be seen as segmenting information into 
discrete individual percepts (Varela, et al., 1981).  
 These attributes of alpha frequency oscillations clearly reflect the proposed gating-by-
inhibition hypothesis. In particular, following the presentation of stimuli, there is a shift from 
a period when alpha activity is relatively high and suppression is imposed, to a less 
synchronised state following the appearance of the stimuli. This ‘disinhibition’ (Pfurtscheller, 
Schwarz, Pfurtscheller, & List, 1983; Romei, Gross, & Thut, 2010), operating through the 
induced6 responses in the alpha band, is known as the event related desynchronisation (ERD, 
Pfurtscheller & Aranibar, 1979) and was the target of this experimental section. 
 A link between the alpha ERD and specifically conscious processing has been 
established (Pfurtscheller, et al., 1983). Event related synchronisation in response to visual 
                                                            
6 Induced responses are changes in phase independent oscillatory activity following presentation of 
stimuli (Singh, 2006). There is a relationship between the evoked and induced responses: the evoked 
responses of the previous section summate activity over trials. Therefore, oscillations in phase with 
one another relative to or as a result of, the presentation of the stimuli will be expressed by the evoked 
responses. Because the late evoked responses (~300ms) were targeted in section 2.6.3, the measures 
used corresponded to phase locked activity in the delta-theta (1-6Hz) range (Yordanova, Kolev, & 
Polich, 2001). In contrast, induced responses to stimuli are the result of summation of oscillatory 
activity independent of phase and are applied to any frequency band prescribed, as it is performed via 
a Fourier (in this case Hilbert) transformation (Singh, 2006). 
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stimuli can be produced from comatose patients, whereas the extent to which the ERD is 
apparent follows recovery from such a state and appearance of conscious processing 
(Pfurtscheller, et al., 1983). In masking experiments it has also been shown that when 
subjects report stimuli as ‘seen’, the subsequent ERD over occipital and parietal channels is 
larger than when they report stimuli as ‘not seen’ (Babiloni, Vecchio, Bultrini, Luca Romani, 
& Rossini, 2006). According to the gating-by-inhibition account, the prediction here is that 
the ERD might be facilitated following the application of the cTBS.   
 
2.6.4.2. Methods  
 
 
Figure 2.6.4.2.1. A typical time-frequency plot, illustrating event related 
desynchronisation (ERD) in the α band. Data is taken from group averaged post-TBS 
blocks, collapsed across TMS conditions. Power is derived from the application of a 
Hilbert transform to the data collected over occipital / parietal channels. Also 
illustrated is the time course of the presentation of the task, baseline period and period 
over which the ERD was quantified.  
 Acquisition parameters are as described in the evoked section (2.6.3.2). Oscillatory 
power within the alpha band (6-12Hz, Pfurtscheller, et al., 1994) was quantified by the 
application of a Hillbert transform (8Hz band width and 0.5Hz step size) applied to all trials 
in the data sets, down sampled to 600Hz. Calculated in sensor space, this resulted in a matrix 
for each data set of time (-2.3 to 1sec) × frequency (6-12Hz) × channel (85). From each 
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channel and frequency pair a baseline was taken from -500ms to the stimulus onset.  This 
resulted in time × frequency plots for each data set of the induced oscillatory response (e.g. 
figure 2.6.4.2.1).  
 The ERD was quantified by the gradient of the desynchronisation between 100ms and 
400ms following the stimuli onset (figures 2.6.4.2.1 and 2.6.4.2.2). The 100ms corresponds to 
the onset of the ERD irrespective of TMS conditions (see figure 2.6.4.2.1) and is consistent 
with previous reports (Pfurtscheller, et al., 1994). The offset of the visual noise and 
subsequent presentation of the questions from 400ms restricted quantification of the ERD to 
before this period. Rather than average power change (Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999) 
or area under the curve (Nogawa, Katayama, Tabata, Ohshio, & Kawahara, 1976), the rate of 
change of synchronisation was chosen as it was more representative of the desynchronisation 
aspect of the ERD and it should theoretically be less susceptible to outlying data points and 
potential confounds such as prior (Romei, et al., 2010; van Dijk, Schoffelen, Oostenveld, & 
Jensen, 2008) or subsequent synchronisations (Pfurtscheller, 1992). The gradient was 
obtained by a linear regression applied to the data collapsed across the frequency pairs in the 
alpha range. The channel most clearly (greatest negative gradient) demonstrating an ERD was 
selected to represent the ERD for each data set, as, owing to the localisation of the ERD (See 
SAM analysis below) many channels would not have expressed the desynchronisation. 
 Tomographic images of the localisation of the ERD were produced using Synthetic 
Aperture Magnetometry (SAM, Robinson and Vrba 1990).  Although synthetic channels 
themselves were not used in the final statistical analysis, this allowed us to localise the 
oscillatory power changes in terms of group level anatomy (figure 2.6.4.3.3). This analysis 
made use of the same parameters as in the sensor space analysis of the ERD (baseline from -
500ms to stimuli onset, 6-12Hz band width, 100-400ms period of interest) but applied to data 
sets that combined all post-TBS blocks. Co-registration of this data to subjects’ anatomical 
MRI images was achieved with MRIViewer software (Krish Singh) in conjunction with 
digital photographs that depicted the position of the localisation coils (one above the nose 
bridge and two over the tragi). The resulting outputs were pseudo T maps (values below 0.4 
were removed from the image), which were averaged across subjects and overlaid on a 
FreeSurfer (Harvard MA) inflated brain mesh using mri3dx (Krish Singh) (figure 2.6.4.3.3).  
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Figure 2.6.4.2.2. Example of linear fit applied to individual time frequency analysis 
of the ERD in each data set. The fit (yellow) was applied to the data (red) between 
0.1 and 0.4 seconds post stimulus averaged across the 6-12Hz alpha frequency. The 
gradient of this fit was the dependent variable and the channel selected was the 
channel expressing steepest gradient in the occipital / parietal cluster. 
 
2.6.4.3 Results 
 
 The ERD, being a drop in synchronisation was quantified by the rate of change of 
phase independent oscillatory power over fixed period relative to stimuli presentation.  Its 
presentation was consistent with previous reports (Pfurtscheller, et al., 1994) in terms of 
frequency and temporal range (figure 2.6.4.2.1). The gradient of the ERD was found to 
increase significantly (become more negative) following the application of cTBS relative to 
controls (F(1,16) =6.828, p=0.019, figure 2.6.4.31-3), indicating facilitation of the alpha band 
response. These analyses were conducted over the occipital / parietal cluster of sensors and 
additionally localisation of the ERD to the targeted occipital lobe is illustrated in figure 
2.6.4.3.3. No time dependent effects were observed (time: F(3,48) =0.863, p=0.45, site × time: 
F(3,48) = 0.399, p=0.678). One outlier was excluded from this analysis. 
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Figure 2.6.4.3.1. Change in gradient of the ERD. The more negative the gradient the 
steeper the onset of the shift from synchronisation to desynchronisation. 
 
Figure 2.6.4.3.2. Group level time frequency plots collapsed over all post TMS blocks 
in control and cTBS conditions, covering the alpha frequencies. 
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Figure 2.6.4.3.3. Synthetic aperture analysis illustrating localisation of the ERD to the 
occipital lobe (left hemifield depicted). Applied to data sets following cTBS and 
control stimulation. 
 The drop in synchronisation in the occipital lobe (the ERD) was more rapid following 
the application of the cTBS, indicating potentiation of the active relief from suppression. This 
mirrors the gating-by-inhibition hypothesis.  
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2.7 General Off-line Discussion 
 
 Experiment 2A showed that subjects’ reported awareness of stimuli became more 
frequent following the application of cTBS, whereas their forced choice ‘unseen’ ability 
remained unaffected. This behavioural effect was replicated in Experiment 2D. Experiment 
2B revealed an elevation of phosphene threshold following the application of cTBS, 
replicating Franca, et al., (2006). Experiment 2C showed a corresponding cTBS-induced 
increase in the inhibitory neurotransmitter GABA, consistent with the findings of Stagg et al., 
(2009). Experiment 2D additionally demonstrated that the onset of ERD in the alpha band 
became steeper following the application of the cTBS. 
 The occipital lobe has long been known to play a prominent role in visual 
consciousness. This study refines our understanding of that role by emphasising the 
mechanism of gating in the formation of conscious percepts. As with blindsight, the effect 
can be said to be relatively specific to conscious processing in that the contrast state of 
‘unseen’ discrimination was above chance but unaffected by the intervention. Determination 
of whether or not a subject consciously perceives stimuli is likely to involve selection, which 
in turn involves discarding representations that do not enter the frame. The suggestion is that 
it was this negative aspect of selection which was facilitated by the application of the cTBS. 
 Selective gating and active suppression are associated with oscillatory changes in the 
alpha band (Foxe & Snyder, 2011; Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010). Decreases in alpha power are 
observed when the requirement for processing is raised; for example, alpha oscillations 
decrease when the eyes are open relative to closed (Berger, 1929). Alpha oscillations have 
also been implicated in the framing of individual percepts, where subjects are more likely to 
group percepts together if they are presented during the negative trough of alpha oscillations 
than they are during the peak (Varela, et al., 1981). Furthermore, the presence of ERDs in the 
alpha band has been specifically associated with the presence of explicitly conscious 
processing, whereas event related synchronisations have been observed following both 
conscious and unconscious processing (Pfurtscheller, 1992). The governance of perceptibility 
by alpha rhythms and their dissolution in the form of the ERD therefore seemed to exemplify 
the kind of gating mechanism that might be responsible for the observed increase in 
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conscious detection following the application of cTBS. Indeed the ERD dropped more rapidly 
following the application of the cTBS, indicating a facilitation of the gating response. 
 The balance of activity at the biochemical level is played out by the balance between 
excitatory and inhibitory neurotransmitters. The hypothesis put forward is that this balance is 
tipped towards inhibition by the application of cTBS, increasing the contrast or gain (Katzner, 
Busse, & Carandini, 2011) between representations. A similar interpretation has been offered 
following the demonstration that microiontophoretically (micro injection and measurement 
using ionic currents) applied GABA suppressed spontaneous discharges, but did not affect 
evoked response to auditory stimuli in rats (Ebert & Ostwald, 1995).The increase in observed 
GABA concentration following cTBS was therefore consistent with the gating-by-inhibition 
hypothesis, suggesting that an important factor in determining whether or not a representation 
is realised as conscious is the active suppression involving GABA. 
Of the three rival hypotheses we explored, none received support in the data. Clearly 
arousal, as measured by pupil diameter, did not appear to correlate with the application of the 
cTBS (Kindler et al., 2012), although arousal or rather lack of arousal did influence the data. 
 If the late evoked MEG responses are seen as representative of conscious signals, 
then increased peak ERF as a result of cTBS can be seen as consistent with the alternative 
hypothesis that cTBS increased excitatory content-bearing responses. Furthermore, if the 
claim were to be that general neuronal activity was suppressed (irrespective of function) 
owing to the application of cTBS, then we might have expected the ERP to have been 
reduced. No clear evidence of such changes was apparent. 
A general suppression of neural activity caused by the cTBS is not sufficient in itself 
to explain the observed increase in conscious detection. Rather, the proposal is that the 
mechanisms which gate consciousness involve suppression / inhibition under normal 
conditions, and it was these selection mechanisms that were specifically facilitated by 
occipital cTBS. This may be why the application of cTBS resulted in the decreased detection 
of phosphenes and increased detection of normal external stimuli. Detection of phosphenes 
differs fundamentally from detection of external stimuli in that phosphenes are the result of 
direct pervasive stimulation of neurons in visual areas (Thielscher, et al., 2010), whereas 
conscious detection of external stimuli is the result of refined teleological mechanisms. 
Therefore, the increase in phosphene threshold is consistent with there being a general 
reduction in excitability and it being this inhibitory element - as part of the mechanism that 
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produces conscious percepts - which benefits from the application of cTBS. The increase in 
phosphene threshold also replicates the work of (Franca, et al., 2006) and detracts from the 
alternative hypothesis that cTBS might increase excitation and/or noise (stochastic 
resonance). 
Although the effect of cTBS increasing conscious detection was replicated, two points 
of caution are worth emphasising. First, the stimuli used here were presented among 
luminance noise and the effect we claim cTBS to have can be interpreted in terms of 
suppression of superfluous noise. It is therefore possible that the increase in conscious 
detection may only be realised during tasks that embed task-relevant stimuli within noise, 
with the facilitation arising through suppression of that noise. Second, the TMS intensity 
applied in these experiments was relatively low. This raises the question: would higher 
intensities cause suppression (Abrahamyan, et al., 2011). A correlation analysis involving 
motor threshold designed to probe this question is described in appendix A1.2. Essentially 
this failed to provide conclusive evidence with respect to this question. It therefore remains a 
potential avenue for future research.  
One of the more common assumptions in the design and interpretation of TMS 
experiments is that TMS operates as some form of ‘virtual lesion’ (Hilgetag, Theoret, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2001; Pascual-Leone, Bartres-Faz, & Keenan, 1999; Pascual-Leone, et al., 
2000; Walsh & Cowey, 2000). The finding that this form of repetitive TMS facilitates 
conscious processing in contrast to the blockage of activity caused by actual lesions (as in 
classic blindsight, where consciousness is lost) indicates that the virtual lesion interpretation 
would be an oversimplification if applied here, and therefore might not be an appropriate 
default assumption of repetitive TMSs mode of operation (Hilgetag, et al., 2001).  
The facilitation of conscious detection following cTBS is by no means the first 
demonstration of improvements in cognitive capacities following repetitive TMS (Cazzoli et 
al., 2012; Cazzoli, Wurtz, Muri, Hess, & Nyffeler, 2009; Funke & Benali, 2011; Kindler, et 
al., 2012; Marzi et al., 1998; Tegenthoff et al., 2005; Thompson, Mansouri, Koski, & Hess, 
2008; Waterston & Pack, 2010; Yamanaka, Yamagata, Tomioka, Kawasaki, & Mimura, 
2010).  Some of these investigations are less relevant to the interpretation of current 
experiments than are others. This is because the frequency at which some experiments 
applied TMS are thought to be excitatory protocols, leading to increased activation of 
corresponding cortical representations (Funke & Benali, 2011; Tegenthoff, et al., 2005; 
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Thompson, et al., 2008; Yamanaka, et al., 2010), unlike cTBS (Franca, et al., 2006; Huang, et 
al., 2005). For example, Tegenthoff et al used an excitatory 5Hz TMS protocol to improve 
tactile discrimination when applied to somatosensory finger areas, and showed that this effect 
correlated with increased blood-oxygen-level-dependent activation in the corresponding 
region as measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging. Other studies where 
improvements have been observed can be attributed to the artefactual effects of the TMS such 
as auditory or inter-sensory facilitation (Marzi, et al., 1998). 
Of greater relevance here is the study by Waterson et al., (2010) who reported that 
cTBS boosted visual sensitivity when applied at similar intensity to the current study. 
However, the findings of that study are questionable. In particular, they report in the text of 
the paper that 6 out of 7 subjects showed an improvement following the application of cTBS 
to primary visual areas. However, in the figure they present, drawn from the same data, the 
effect relative to controls is only apparent in 3 out of 7 subjects and it appears to be these 3 
subjects that drove the group-level mean difference in performance.  Although there are 
statistical concerns with this study, the authors’ conclusions are consistent with the data 
collected over the current experiments. In particular, they describe cTBS as being effective in 
improving ‘coarse’ perceptual judgements (using large angular displacement, low contrast 
gratings) and not ‘fine’ judgments (small angular displacement, high contrast gratings). It is 
notable that the detection task employed here more closely resembled the coarse task, 
consistent with the findings of Waterson et al., (2010).  
The most promising areas in which improvements in performance following cTBS 
might be applied is within the clinical context; for instance, cTBS has been shown to relieve 
symptoms of unilateral spatial neglect (Cazzoli, et al., 2012; Cazzoli, et al., 2009). It has been 
proposed that the cause of spatial neglect is a lack of inter-hemispheric inhibition, leading to 
hyperactivity with the contralesional hemisphere and the maintenance of attention to the 
corresponding contralesional visual field (Cazzoli, et al., 2009; Koch et al., 2008; Reuter-
Lorenz, Kinsbourne, & Moscovitch, 1990). The interpretation offered by Cazzoli et al, is that 
cTBS increased the mechanism of inhibition leading to a reduction in the symptoms of 
neglect (Cazzoli, et al., 2012; Cazzoli, et al., 2009). This is consistent with the interpretation 
of the improvements based on facilitation of inhibitory gating mechanisms offered here. A 
similar interpretation (potentiation of intercortical inhibition mechanisms) could explain the 
finding that other forms of rTMS can help alleviate the symptoms of amblyopia (see 
Thompson, et al., 2008). The increase in conscious detection here is also consistent with the 
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recent demonstration that a similar cTBS protocol can speed verbal responses for aphasic 
patients following stroke (Kindler, et al., 2012). In conjunction with the data here, the further 
speculative suggestion can be made that the observed changes may reflect part of a 
homeostatic response orientated towards the return of optimal conditions following the 
presumably high levels of enforced activity that occurred during the application of the cTBS.   
In summary, this study found cTBS to increase conscious detection of stimuli, 
contrary to the expected profile of blindsight. The confirmation of cTBS being neuronally 
suppressive and the demonstration of increases in measures associated with active regulation, 
suggests that mechanisms which gate, select and bring into relief consciousness are those that 
were influenced by occipital cTBS. 
 
2.8 Limitations  
 
2.8.1 Behavioural Task Limitations 
 
 This section will set out the principal limitations encountered. Resulting modifications 
in task design are discussed in section 3.2.1. 
 There were two interrelated problems encountered in these experiments. The first is 
the extent to which reportedly ‘unseen’ abilities can be regarded as unconscious.  This in turn 
has two facets – one conceptual and one practical. The conceptual problem of what 
behavioural pattern should be interpreted as unconscious (and conscious) is discussed in 
section 4.3. The practical aspect is the possibility of subjects being aware – consciously – of a 
portion of the arrow (figure 2.8.1.1), and are therefore provided with directional information, 
yet, this representation is insufficient to elicit a categorical ‘yes’ response to the ‘arrow?’ 
question. It is therefore possible that the TMS may cause such partial ablation, resulting in the 
demonstration of above chance reportedly ‘unseen’ ability, yet the processing upon which 
these demonstrations are based would be conscious.   
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Figure 2.8.1.1 Illustration of the possibility that TMS could cause a partial scotoma 
which might prevent acknowledgment of conscious awareness, yet facilitate task 
performance on the basis of partial conscious awareness.   
 The second problem concerns the application of SDT when relatively few false alarms 
are produced. Subjects’ response criteria to the ‘yes/no’ question was very conservative (BrC 
mean = 0.067 ± 0.087SD, where Br = 0 is 0 false alarms and 1 is responding ‘yes’ on all 
trials). That is, subjects were unlikely to report being aware of stimuli that had not been 
presented. This feature of ‘yes/no’ tasks has previously been described (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 1990) and is to be expected given the meta-cognitive aspect of the question. Meta, 
here, refers to the requirement for a secondary level of report and/or measurement referring to 
a primary level representation. The secondary response is unlikely to be positive in the 
absence of a primary representation (see section 4.4.1.1 for further details). The resulting 
willingness of subjects to report ‘No/Unseen’ relates to the difficulty of defining these 
responses as categorically unconscious (1.3.2.3). The problem this poses for the application 
of classic parametric SDT is that small changes such as single false alarms will have a 
disproportionately large effect on the data. Single trial differences in the context of low 
overall rates will correspond to the tail ends (most non-linear) of the normal distributions 
applied. Although the application of non-parametric SDT reduces this problem, the capacity 
of any form of SDT to extract bias from sensitivity measures and to track changes 
independently, is limited if no false alarms are produced. 
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 Fortunately, the impact of these problems upon the conclusions of the off-line TMS 
experiments in this chapter is arguably limited. The central findings of these experiments all 
concern changes upon the measure of conscious detection, not ‘unseen’ discrimination.  The 
relation between the measure of conscious detection and conscious awareness is only made 
more tenable through subjects’ adoption of conservative criteria, as any token reported 
awareness is more likely to be veridical. Furthermore, the contrast between conscious 
awareness and perception lacking awareness is maintained even if the perception lacking 
awareness is not described as unconscious. This is because what is required for the contrast, 
revealing of conscious processing, to function as intended, is the relative difference between 
when the subject reports awareness and reports ‘no’ awareness, not the absolute absence of 
awareness when reporting ‘no’. In this way, consciousness can still be said to be suppressed 
in the case of the partial scotoma. 
Although these problems do not impact greatly upon the interpretation of the 
experiments described in this Chapter, they are important for the demonstrations of TMS-
induced blindsight in Chapter 3. Task adaptations applied to lessen the impact of these 
problems are discussed in section 3.2.1. 
 
2.9 Summary of off-line TMS study  
 
 These experiments have developed from the initial counterintuitive finding that 
suppressing cortical excitability with TMS can increase the conscious detection of stimuli. 
This facilitation was replicated and was found to be coincident with potentiation of the ERD 
and the elevation of occipital GABA concentration. Together these findings suggest that 
inhibitory gating is an important element in the formation of visual consciousness.  
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Chapter 3. On-line experiments  
Using event related TMS to track the temporal dynamics and 
anatomy of information flow in visual perception. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
3.1.1 Overview 
 
This series of experiments comprised two broad sections: a between-subjects study 
(Experiment 3A, section 3.3) and a single subject case study (section 3.4-6). The single 
subject study was conducted over three individual experiments (3B, 3C, 3D). The 
experimental tasks and aims were essentially the same across the two studies, so this chapter 
is prefaced with a general introduction followed by separate descriptions of the individual 
experiments. 
 The over-arching aim of this chapter was to look at the timing and pathways of 
activity that support conscious vision and visual perception lacking in conscious awareness. 
The main novel findings are that input from the superior colliculus is not necessary for the 
residual abilities of TMS-induced blindsight, and that these abilities appear to depend upon 
later recurrent activity, rather than the early feedforward sweep of activity as has been 
previously suggested (Lamme, 2001). In contrast to reportedly ‘unseen’ abilities, the 
conscious detection of stimuli appears to be supported by input from the superior colliculus 
and/or magnocellular routes of the lateral geniculate nucleus, during very early and very late 
stages of occipital processing.  
 
 
79 
 
3.1.2 The timing of visual activity  
 
Individual TMS pulses applied to the occipital lobe, at times relative to visual stimuli, 
can track the passage of information through the visual system in a temporally precise 
manner. Amassian and colleagues were the first to use TMS in this mode, applying 
stimulation at 20ms intervals between 0 and 200ms during a letter recognition task 
(Amassian, et al., 1989). They showed that TMS caused a suppression or dip in performance 
accuracy when it was applied between 80-100ms after stimulus onset. They speculated that 
there is an early unconscious stage of processing and a second consciousness-related stage, 
corresponding to the 80-100ms dip, which is more susceptible to the effects of TMS 
(Amassian, et al., 1989). This strategy, of applying TMS at times relative to stimuli in order 
to reveal the timing of activity, became a theme running through a great deal of subsequent 
work and inspired this series of experiments. 
The drop in detection as a result of applying TMS at ~ 100ms, first reported by 
Amassian et al, is probably the most widely replicated effect to have emerged from the non-
motor TMS literature (e.g. Corthout, Uttl, Juan, Hallett, & Cowey, 2000; Corthout, Uttl, 
Walsh, Hallett, & Cowey, 1999; Corthout, Uttl, Ziemann, Cowey, & Hallett, 1999; Kammer, 
Puls, Strasburger, Hill, & Wichmann, 2005; Koivisto, Railo, & Salminen-Vaparanta, 2011; 
Overgaard, Nielsen, & Fuglsang-Frederiksen, 2004; Sack, van der Mark, Schuhmann, 
Schwarzbach, & Goebel, 2009; Thielscher, et al., 2010). It has also been suggested that there 
are other periods over which TMS is effective in reducing perception. For example, papers 
produced by Erik Corthout and colleagues suggest that there are several additional periods 
during which TMS is effective before the ~100ms period (Corthout, et al., 2002; Corthout, 
Hallett, & Cowey, 2003; Corthout, et al., 2000; Corthout, Uttl, Walsh, et al., 1999; Corthout, 
Uttl, Ziemann, et al., 1999). Others have suggested that there are periods where TMS is 
effective, in addition to ~100ms, at a much later stage, beyond 200ms (Camprodon, Zohary, 
Brodbeck, & Pascual-Leone, 2010; Chambers, Allen, Maizey, & Williams, 2012; Heinen, 
Jolij, & Lamme, 2005). Recently, it has even been suggested that the period of TMS efficacy 
at ~100ms can be divided into sub-components via the demonstration of additional dips in 
performance over the 60 to 120ms range (de Graaf, Herring, & Sack, 2011). 
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The central concern regarding the demonstrations of periods of TMS efficacy in 
addition to the ~100ms dip is consistency in replication. For example, work produced by the 
same researchers has appeared to provide evidence both for and against the existence of 
additional periods of TMS efficacy upon visual processing (cf. Sack, et al 2009., with de 
Graaf, et al., 2012; and Koivisto, Mantyla, & Silvanto, 2010; with Koivisto, et al., 2011). The 
early period of TMS efficacy (20-60ms post stimulus Corthout, Uttl, Walsh, et al., 1999) has 
also been resistant to replication with many studies capable of demonstrating efficacy of 
TMS applied at these times (e.g. Amassian, et al., 1989; Koivisto, Henriksson, Revonsuo, & 
Railo, 2012) but few having achieved such replication (Koivisto, et al., 2010). The efficacy of 
TMS when applied at times after the ~100ms period does seem slightly more consistent than 
the very early effects, although relatively few TMS experiments have targeted activity 
beyond 200ms. These experiments are explored in greater depth in section 3.5.3.  
One reason for inconsistencies in the reporting of multiple periods of TMS efficacy 
may be statistical. In order to demonstrate two separable periods of TMS efficacy, the 
orthodox strategy is often to show two periods which express significant drops in 
performance (often performed with t-tests) with an intervening period where TMS is 
ineffective (e.g. Corthout, Uttl, Ziemann, et al., 1999). However, this may not be a valid 
approach because the demonstration of multiple periods rests on the demonstration of the 
intervening period when TMS is ineffective and the application of orthodox Fisher-based 
statistics does not address this null hypothesis (Dienes, 2008; Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & 
Wagenmakers, 2011); the absence of a significant effect of TMS applied over the intervening 
period does not mean there is no effect. Indeed, it is often the case with demonstrations of 
multiple periods that the statistics referring to the intervening period are simply absent from 
the published report (e.g. Juan & Walsh, 2003). 
Another, and possibly more influential, reason for inconsistencies of effects may be 
differences in the behavioural tasks employed. Intuitively, different behavioural tasks put 
different demands upon early cortical areas in order to form correct responses. In particular, 
long exposures to stimuli and more complex tasks may require later activity, whereas speeded 
and reflexive responses are likely to depend upon earlier activity (cf. Ro, et al., 2004 with 
Chambers, et al., 2012). 
The demarcation between early and late activity is most widely recognised as 
corresponding to the neuronal processes of feedforward followed by recurrent activity, as 
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described by Victor Lamme. He describes feedforward activity as corresponding to pre-
attentive or unconscious vision and the later recurrent phase as conferring conscious 
awareness (Lamme, 2001; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000).  This differentiation maps on to the 
distinction between ‘unseen’ discrimination vs. conscious detection, in the current 
experiments, and the dissociation of blindsight type phenomena generally. Indeed, Lamme 
cites in support of his theory the disruption to recurrent processing in blindsight, the resulting 
lack of conscious awareness, the preservation of pathways that might still provide an early 
feedforward sweep of activity, and the preservation of unconscious abilities (Lamme, 2001). 
TMS-induced blindsight studies tend to adopt the feedforward followed by recurrent – 
conscious processing model in their interpretation of data (Boyer, et al., 2005; Jolij & 
Lamme, 2005 ; Ro, et al., 2004). That is, the disruption caused by applying TMS from 
approximately 100ms post stimulus onset disrupts recurrent processing and therefore leads to 
a suppression of conscious awareness. One of the main aims of the current experiments has 
been to uncover whether there are one or multiple periods of TMS efficacy in response to this 
arrow based task, and to ascertain whether the early and late distinctions correspond to the 
distinctions between consciousness and perception lacking in consciousness.   
 
3.1.3 The pathways of visual activity 
  
According to Lamme (2001), the retinotectal pathway via the superior colliculus (SC)  
is the main route responsible for the feedforward sweep of activity and residual perceptual 
abilities of blindsight (Lamme, 2001). However, whether or not the residual abilities of 
blindsight are supported by this pathway, as opposed to other pathways such as preserved 
projections from the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), is not clearly resolved and this debate 
forms a central question in the blindsight literature (Cowey, 2010 see figure 3.1.3.1). The 
current series of experiments addressed this question by demonstrating TMS-induced 
blindsight and using stimuli types which do or do not activate the SC (Sumner, et al., 2002). I 
will briefly discuss the evidence in support of this stimulus intervention isolating collicular 
tracts before addressing the evidence in relation to the role of the SC in blindsight. 
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Figure 3.1.3.1. Illustration of the experimental configuration with TMS functionally 
targeted at visual cortices (see Thielscher, et al., 2010)(V1). The main geniculate 
pathway, via the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), is represented in grey / purple 
(purple depicting the s-cone opponent projection via the koniocellular layers of the 
LGN). These pathways project mainly to V1, but are also thought to contribute some 
inputs directly to extrastriate areas, represented by the junction between the LGN and 
V1 (e.g. Fries, 1981; Sincich, Park, Wohlgemuth, & Horton, 2004). The collicular / 
retinotectal pathway, also suggested as supportive of the residual abilities of 
blindsight, is illustrated as projecting via the superior colliculus (SC), here represented 
in grey below the geniculate pathway. From the SC, this route makes onward 
projections to pulvinar and several cortical areas including extrastriate, parietal and 
frontal regions (Fries, 1984). 
The critical stimulus intervention in these studies is based on the principle that, of the 
three classes of colour receptors in the retina, short wavelength responsive cones (s-cones) 
are thought to be the only cells that do not activate the tectum of the SC in a colour opponent 
manner (Sumner, et al., 2002). In addition to bypassing the retinotectal (collicular) pathways, 
s-cones are also thought not to project via the magnocellular layers of the LGN, and possibly 
parvocellular layers (Dacey, 2000; Mollon, 1989). These non-s-cone retinotectal and 
magnocellular pathways are therefore collectively denoted henceforth as ‘R/M’. This 
anatomical peculiarity has previously been exploited to demonstrate the roles of these 
pathways. The use of s-cone specific stimuli impoverishes R/M input, and differences in 
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responses, relative to comparable luminance stimuli, can be attributed to a functional role of 
the isolated pathways (e.g. Sumner, et al., 2002; Sumner, Nachev, Vora, Husain, & Kennard, 
2004). 
 Evidence supporting the absence of s-cone input to the retinotectal pathway has 
emerged largely from primate electrophysiological work carried out in the 1970s. For 
instance, de Monasterio (1978) probed the responsiveness and connectivity of retinal 
ganglion cells by displaying monochromatic colours and antidromic stimulation of various 
areas of the monkey visual system. Although he found cells responsive to all wavelengths of 
visible light and cells activated by stimulation of the SC, he found no cell type that was 
responsive to both blue (short wave) light and to stimulation of the SC. Similarly, Schiller 
and Malpeli (1977) found a lack of colour opponency in ganglion cells projecting to the SC 
(and suggested the segregation of a blue ‘on’ opponent pathway to the LGN). Consistently, 
Marrocco and Li (1977) showed no colour opponent processing when probing the activity of 
the SC using microelectrodes, and argued that previous work (Humphrey, 1968; Wolin, 
Massopust, & Meder, 1966) which appeared to demonstrate colour processing in the SC 
could be attributed to luminance differences between coloured stimuli that did not appear to 
be adequately controlled for in the earlier experiments, and to which the SC is sensitive. 
Lesions of the SC in monkeys have also been shown to impair responses to some visual tasks, 
but not those that involve s-cone opponent (blue-yellow) discriminations (Butter, 1974). 
 The magnocellular layers of the LGN provide an additional pathway whose function 
can be addressed using s-cone stimuli. A significant proportion of magnocellular projections 
bypass primary visual areas, directly innovating extrastriate regions such as the middle 
temporal cortex (MT, Chatterjee & Callaway, 2002). As with the SC, it is not that 
magnocellular projections lack s-cone input but that they lack colour opponency in their 
response profiles, which enables their functional isolation (Derrington, Krauskopf, & Lennie, 
1984). The presence of s-cone input was demonstrated in about 10% of magnocellular LGN 
neurons sampled by Chatterjee and Callaway (2002), but these responses summated in the 
presence of other colours rather than showing colour opponency. Since these pathways 
respond to changes in luminance, the use of s-cone stimuli to isolate the R/M pathways 
mandates the inclusion of luminance noise in order to mask the stimuli in terms of any 
luminance change. Instead of a change in luminance the s-cone stimuli are presented as an 
increment of s-cone colour saturation, rendering the R/M pathways blind to these stimuli. 
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Note that here ‘s-cone stimuli’ is used to denote the transition between gray and purple in the 
context of luminance noise, rather than the presence of the purple arrow per se. 
 These s-cone stimuli provide an avenue of enquiry into one of the central debates in 
the blindsight literature. Namely, which pathways support the residual vision when primary 
visual areas are disrupted? Collicular pathways fulfilling this role were first suggested by 
Weiskrantz (1986). A series of psychophysical (Leh, Mullen, et al., 2006) and imaging (Leh, 
Johansen-Berg, & Ptito, 2006; Leh, Ptito, Schonwiesner, Chakravarty, & Mullen, 2010; 
Tamietto et al., 2010) experiments claimed to show that this was indeed the case via the use 
of s-cone stimuli. They demonstrated that collicular projections were preserved when 
geniculate routes were damaged in patients with blindsight (Leh, Johansen-Berg, et al., 
2006). The superior colliculus responded to visual stimulation (Leh, et al., 2010; Tamietto, et 
al., 2010) and, most importantly, blindsight type effects were suppressed when s-cone stimuli 
were used (Leh, Mullen, et al., 2006; Tamietto, et al., 2010); that is, when R/M input 
including SC input was diminished, so too were residual unconscious abilities. It has also 
been suggested that the SC plays a critical role in the preserved perceptual responses of TMS-
induced blindsight (Ro, et al., 2004). Ro et al demonstrated the preservation of saccadic 
responses during a TMS-induced suppression of awareness, whereas a manual response task 
was affected by the application of the TMS (Ro, et al., 2004). Because Ro et al., link saccadic 
response to role of the SC and manual responses to activity provided by other routes, they 
concluded that input from the SC is necessary for the residual abilities of TMS induced 
blindsight.  
 In contrast to these demonstrations of s-cone and collicular dependency of blindsight, 
it has been demonstrated that reversible blockade of the LGN is coupled to the reversible 
elimination of blindsight responses (Schmid, et al., 2010). This may be the clearest 
demonstration that the residual abilities of blindsight can depend on the LGN rather than the 
SC. This is also consistent with previous demonstrations that ‘spared islands’ of striate cortex 
(in the geniculostriate stream) respond to stimuli presented to the blind field of blindsighted 
patients (Fendrich, Wessinger, & Gazzaniga, 1992). Recently, it has also been demonstrated 
that in the context of a TMS-induced suppression of conscious detection, subjects’ forced 
choice discrimination ability showed no preference for red vs. blue stimuli (Railo, Salminen-
Vaparanta, Henriksson, Revonsuo, & Koivisto, 2012). If this ability were dependent upon SC 
input then we might expect a relative impairment in the selection of blue stimuli. The results 
of Railo et al., therefore provide weak evidence in support of the LGN providing the input for 
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the residual abilities of TMS-induced blindsight. However, because Railo et al., made no 
attempt to mask the stimuli in terms of a luminance change, the conclusions that can be 
drawn are limited. 
 These conflicting and equally compelling demonstrations of the neural basis for the 
preserved abilities of blindsight indicate that the debate over the pathways is far from 
resolved. In the current experiments, applying this s-cone intervention therefore allowed 
assessment of the role of collicular tracks in the preserved abilities of TMS-induced 
blindsight. 
 
3.1.4 Synopsis of experimental aims for the on-line TMS 
experiments 
 
 The aims of this series of experiments were first to establish the time course of 
causally relevant information flow through visual cortical areas in the support of visual 
consciousness and reportedly ‘unseen’ perception.  Second, the intention was to investigate 
the contributions made to such processing from sub-cortical pathways, particularly those via 
the SC and LGN. We therefore sought to investigate the correspondence between early 
feedforward and unconscious processing, as well as the dependency of conscious processing 
upon recurrent activity. If this correspondence holds, and the effects are consistent with 
previous reports, then the disruption of recurrent processing (~100ms) should lead to TMS-
induced blindsight. Within the context of TMS-induced blindsight the dependency of the 
preserved abilities upon input from the SC can be obtained via the use of s-cone stimuli, 
where – if the collicular hypothesis is correct – ‘unseen’ abilities should be diminished 
relative to those in response to luminance stimuli.  
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3.2 Task adaptations for on-line TMS study 
 
3.2.1 Modifications 
 
 The difficulties with the task encountered in the off-line experiments approximate to 
the possibility of there being some residual awareness that might facilitate discrimination 
ability when stimuli are reportedly ‘unseen’, and low incidence of false alarms (highlighted in 
section 2.8). In an attempt to alleviate some of these difficulties two modifications of the task 
were implemented. 
 The first and most important task modification was the introduction of a further 
question: ‘Did you see something?’ This was added to limit the impact of the problem, 
common in blindsight studies, that there is the possibility that some residual awareness of the 
target stimulus could support ‘unseen’ discrimination performance, even when the level of 
awareness is insufficient to elicit a categorical ‘yes’ response (Campion, et al., 1983). The 
additional question was explained to subjects as corresponding to lower levels of awareness. 
They were instructed to respond positively to this question if they saw something that may 
have been an arrow and/or were unsure (see appendix A4 participant instructions). 
Alternatively, if the subjects thought the trial to be equivalent to a stimulus-absent condition 
then they were to respond ‘No’ to both ‘Did you see the arrow?’ and ‘Did you see 
something?’ In this way, any accessible awareness that the subject holds of the stimulus on a 
given trial should lead to the exclusion of that trial from the category of ‘unseen’ 
discriminations. This experimental manipulation not only reduces the concern that residual 
conscious awareness could facilitate ‘unseen’ discrimination judgements; it also allows the 
subject to register degrees of awareness against which the efficacy of interventions can be 
compared. 
 Another reason for the inclusion of the additional ‘something?’ question was that 
some subjects also reported a degree of uncertainty during some trials of the off-line TMS 
experiments. The addition of the ‘something?’ question is therefore partly intended as a 
response to this phenomenological lead (Gallagher, 2003; Lutz, 2007). In addition, type II 
blindsight abilities have been associated with awareness that ‘something’ occurred in the 
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visual field without subjects being aware of what that ‘something’ was (Cowey, 2010; 
Weiskrantz, 1996). The presence of some vague feeling that something may have been 
presented in contrast to clear explicit detection of arrows may also be seen as corresponding 
to Ned Block’s differentiation between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 2007), 
which is discussed in section 4.6. The ‘something’ question was therefore also intended to 
reflect these potential aspects of blindsight. The inspiration for the addition of this question 
should, in addition to the suggestions made by the subjects, also be partly attributed to the 
Perceptual Awareness Scale of Ramsoy and Overgaard (2004), which measures four levels of 
reported awareness (as opposed to the three included here), but which does not make use of 
SDT in its application.  
 
 
Figure 3.2.1.1. Examples of stimuli used, illustrating arrows for luminance and s-
cone conditions, a stimulus-absent frame and a non-arrow luminance frame. 
 
 The second task modification was the addition of a non-arrow condition to the 
stimulus-absent condition. These were bars, equal in luminance (or s-cone colour in the s-
cone condition) to that of the arrow, but containing no directional information, see figure 
3.2.1.1. These control stimuli were presented on half the stimulus-absent trials (25% of all 
trials). This manipulation increased the number of false alarm responses in arrow detection 
irrespective of TMS conditions, which has the advantage of increasing the reliability of SDT 
analyses (Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). Subjects were instructed to respond positively to 
the ‘something’ question and negatively to the arrow question if they were aware of this non-
arrow being present, as was reflected in the application of SDT (see below and appendix A4). 
The logic of using the something question in this way firstly ensured that the subjects were 
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performing the task correctly, i.e. not simply responding to the ‘something?’ in the same way 
as the arrow question, nor could they simply be responding ‘yes’ to ‘something?’ on all trials, 
as these response patterns would have prevented them from achieving threshold levels of 
detection. Secondly, if subjects’ criteria were such that they were responding positively to a 
change in luminance in the range of the arrows’ presentation (or the presence of colour in s-
cone conditions) rather than when they actually saw an arrow, the presence of the non-arrow, 
classed as stimulus-absent, would again prevent them from obtaining threshold levels of 
detection. 
 The imbalance of stimulus-absent conditions and the now two classes of non-targets 
further necessitates the use of non-parametric versions of SDT which can cope with such 
imbalances, thus confirming the use of Pr as the preferred measure of sensitivity and Br as 
the preferred measure of bias (Corwin, 1994). 
 There was also an additional modification to the stimuli, which did not relate to 
matters concerning the off-line experiments. This was that the background colour on which 
the stimuli were presented was changed from black to the mean grey of the luminance noise 
stimuli (Smithson, 2003)(25 cd/m2). This was the same background luminance as used in the 
s-cone calibration tasks (see 3.3.2). 
 The other notable difference between the off-line and on-line experiments (other than 
the mode of TMS) was in statistical approach adopted. Since some of the hypotheses of the 
on-line section required tests for both variance and invariance between experimental 
conditions, we employed a combination of orthodox significance tests and complementary 
Bayesian analyses (Dienes, 2008; Gallistel, 2009). Unlike conventional significance testing, 
Bayesian analyses can estimate the likelihood of the null hypothesis given data (Dienes, 
2008; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). 
 
3.2.2 Measures used 
 
 The addition of the ‘something?’ question and the non-arrow stimuli increased the 
number of SDT measures that could potentially be applied to the task. To minimise the 
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number of comparisons, the measures to which statistics are applied should be reduced to 
those that directly correspond to the logic of the task and address the hypotheses. 
 The primary measure of subjects’ conscious awareness of the arrow applied the 
following responses to the SDT classes as follows: 
Table 3.2.2.1. SDT classes for measures of conscious awareness (PrC) and bias in 
conscious detection (BrC). FA = False Alarms; CR = Correct Rejections. Hit Rate = 
Hits/(Hits + Miss); False Alarm Rate = FA/(FA+CR); Pr = Hit Rate – False Alarm 
Rate; Br = False Alarm Rate /(1-Pr) (Corwin, 1994). 
  RESPONSE   
STIMULUS Something? Arrow? SDT 
Class 
Arrow Yes Yes HIT 
  No No MISS 
Non-arrow Yes Yes FA 
  Yes No CR 
  Yes Yes FA 
Nothing Yes No FA 
  No No CR 
 
 The task aimed to quantify the subjects’ conscious awareness of the arrow, so ‘hits’ 
could only be achieved by reporting awareness of the arrow (and something) in the arrow’s 
presence. Conversely, a ‘miss’ could be achieved by denying awareness of the ‘arrow’ and 
‘something’ in the presence of an arrow. ‘False alarms’ could be achieved by reporting that 
the arrow was present when it was not, and by reporting that ‘something’ occurred when no 
stimuli were present. This meant that even small shifts in bias as reflected by their use of the 
‘something’ question might be reflected in the derived measures. Registering ‘correct 
rejections’ also made use of the ‘something’ question: reporting having not seen an arrow 
when none was presented was a ‘correct rejection’, as was responding ‘no’ to the arrow 
question and ‘yes’ to the ‘something’ question in the presence of a non-arrow. This profile 
was not classed as a ‘hit’ (which it was in terms of the non-arrow) because the principal task 
instruction referred to awareness of the arrow stimulus. There are of course many other ways 
in which responses could be classified to bring out different aspects of the task, but the above 
scheme was most closely aligned to the logic and phenomenology of the task. This 
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classification of SDT was also discussed with the subjects after their completion of the 
experiment or piloting, and took the descriptions they offered in reference to their experience 
of the task into account (Gallagher, 2003; Varela, 1996). The classification was established 
prior to the analysis of the data and used for the primary measure of conscious detection 
(PrC) and bias in detection (BrC).  
 The presence of the ‘something’ question meant that trials in which subjects reported 
not seeing the ‘arrow’ and not seeing ‘something’ could be assuredly categorised as lacking 
in conscious awareness of the stimuli. The use of these double ‘unseen’ discriminations to 
illustrate blindsight type effects means that the responses are more akin to type I blindsight 
than type II and hence of more utility in revealing the contrast of interest with overt conscious 
experience. The measure of ‘unseen’ perceptual ability was taken as proportion correct in 
terms of the left/right discrimination, when subjects reported both not having seen the 
‘arrow’, nor ‘something’ (PcU). 
 These two measures (PrC and PcU) are the principal dependent variables of the 
following experiments, used to illustrate conscious detection and reportedly ‘unseen’ 
discrimination abilities. Fluctuations in secondary measure of response criteria (BrC) are also 
considered. There are also other measures derived from responses to the task that may shed 
light on secondary questions, the principal additional measure discussed being subjects’ 
propensity to report awareness of ‘something’, which is discussed in Chapter 4.6 and 
appendix A5.  
 
3.3 Between-subjects study, experiment 3A. 
 
3.3.1 Between-subjects introduction 
 
As noted in section 1.2.2, blindsight is the intriguing phenomenon in which observers 
can successfully identify visual stimuli for which they deny awareness (Weiskrantz, 1986). 
This condition typically arises from damage to the primary visual cortex (Sanders, et al., 
1974) and can also be mimicked through reversible interference using TMS (e.g. Boyer, et 
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al., 2005). By dissociating visual ability from awareness, blindsight offers a unique insight 
into the neural basis of consciousness and perception lacking in awareness (Dretske, 2000), 
yet a consensus view remains elusive. Two central problems remain unsolved. The first, long-
standing, question concerns which neural pathways are crucial for vision lacking in 
awareness (Cowey, 2010). The second, more recent, question concerns the temporal 
dynamics of vision – whether residual ability in blindsight is supported by early feedforward 
processing, and whether the later recurrent phase of processing corresponds to conscious 
vision (Lamme, 2001). 
A classic point of contention in blindsight has been whether the residual vision 
depends on the ancient retinotectal pathway between the eye and superior colliculus (SC), 
which remains the main visual pathway in reptiles and birds (Cowey, 2010). Information via 
this route can bypass the visual cortex rapidly to reach frontal and parietal brain regions 
(Fries, 1984). In primates, however, the collicular pathway has become weakened compared 
with the abundant pathways from retina to visual cortex via the lateral geniculate nucleus 
(LGN). Thus, an alternative to the collicular hypothesis is that blindsight is supported by 
spared fibres or areas within geniculate pathways (Schmid, et al., 2010). Both the collicular 
and geniculate hypotheses have received empirical support from a range of studies (see 
section 3.1.3), with the majority in favour of the collicular hypothesis (Leh, Johansen-Berg, et 
al., 2006; Leh, Mullen, et al., 2006; Leh, et al., 2010; Rafal, Smith, Krantz, Cohen, & 
Brennan, 1990; Ro, et al., 2004; Tamietto, et al., 2010), cf. (Radoeva, et al., 2008; Railo, et 
al., 2012; Schmid, et al., 2010; Wessinger, Fendrich, & Gazzaniga, 1997). 
In this study we directly contrasted the collicular and geniculate accounts of TMS-
induced blindsight by comparing responses to stimuli that do or do not activate the collicular 
pathway, following the approach introduced by Sumner et al., (2002). As shown in figure 
3.1.3.1, the collicular pathway is thought not to receive colour opponent input from short-
wave cones (s-cones) of the retina (de Monasterio, 1978; Schiller & Malpeli, 1977; Sumner, 
et al., 2002). This means that the use of s-cone specific stimuli, when masked by luminance 
noise, will prevent information from passing via the collicular route. 
Recently, the question of how neural processing produces vision has focused on the 
temporal dynamics of information flow. According to a popular account (Lamme, 2001; 
Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000), the onset of a visual stimulus triggers a rapid feedforward 
volley that is sufficient for some degree of unconscious processing; this is then followed 
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(from ~100ms post-stimulus) by recurrent feedback that facilitates awareness. This theory is 
linked to the anatomical question of blindsight as it has implicated collicular tracts in the 
unconscious feedforward sweep. 
 To determine how these temporal dynamics of visual processing interact with 
neuroanatomy, not only were visual stimuli manipulated either to activate or to bypass the 
collicular pathway, but the onset time of occipital TMS was also varied. In the paradigm, 
active or sham (control) TMS was applied in 25Hz pulse pairs over the occipital cortex (see 
figure 3.1.3.1 and 3.3.1.1). To modulate the earliest phases of visual processing, TMS was 
applied at 0-40ms and 40-80ms after stimulus onset. Recurrent processing was targeted by 
applying TMS at 90-130ms and during a later period at 280-320ms. These four periods were 
tested to capture possible independent early and late phases (e.g. Corthout, et al., 2002). The 
target stimulus was an arrow embedded in luminance noise, presented on 50% of all trials 
(figure 3.3.1.1).  On each trial, subjects were asked if they were aware of the arrow stimulus, 
whether they were aware of ‘something’ having been presented (see section 3.1.1) and in 
which direction it was pointing (left or right). Demonstration of blindsight would thus 
manifest as a TMS-induced impairment of conscious detection while leaving the ability to 
discriminate reportedly ‘unseen’ arrows above chance and relatively unaffected by TMS. 
If feedforward and recurrent phases of processing map directly onto unconscious and 
conscious vision (Lamme, 2001) respectively, then we expected early TMS to impair 
‘unseen’ abilities through the selective disruption of feedforward processes, and possibly also 
to reduce awareness through the transmission of impoverished feedforward information. 
Later disruption, on the other hand, was predicted selectively to impair feedback, producing 
the characteristic signature of blindsight in which conscious detection is specifically impaired 
without influencing ‘unseen’ abilities. 
Both the collicular and geniculate hypotheses predict that conscious detection is more 
likely to be disrupted by occipital TMS during later periods (e.g. ≥100 ms) than during earlier 
periods. In addition, both hypotheses predict that corresponding ‘unseen’ discrimination of 
luminance stimuli should be spared – resulting in blindsight – because these stimuli are 
processed by all visual pathways. Where these competing accounts can be dissociated is 
through ‘unseen’ discrimination performance for s-cone stimuli. According to the collicular 
hypothesis, there should be no blindsight for s-cone stimuli: whenever TMS impairs 
conscious detection, ‘unseen’ discrimination should also suffer because the collicular route is 
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unable to provide residual information. In contrast, according to the geniculate hypothesis, 
blocking the collicular pathway should be inconsequential and thus s-cone stimuli should be 
equally likely to produce blindsight. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.1.1. Illustration of the times at which TMS was delivered relative to 
stimulus presentation in the four experiments presented in this chapter.  
 
3.3.2 Between-subjects materials and methods 
 
3.3.2.1 Subjects 
 
Sixteen neurologically healthy subjects with normal colour vision were recruited (7 
male, aged 20 to 32, mean 24).  All procedures were approved by the research ethics 
committee at the School of Psychology, Cardiff University.  
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3.3.2.2 Stimuli and task 
 
Each trial commenced with a fixation cross (1.5 s) followed by luminance noise, 
which was produced by alternating the luminance of the bars at 50Hz (figure 3.3.1.1 and 
3.2.1.1). The noise continued for 800ms before the onset of the target stimulus (20ms; or 
noise of equal duration on stimulus-absent trials). Following target offset, the noise continued 
for a further 380ms (figure 3.3.1.1). The three questions were then asked and responses 
collected on a standard computer keyboard. The questions and measures are described and 
discussed in section 3.2. 
Two classes of target stimuli were employed (figure 3.2.1.1): luminance stimuli, 
which were defined by an increase in luminance, and s-cone stimuli, which were defined by 
an increase in colour saturation that stimulated s-cones, but not (or minimally) long and 
medium wave cones (Sumner, et al., 2002; Sumner, Nachev, Castor-Perry, Isenman, & 
Kennard, 2006; Sumner, et al., 2004). To mask the s-cone stimuli from R/M channels 
(Bompas & Sumner, 2009; Sumner, Nachev, et al., 2006), all stimuli were presented against a 
background of luminance noise (mean luminance of noise and background: 25 cd/m2; range 
of noise: 10 cd/m2). The noise occupied a 1.91o square at fixation, while the arrows and non-
arrows subtended 0.81 × 1.43o. To aid stimulus comparability of stimulus classes, the noise 
also contained low levels of colour noise along the tritan axis (range: ±8% of mean s-cone 
saturation of stimuli). Arrow stimuli were present on 50% of all trials, while non-arrows and 
stimulus-absent trials comprised 25% of trials each. The use of one or other of the two 
possible non-arrows was randomised. 
 
3.3.2.3 Procedure 
 
Prior to the main experiment, each subject completed approximately four hours of 
preparatory testing. During this phase, stimulus levels were calibrated to ensure that all 
subjects performed at comparable levels of detection, subjects were screened for suitability 
for TMS, and the phosphene threshold was obtained (PT, Franca, et al., 2006). Subjects’ 
individual tritan lines in colour space were also established, enabling s-cone stimuli to be 
95 
 
presented (Smithson, 2003, detailed below). The reason subject-specific tritan lines must be 
established is that there are individual differences and variance across retinal locations within 
subjects in the wavelength of light that specifically activate s-cones (Smithson, 2003). Thus, 
were a non-specific s-cone colour to be used (e.g. 00 in MacLeod-Boynton 1979 space) such 
a colour may have activated additional channels in some subjects. 
Subjects then completed six experimental sessions of ~1 hour. Each session consisted 
of 4 blocks, one for each of the experimental conditions: s-cone stimuli or luminance stimuli 
combined with sham or active TMS, with the order randomised between sessions. Blocks 
consisted of 80 trials, including the 4 stimulus types (left arrow, right arrow, non-arrow and 
stimulus-absent) and 4 TMS onset times (0-40, 40-80, 90-130 and 280-320ms) in a 
randomised order.  
The order of the response questions (Arrow? Something? Left/Right?) was different 
for each session, so that across the experiment each subject completed a fully 
counterbalanced set of question orders. Subjects were given ten practice trials at the start of 
each session to become familiar with the order. The sequence in which these question orders 
was presented was randomised between subjects.  
 
3.3.2.4 Equipment and TMS procedure 
 
Cortical stimulation was delivered with a Magstim high-power 90mm round coil in 
conjunction with a Magstim Rapid2 biphasic stimulator. Pulse delivery was controlled via a 
Cambridge Research Systems (CRS) Visage running Real Time Sequencer software on a 
Matlab platform, which also governed stimulus presentation on a gamma-corrected 21” 
Mitsubishi CRT monitor (100Hz vertical refresh rate). Pairs of TMS pulses were applied at 
95% of PT (group mean 54.4% of maximum stimulator output ±11.5% SD). The same 
method for determining PT was used as described for a single analysis block in Experiment 
2C, with the exception that there was no time critical aspect to the calibration applied here. 
This TMS intensity was adopted because higher intensities in pilot experiments caused 
blinks, twitches and phosphenes that the subjects reported as visible during the task. In pilot 
experiments, lower intensities and single pulses of TMS were found not to produce reliable 
effects on performance. The coil was oriented with the handle pointing upward and side ‘B’ 
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facing the subject, so that the induced current passed initially in a left-to-right direction. Coil 
positioning was initially based on anatomical proximity to the calcarine sulcus, localised in 
individual structural MRI scans. Immediately prior to each active TMS block, the intensity 
was set to 120% of PT and the coil was moved so that it produced a phosphene that the 
subject reported as being ‘reasonably clear’ and ‘at least in part, covering the centre of their 
visual field’ with their eyes closed. This procedure usually required ~10 pulses. The coil 
position was then recorded using a Brainsight system (Rogue Research Inc.) and used for the 
subsequent block of trials. If the subject moved beyond a 5mm tolerance of the original 
position, then the block was paused and the coil repositioned to the recorded site. An 
approximation of this position was used in the sham condition but with the coil perpendicular 
to the scalp so that the rim pointed toward the head, with a 9mm plastic spacer inserted 
between the scalp and coil to replicate the contact artefact.  
To exclude effects of TMS-induced blinks on performance, eye tracking was 
undertaken throughout the experiment using a CRS chin-rest mounted infrared eye tracker 
(250Hz).  Trials were excluded on the basis of blinks identified by a shift in pupil position 
followed by a transitory loss of pupil signal, coincident with the stimulus presentation. 
Overall, 241 of a total 30,720 trials were excluded from the analysis (<0.8%).  
 
3.3.2.5 Statistical analyses 
 
Effects were assessed using repeated measure ANOVAs with TMS site (2 levels: 
active and sham), stimulus type (2 levels: luminance and s-cone) and time of TMS relative to 
stimulus onset (4 levels: 0-40,40-80,90-130 and 280-320ms) as factors, conducted separately 
on measures of conscious detection (PrC), ‘unseen’ discrimination (PcU) and bias in 
conscious detection (BrC). Analyses of simple main effects exploited the relevant 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected error terms from the ANOVAs (Winer, Brown, & Michels, 
1991), and the sham condition as a baseline. ‘Unseen’ discrimination performance was 
assessed relative to chance using single-sample t-tests. All t-tests and analyses of simple main 
effects applied the Holm–Bonferroni method of correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 
1979). 
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Complementary Bayesian analyses were based upon models representing the critical 
hypotheses. The Bayes factor (B) represents the strength of support for the alternative 
hypothesis (H1) relative to the null (Dienes, 2008), with B>1 indicating evidence in favour of 
H1 and B<1 indicating evidence in favour of the null. In practice, values of B greater than 3 
or smaller than 1/3 are regarded as providing substantial evidence in favour of H1 or the null 
hypothesis, respectively (Dienes, 2011; Jeffreys, 1961). Bayesian tests were conducted 
separately on both positive and negative changes from the sham baseline in order to avoid 
specifying opposing changes within a single model, with the hypotheses represented by a 
uniform distribution (Dienes, 2008). Since the critical measures were calculated relative to a 
baseline, zero was selected as the starting point for the distributions. The maximum 
reasonable shift on both measures was 0.5 and so was used as the upper limit for the 
theoretical distributions. To assess TMS-dependent effects, the analysis was applied to the 
change in measures from sham at each level of TMS onset time and stimulus condition. To 
assess TMS independent effects of stimulus type on ‘unseen’ abilities we analysed data from 
the sham condition only.  This collapsed data across TMS onset times, and utilised the s-cone 
condition as the baseline for comparison. This was to ensure that baseline differences in task 
performance could not explain effects in the presence of the active TMS condition. 
To distinguish between the collicular and geniculate accounts we tested for 
differences in ‘unseen’ performance between stimulus types, during TMS-induced blindsight 
(as observed 90-130ms after stimulus onset). For this reason, the comparisons involving 
‘unseen’ discrimination at this time were reported individually (s-cone and luminance relative 
to sham) and a further analysis was undertaken which directly compared the change in PcU 
from sham between luminance vs. s-cone stimuli. The vector for this Bayesian analysis was 
thus calculated as: (Luminanceoccipital - sham) - (s-coneoccipital - sham). The hypothesis for this 
analysis was represented by a uniform distribution between 0 and 0.5, corresponding to a 
benefit bestowed by the additional input of luminance stimuli. Also, for these comparisons 
involving ‘unseen’ discrimination with TMS at 90-130ms, the complementary t-tests were 
reported, as were the B statistics representing effects in the opposite direction. Because each 
comparison involved 16 independent data points (subjects), appropriate standard error 
adjustments were applied, as recommended by Dienes (2008). 
Tests for outlier rejection were applied at a subject level using Chauvenet’s criterion 
(Taylor, 1997). No subjects were excluded using this criterion. 
98 
 
 
3.3.2.6 Task calibration 
 
  Detection thresholds were calculated using a psychophysical method of constants. 
Following a period of familiarisation with the task, subjects completed approximately ten 
blocks over a range of stimulus intensities, separately for s-cone and luminance stimuli. For 
luminance stimuli, the threshold was obtained by adjusting stimulus intensity, whereas for s-
cone stimuli the colour saturation was varied along the s-cone axis / tritan line. Data were 
then regressed using a sigmoidal or linear function (depending on fit quality), solving for the 
intensity which produced a PrC of 0.5; this corresponded to the stimulus level at which 
subjects reported consciously seeing the stimulus on 50% of target-present trials if no false 
alarms were reported. Following the initial calibration, subjects then completed several 
blocks at the derived intensity and minor adjustments were made to the stimulus levels to 
compensate for any learning effects, thus maintaining PrC≅0.5. At the start of each 
experimental session, subjects completed at least one pre-block with sham TMS (40 trials), 
and similar adjustments were made as required (criteria >±0.1 PrC from 0.5). If subjects 
completed two sessions in one day, then the mean value for the previous sham block was 
taken as the starting point for subsequent recalibration. The mean luminance for luminance 
stimuli was 36.5 cd/m2 (±3.5 SD). Subject-specific s-cone stimuli were produced following 
the methods described in Smithson et al (2003) and used in several previous experiments 
(Anderson, Husain, & Sumner, 2008; Bompas, Sterling, Rafal, & Sumner, 2008; Bompas & 
Sumner, 2008, 2009, 2011; Sumner, 2006; Sumner, et al., 2002; Sumner, Nachev, et al., 
2006; Sumner, et al., 2004). This procedure yielded individual s-cone colours with the 
following coordinates in CIE 1931 space: Mean (±SD): 0.249 (0.009), 0.186 (0.022), 25.067 
(0.809) and is described below. 
 
3.3.2.7 S-cone Calibration 
 
Calibration of s-cone stimuli within each subject followed the methodology outlined 
by Smithson et al., (2003). In brief, this procedure included a four-alternative forced-choice 
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detection task to ascertain the hue to which subjects were maximally insensitive during a 
period of ‘transient tritanopia’(Mollon & Polden, 1975): their tritan line. Transient tritanopia 
is a brief (~2 seconds) period where the retina (and/or retinal ganglion cells) are rendered 
insensitive to short wave input, following a period of exposure to a yellow-field stimulus and 
subsequent darker field exposure. During this period, subjects should be selectively 
insensitive to s-cone input; hence, the elevation of threshold for detecting coloured stimuli 
should be maximal in the presence of stimuli that specifically activate s-cone channels. 
To ensure that subjects were performing this task on the basis of s-cone sensitivity 
rather than changes in luminance, the luminance of each colour stimulus was adjusted in a 
separate ‘minimum motion task’ (Sumner, 2000), designed to equate coloured stimuli with 
the surrounding grey patches. During this task, bars of s-cone colour and luminance grey 
were presented vertically above one another, alternating every 50ms, and giving rise to the 
illusion of motion. Using an up-down staircase to adjust the luminance of the bars, this 
apparent discrepancy between the coloured and grey bars was minimised, resulting in 
luminance values that were then used in the production of subsequent s-cone stimuli. The 
calibration stimuli appeared within the same spatial location as the noise of the experimental 
stimuli, used the same background luminance, and were presented using the same equipment 
as the main experiment.   
Chromaticity vectors for the initial calibration were set to a range of -15º to +15º, in 
5º intervals of MacLeod-Boynton space, where 0º is the theoretical average tritan line for 
foveal viewing. The procedure commenced by estimating the point of equi-luminance for 
these seven vectors (-15º, -10º, -5º, 0º, +5º, +10º, +15º standard MacLeod-Boynton 1979 
space) using the minimum motion task, including 40 trials for each vector that were randomly 
interleaved in up-down staircases (step-size of 2cd/m2). The resulting luminosities were then 
used to construct the seven stimuli for the estimation of transient tritanopia. This phase 
involved 25 trials per stimulus, which were again interleaved. The initial adapting exposure 
to the yellow-field lasted 25 seconds, with a 3 second exposure between trials. Immediately 
following adaptation, target stimuli were then presented for 250ms in one of four locations. 
The other target locations displayed a change in luminance within a 2 cd/m2 range. The 
vector that produced the most elevated threshold was taken as an approximation of the tritan 
vector and used for a subsequent more accurate calibration in which three to five vectors 
were selected around the initial peak and the procedures repeated. If no peak was observed, 
or if a trend indicated that the peak might lie outside the -15º to +15º range, more eccentric 
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hue angles were tested. This iterative procedure was stopped when a peak was observed with 
lower threshold levels ±1º to either side. The final vector was taken as the subject’s tritan line 
and the minimum motion task was repeated to ensure equi-luminance. If no reliable peak 
could be established, subjects were excluded from the subsequent experiments. Three 
subjects were excluded in addition to the 16 who participated in the full experiment. 
 
3.3.2.8 Rationale for TMS Pulse Timing 
 
Pilot experiments indicated that pairs of TMS pulses were more effective than single 
pulses in suppressing perception. In addition, pairs of pulses did not produce reportable 
phosphenes during the task (consistent with Rauschecker, Bestmann, Walsh, & Thilo, 2004). 
As noted, the timing of pulses was selected carefully to target early and late stages of visual 
processing. More specifically, TMS has been reported to disrupt the earliest stages of visual 
processing from 20ms after stimulus onset (Corthout, Uttl, Walsh, et al., 1999; Koivisto, et 
al., 2010) motivating the 0-40ms intervention. Although controversial, two temporally 
distinct suppressions or ‘dips’ in perception have also been described (Camprodon, et al., 
2010; Corthout, et al., 2002; Corthout, Uttl, Walsh, et al., 1999; Corthout, Uttl, Ziemann, et 
al., 1999; Heinen, et al., 2005; Juan & Walsh, 2003; Koivisto, et al., 2010; Stevens, McGraw, 
Ledgeway, & Schluppeck, 2009). In order to demonstrate independence of these two periods, 
an intervening, unaffected period needs to be demonstrated, which motivated in part the 
inclusion of the 40-80ms intervention. In addition, it has been suggested (Camprodon, et al., 
2010; Sack, et al., 2009) that the early feedforward period occurs later than described in some 
previous studies (Corthout, Uttl, Walsh, et al., 1999; Koivisto, et al., 2010); if so, then the 40-
80ms intervention would be expected to capture such later feedforward activity.  
The intervention at 90-130ms corresponds to the most clearly replicated period of 
TMS-induced visual disruption, which peaks at ~100ms (e.g. Amassian, et al., 1989; 
Kammer, et al., 2005). Since the input from s-cone stimuli is thought to arrive in the occipital 
cortex slightly later (~20ms) than the input from luminance stimuli (Bompas & Sumner, 
2008; Cottaris & De Valois, 1998; Maunsell et al., 1999), and since our aim was to achieve 
comparable suppression in detection across stimuli types, the mean pulse time for this epoch 
(110ms) was slightly later than 100ms. Activity within the occipital cortex at ~300ms and 
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beyond has been widely linked to higher cognitive processes and re-entrant processing (e.g. 
Chambers, et al., 2012; Liddell, et al., 2004; Sergent, et al., 2005). Relatively few studies 
have applied occipital TMS as late as 300ms, although the published exceptions demonstrate 
suppressive effects during similar late epochs (Camprodon, et al., 2010; Chambers, et al., 
2012; Heinen, et al., 2005). The 280-320ms intervention was therefore chosen to target this 
very late period. 
 
3.3.3 Between-Subjects Results 
 
As an overview, conscious detection was suppressed by TMS during the middle and 
later time periods, whereas ‘unseen’ performance remained above chance and statistically 
unaffected, indicating characteristic TMS-induced blindsight. The key result was that s-cone 
and luminance stimuli produced the same pattern of results during the principal blindsight 
epoch (~100ms), indicating that the residual abilities of TMS-induced blindsight did not rely 
on the collicular pathway. Beyond this, it was also demonstrated that the TMS appeared to 
facilitate rather than impair conscious detection at the earliest time point (0-40ms), for 
luminance stimuli only. Finally, TMS impaired conscious detection at the latest time point 
(280-320ms), also only occurred for luminance stimuli.  
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Figure 3.3.3.1. Sham-normalised effects of occipital TMS on (A) conscious detection 
(PrC) and (B) ‘unseen’ discrimination (Proportion correct ‘Unseen’ PcU), plotted 
according to stimulus type (s-cone or luminance) and TMS onset time. PrC is 
calculated as a non-parametric equivalent of d’ (Corwin, 1994). Error bars are the 
within-subjects standard error  (Loftus & Masson, 1994). Occipital TMS selectively 
enhanced (0-40ms) or impaired (280-320ms) PrC for luminance stimuli relative to s-
cone stimuli, while impairing PrC for both stimulus types at 90-130ms. No significant 
effect of TMS was observed for PrC at 40-80ms, or for PcU at any TMS onset times.  
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3.5.3.1 Conscious detection 
 
If conscious processing is supported by recurrent activity then TMS during middle 
and later time periods (≥100ms) should reduce conscious detection performance. Although no 
specific predictions were cast in terms of s-cone dependency, such effects are clearly a 
possibility, given the significant contribution of R/M pathways to cortical input (Nealey & 
Maunsell, 1994). Indeed, the modulation of awareness by TMS was both time- and stimulus- 
dependent: a significant three-way interaction (F(3,45) =3.3, p=0.028; see figure 3.3.3.1.A) was 
revealed between factors of TMS condition (occipital, sham), TMS onset time (0-40, 40-80, 
90-130, 280-320) and stimulus type (luminance, s-cone).  
For luminance stimuli, occipital stimulation significantly facilitated conscious 
detection relative to sham when delivered early after stimulus onset (0-40ms; t(15) =5.59, 
p<0.001), while having no significant effect at a slightly later time (40-80ms; t(15) =0.27, 
p=0.792), and then impairing detection at even later times of 90-130ms and 280-320ms(t(15) 
=4.19, p<0.001; t(15) =5.09, p<0.001). For s-cone stimuli, however, occipital TMS 
significantly reduced conscious detection only when applied at 90-130ms (t(15) =4.00, 
p=0.002; all other t <1.7, p>0.098). Additional comparisons of the change in conscious 
detection relative to sham revealed that both the early potentiation (0-40ms) and later 
impairment (280-320ms) were significantly greater for luminance stimuli compared with s-
cone stimuli (t(15) =2.70, p=0.016. t(15) =3.53, p=0.004 respectively). At 90-130ms, however, 
the impairment in conscious detection did not significantly dissociate between stimulus types 
(t(15) =0.23, p=0.822). 
A convergent analysis of TMS-induced changes in conscious detection was 
undertaken using Bayesian methods. Corresponding analyses of change in conscious 
detection at each level of TMS onset time and stimulus type, baselined to sham, confirmed an 
early potentiation (0-40ms) and late impairment (280-320ms) that was specific to luminance 
stimuli (B=8.96 and B=169.49, respectively) and not observed for s-cone stimuli at 
equivalent times (B=0.31 and B=0.11). At 90-130ms, occipital TMS also impaired conscious 
detection for s-cone stimuli (B=59.98) and less robustly for luminance stimuli (B=1.58). All 
other comparisons of conscious detection between occipital TMS and sham revealed 
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evidence in favour of the null (all B<0.33). This outcome aligns with the orthodox analysis, 
indicating that the early (0-40ms) and late (280-320ms) modulation of conscious detection 
was dependent on inputs via the R/M pathways, whereas the intermediate period of disruption 
(90-130ms) was pathway-independent. 
 
3.3.3.2 ‘Unseen’ discrimination 
 
The key question in this study is whether above-chance ‘unseen’ discrimination is 
maintained in the context of the TMS-induced impairment of conscious detection – i.e. 
whether TMS-induced blindsight occurred – and whether these ‘unseen’ abilities are stimulus 
independent, as predicted by the geniculate hypothesis, or differentially impaired in the 
presence of s-cone vs. luminance stimuli, as predicted by the collicular hypothesis. 
Furthermore, a TMS-induced early suppression of unseen abilities, compared to later time 
periods would support the role of the feedforward sweep in unconscious processing. 
Discrimination performance on ‘unseen’ trials was consistently above chance at all 16 
combinations of TMS condition, TMS onset time, and stimulus type (mean proportion correct 
= 0.71, ± 0.15 SD, all t(15) >3.14, p<0.007 with Holm–Bonferroni correction), indicating that 
the measure tracked a form of perception. In contrast to the analysis of conscious detection, a 
three-way ANOVA of ‘unseen’ discrimination revealed no significant interaction of TMS 
condition × TMS onset time × stimulus type (F(3,45) =0.36, p=0.75; figure 3.3.3.1.B), and no 
significant main effects or lower-order interactions (all F<2.37, all p>0.142). Bayesian 
analyses of the difference in ‘unseen’ discrimination between occipital TMS and sham 
supported the null hypothesis of equivalence in all conditions (all B<0.35). Since this analysis 
included any potential early suppression of ‘unseen’ abilities, these results do not directly 
support a correspondence between early occipital processing and unconscious vision 
(Lamme, 2001, 2006b). 
During the critical time-period where conscious detection was suppressed for both 
stimulus types (90-130ms), ‘unseen’ ability was unaffected by occipital TMS in the presence 
of both s-cone stimuli (Boccipital < sham=0.18, Boccipital > sham=0.15, t(15) =-0.14, p=0.89) and 
luminance stimuli (Boccipital < sham=0.07, Boccipital > sham=0.12, t(15) =0.39, p=0.70). Additional 
comparisons between sham-normalised discrimination performance (occipital – sham) 
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confirmed no reliable difference between stimulus types (Bluminance > s-cone=0.16, Bluminance < s-
cone=0.24; t(15) =0.40, p=0.77). Moreover, the strongest trend in this comparison was a 
tendency for reduced performance to luminance over s-cone stimuli (B=0.24), contrary to the 
pattern predicted by the collicular hypothesis. Taken together, the findings for ‘unseen’ 
discrimination ability are thus consistent with the characteristic signature of blindsight in 
which conscious detection is selectively impaired while ‘unseen’ discrimination performance 
is spared. 
It is notable that PcU is calculated from ‘unseen’ trials only, whereas more trials 
contribute to the measure of conscious detection (PrC calculated from a total of 22,275 trials, 
whereas PcU was calculated from 5,525 trials). Thus, it could be argued that the analysis of 
PcU is hindered by a relative lack of statistical power. To test whether this was the case, an 
additional analysis was undertaken. The estimates of standard error based on these specific 
trial numbers (the number of data points convolved for the number of contributing trials) can 
be compared in order to test whether heterogeneity of variance could be responsible for the 
observation of significant effects on one measure and not another. Keppel (1982) 
recommends a 3:1 ratio of such variances (Fmax ratio) as the cut-off point, beyond which the 
variances should be considered heterogeneous and the conditions non-comparable. For the 
data, the Fmax ratio was calculated as 1.84:1 (0.032/0.017), thus satisfying this requirement.  
If ‘unseen’ abilities were dependent upon input from the SC without disruption of the 
occipital cortex, then this might negate the demonstration of collicular independency, because 
the difference indicating a role for the collicular pathway would be present in the baseline. In 
order to test whether this was the case we contrasted s-cone and luminance stimuli in the 
sham condition the results of which did not reveal any such difference (t(15) =1.51, p=0.15, 
B=0.39). There was a weak non-significant trend, observed in the sham condition, for higher 
‘unseen’ discrimination performance in the presence of luminance vs. s-cone stimuli; this 
suggests that R/M pathways could contribute to ‘unseen’ abilities when there is no disruption 
to early visual areas. However, given that this potential difference occurred in the presence of 
clearly above-chance performance when of R/M inputs are blocked, general (non-blindsight) 
‘unseen’ abilities are unlikely to be crucially dependent upon such input. Furthermore, any 
potential difference between ‘unseen’ performances across stimuli classes in the sham 
condition could (speculatively) be attributed to the observed criterion difference between 
stimuli types: lower performance on ‘unseen’ trials, in the presence of s-cone stimuli, may be 
expected if the criteria subjects used to identify ‘unseen’ trials are more stringent. That is, the 
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analysis of bias (3.3.3.3 below) demonstrated subjects to be more likely to report s-cone 
stimuli as ‘seen’ independently of what has been presented to them. This meant that when 
they reported s-cone stimuli as ‘unseen’ they may have been doing so on the basis of less 
information than was the case for luminance stimuli. This possibility therefore highlights the 
necessity of baselining active TMS conditions to control conditions, such as sham, because 
doing so cancels out the bias difference between stimuli types. 
 
3.3.3.3 Response Bias 
 
It is possible that the pattern of behaviour that characterises blindsight could 
potentially be attributed to changes in response bias together with there being a disruption of 
‘normal’ vision (Campion, et al., 1983; Nisbett, 1977). To alleviate these concerns we applied 
signal detection theory, which provides a measure of conscious detection that is essentially 
independent of response criteria (Pr), and a measure of response bias (Br) that is independent 
of sensitivity (Corwin, 1994). The analysis of Br revealed no higher level interactions, but 
there were main effects: subjects were more prone to respond positively in the presence of 
occipital over sham TMS (site effect: F(1,15) =5.235, p=0.037; replicating Rahnev, Maniscalco, 
Luber, Lau, & Lisanby, 2011), s-cone  over luminance stimuli (stimuli type effect: F(1,15) 
=16.642, p=0.001) and at earlier TMS onset times (time effect F(3,45) =14.931, p<0.001, figure 
3.3.3.3). The reduced propensity to respond ‘yes’ when TMS was applied at later times, 
independently of coil orientation (occipital or sham) is consistent with the effects of auditory 
distraction. Likewise, the stimulus-dependent effects may reflect differences in subjects’ 
attribution of the stimulus noise across the stimuli conditions. The posing of experimental 
questions can affect subject’s experience of the task, independently of stimuli conditions. 
This is the observer paradox (Labov, 1972). The application of active TMS is equally capable 
of producing such a reactive (Ericsson, 2003) effect, potentially independently of direct 
neuronal effects. This therefore could explain the increased propensity to respond positively 
under the active condition. These contingent bias effects are relatively uninformative and 
would have been conflated with effects on veridical conscious perception were it not for the 
application of SDT. These effects are considered in greater depth in section 4.3. 
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Figure 3.3.3.3. Bias in conscious detection (BrC) for all TMS and stimulus 
conditions. Higher values indicate greater propensity to respond ‘yes’. Error bars are 
±1 SEM (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
3.3.4 Between-Subjects Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 3A suggest that the residual abilities of TMS-induced 
blindsight shown here are predominantly geniculate (Schmid, et al., 2010) rather than 
collicular (e.g. Ro, et al., 2004) in origin. Blindsight was demonstrated most clearly by the 
suppression of reported awareness at 90-130ms for both stimulus types, in the presence of 
above chance ‘unseen’ discrimination. This corresponds to the classically reported epoch of 
visual suppression by occipital TMS (Amassian, et al., 1989). The central question posed was 
whether or not the concurrent ‘unseen’ abilities were dependent upon stimulus type, i.e. 
whether or not the residual abilities were maintained when input via the SC was blocked. The 
preservation of such abilities in the presence of s-cone stimuli indicates that the residual 
abilities in this case of TMS-induced blindsight are supported by chromatic geniculate 
pathways rather than the collicular route. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the absence of 
stimulus-specific effects on the measure of ‘unseen’ discrimination was due to the stimuli not 
isolating the R/M pathways or the TMS being ineffective, because both TMS effects and 
108 
 
stimulus specificity were reliably demonstrated upon the contrasting measure of conscious 
detection. 
How can the previous evidence in favour of the collicular hypothesis be reconciled 
with the current evidence in support of the geniculate hypothesis? Much of the evidence 
consistent with collicular mediation does not in fact logically exclude a geniculate role, but in 
patients where the geniculate pathways are surgically cut the evidence for collicular 
mediation is particularly strong (Leh, Johansen-Berg, et al., 2006; Leh, et al., 2010; Tamietto, 
et al., 2010). Our results are not inconsistent with a role for the collicular pathway in certain 
kinds of residual ability in some contexts, particularly those following permanent brain 
injuries where plasticity may alter the functional contribution of different pathways (Huxlin, 
2008; Mittmann & Eysel, 2001). Yet, our findings do negate the claim of collicular necessity 
(Ro, et al., 2004). Rather than exclusively supporting the geniculate hypothesis and 
disconfirming the collicular hypothesis, the position taken is that the data disconfirms the 
core idea implicit in the long debate between these theories – that because blindsight has been 
categorised as a single phenomenon we should expect a single pathway to support it. 
Different pathways are likely to support unconscious abilities that depend on different types 
of information (Danckert & Rossetti, 2005). 
Although the results provide no evidence for collicular dependency of unconscious 
abilities, R/M pathways did make a time-specific contribution to conscious vision. 
Interestingly, the earliest effect we observed (0-40ms) was a facilitation of conscious 
detection. Early TMS has been previously reported to cause either suppression (Corthout, 
Uttl, Walsh, et al., 1999; Corthout, Uttl, Ziemann, et al., 1999) or enhancement 
(Abrahamyan, et al., 2011; Schwarzkopf, et al., 2011) in perception. Such enhancement 
effects have been attributed to the addition of neuronal noise, producing stochastic resonance 
and driving cortical activity across a threshold for detection (see Schwarzkopf, et al., 2011). 
Earlier potentiation and later suppression of functionality can be further understood if the role 
of the early period is seen as preparatory (Marr, 1982), potentially in the service of later 
conscious processing. Because the state of activation leading up to the arrival of information 
is crucial in determining whether or not that information is perceived (Mathewson, Gratton, 
Fabiani, Beck, & Ro, 2009; Romei, et al., 2010), the application of early TMS may thus 
provide a pedestal of activity, priming the region for subsequent processing. This might not 
be the case for later applications because increasing activity without interfering with 
information is only possible when TMS is applied prior to the arrival of that information. 
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Here this rapid facilitation was only realised in the presence of luminance stimuli, indicating 
that this early period was dependent upon fast (Bompas & Sumner, 2008; Cottaris & De 
Valois, 1998; Maunsell, et al., 1999; McKeefry, Parry, & Murray, 2003) input provided by 
R/M pathways. 
The observed disruption of conscious detection at later TMS onset-times is consistent 
with existing proposals (Lamme, 2001) that delayed re-entrant processing supports conscious 
vision. The latest of these effects (280-320ms) occurred only in the presence of luminance 
stimuli, indicating that information conveyed via R/M pathways supports this later period. 
What then provides this late R/M input? Our findings do not provide a definitive answer for 
this question. However, it seems unlikely to be dependent upon feedforward or recurrent 
activity that has first passed through the affected early visual cortex, because s-cone inputs 
are thought to be integrated with other signals within these regions (Cottaris & De Valois, 
1998; Sincich & Horton, 2005). It is more plausible that R/M information is first passed 
through unaffected, more rostral, areas – possibly via the aforementioned extrastriate 
pathways – and is then fed back to interact with feedforward processing. In this way, the later 
stage of conscious processing may have been susceptible to later TMS because it is supported 
by R/M inputs that initially enter frontoparietal networks (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008) 
before later feeding back into the disrupted occipital cortex.  
The differential directions of early and late effects upon conscious detection, together 
with the Bayesian analysis indicating an intervening (40-80ms) absence of effects, suggests 
that there are multiple periods during which TMS can affect perception. However, because 
the first period is expressed by an increase in the measure, the existence of more than a single 
‘dip’ or period over which TMS directly interferes with responses to arrows, is not supported 
by this data. This issue is discussed further in section 3.5.3. 
In conclusion, the residual visual abilities of TMS-induced blindsight shown here 
originate primarily from spared geniculate projections. These findings thus stand in contrast 
to the popular explanation of blindsight that relies on the collicular pathway (Ro, et al., 
2004), instead adding weight to evidence that spared regions in the geniculate pathway can 
support unconscious vision following occipital disruption (Schmid, et al., 2010). The results 
also indicate that conscious vision depends on activity within the early occipital cortex from 
~100ms after stimulus onset, and that R/M pathways make a contribution to awareness during 
early preparatory (0-40 ms) and later feedback (280-320 ms) stages of visual processing.  
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3.4 Single-subject introduction 
 
 Experiments 3B, 3C and 3D were developed to address very similar questions to those 
posed in Experiment 3A, but with higher temporal resolution than is feasible with multiple 
subjects. In terms of their development over the course of this research, it is worth noting that 
these experiments were originally designed as between-subject studies and were initially 
piloted on three subjects. However, it soon became apparent that applying this quantity of 
testing to multiple subjects was impractical, mainly owing to subject availability and their 
willingness to participate in experiments with such a prolonged exposure to TMS. The 
experiments were therefore adjusted to become single subject case studies where the subject 
underwent approximately 50 hours of testing, conducted over 1 to 3 hour sessions, occurring 
roughly weekly. Data were collected concurrently for the between-subject and single-subject 
studies. 
The single subject study comprised three experiments. The first, Experiment 3B, 
aimed to establish a high-resolution time course for conscious and reportedly ‘unseen’ 
perceptual processing. This involved the application of single pulses (hence described as the 
single-subject single-pulses experiment) of TMS at 24 times relative to stimulus onset (see 
figure 3.3.1.1), designed to cover the range of previously reported effects from very early 
effects ~ 0ms (e.g. Corthout, et al., 2003) to late recurrent effects ~350-400ms (e.g. 
Chambers, et al., 2012), with the exception of the effects of TMS when applied 70-50ms 
before stimuli onset that have been attributed to blinks (Corthout, Uttl, Walsh, et al., 1999). 
The primary question was whether the data would conform to a ‘single dip’ in conscious 
detection as has been reported (e.g. Amassian, et al., 1989), or whether it would be better 
described by two (e.g. Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) or more (e.g. Corthout et al 1999 -2002) 
periods of suppression, as has also been reported. This experiment also served to provide a 
Blindsight Inducing Pulse (BIP) which was exploited in subsequent sections. Once a reliable 
method for demonstrating TMS-induced blindsight had been established (the BIP) it was then 
possible to apply additional manipulations to study the role of different phases of activity and 
pathways in relation to TMS-induced blindsight. 
The second of the single-subject experiments (3C) applied the BIP and additional 
TMS pulses before and after the BIP (described as the double-pulses experiment). This 
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permitted analysis of different phases of activity in the provision of the residual abilities of 
TMS-induced blindsight. Specifically, it has been proposed that the residual abilities of 
blindsight correspond to an early feedforward sweep of activity prior to the conscious 
recurrent phase (Lamme, 2001), presumably being disrupted by the BIP. If so, the 
expectation would be that application of additional pulses prior to the BIP to cause a greater 
suppression of ‘unseen’ abilities than comparable pulses applied after the BIP (Lamme, 
2006b).  
The third section was an s-cone experiment (3D), where performance was compared 
between stimuli types in the context of the BIP. This employed the same stimuli manipulation 
as in the between subjects study (3A), isolating the SC through the use of stimuli which do 
not activate the SC in a colour opponent manner. If the residual abilities of TMS-induced 
blindsight depend on input from the collicular pathway, then we would expect there to be a 
reduction or elimination of ‘unseen’ abilities in the presence of s-cone stimuli relative to 
luminance stimuli. 
 
3.5 Single-subject single-pulse, experiment 
3B. 
 
3.5.1. Single-pulse methods 
 
3.5.1.1 General methods 
 
Methods are as in the between subjects study unless otherwise stated. 
 The subject was male, aged 28 - 29 at the time of the experiment, with normal vision 
and no known neurological abnormalities. He provided informed consent to participation in 
this experiment, which was approved by the ethics committee of the School of Psychology, 
Cardiff University. 
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Prior to experimental sessions the subject’s conscious detection performance was 
calibrated to Pr = 0.6 in the presence of luminance stimuli. Ability to discriminate arrows 
above chance when reported ‘unseen’ was assessed through the concatenation of later 
practice and calibration blocks and application of χ2 tests – in order to ensure the possibility 
of demonstrating blindsight type effects. Structural MRI scans and motor threshold (based on 
the methods set out by Rossini et al., 1994) were collected on separate sessions. The tritan-
line and susceptibility to phosphenes were also assessed prior to experimental sessions. 
 The subject completed 12 experimental sessions, each involving 5 blocks of active 
TMS and one of sham, the order of which was counter balanced across sessions. Each session 
lasted approximately 2 hours and each block consisted of 100 trials. TMS was applied at 24 
time conditions relative to stimulus onset (-20, 0, 10 ,20 ,30 , 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 
120, 130, 140, 160, 180,  200, 220, 250, 300, 400 ms) and one condition where TMS was not 
applied, yielding a total of 25 TMS conditions. As mentioned, there were four stimulus 
conditions (arrow left, arrow right, non-arrow and stimulus-absent). Each block thus 
contained a full set of stimulus and TMS conditions, the order of which was randomised. The 
order in which the three questions were presented was counterbalanced between sessions. At 
the start of each session the subject was given a block of 40 practice trials in order to re-
familiarise himself with the task and the new question order. The practice blocks and sham 
blocks were used to re-calibrate over the course of the experiments. That is, if the subject’s 
detection behaviour was outside a tolerance of ± 0.1 of the Pr value of 0.6, the stimuli were 
adjusted accordingly, so that detection performance  might be maintained at around 0.6 in the 
subsequent sessions. This meant that the luminance of the target ranged from 53 to 59 cd/m2 
with a mean of 56.5 (±1.9 SD). 
 The TMS intensity at which pulses were applied during the experiment was set at 
120% of PT (70% of maximum stimulator output, the subject’s PT being 58% of output) for 
the pulses applied during the experiment. This intensity did not appear to cause facial 
twitches when applied to occipital areas and rarely caused blinks in this subject. Eye tracking 
flagged 43 trials for exclusion from a possible 6000 active TMS trials, on the basis of blinks 
concurrent with visual stimuli exposure. 
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3.5.1.2 Statistical methods 
 
Analyses were applied to single SDT or proportion correct data for each time point, 
resulting in a variable representing the time course of the effects of TMS on the measure of 
conscious detection (PrC) and ‘unseen’ discrimination (PcU). The main comparisons of 
interest were between active and sham TMS for both PrC and PcU measures. Comparisons 
were made by analysis of where data points sat in relation to the variance of the 
corresponding state of contrast: equivalent to z-tests for each time point. Therefore, if TMS 
effects upon conscious detection were to be assessed relative to sham, then z-scores were 
produced from PrC for each time point with active TMS, relative to variance in task 
performance across all points with sham TMS. These z-scores were converted to p values, 
which were assessed for significance relative to a Holm-Bonferroni adjusted alpha level (with 
25 time points the most stringent p value required to reject the null hypothesis was < 0.002 ). 
Points that pass these criteria are denoted as significantly different (S) in figure 3.5.2.1. 
 Demonstration of ‘unseen’ discrimination ability (PcU) was provided by assessment 
of the subjects’ forced choice proportion correct performance, coincident with reporting not 
seeing the ‘arrow’ nor ‘something’, relative to a binomial distribution. As with PrC, Holm-
Bonferroni correction for the 25 time point comparisons was also applied. Note that this 
differs from the single sample t-test methodology applied in the between-subjects study 
because the absence of multiple mean values at each data point mandates the use of an 
alternative binomial test. Bayesian analyses were not applied to this data set because of the 
absence of variance information at each data point / condition.  
 Gaussian models were fitted to the data, using the curve fitting toolbox of MATLAB 
(Mathworks Inc) and Sigmaplot (SPSS Inc). These models described one or two distinct 
epochs as single and double peaks. Quality of fit was used to assess models on the basis of 
least means squared regression values.  
The BIP was determined as being the minima of the lowest drop in conscious 
detection modelled. This value was rounded up to the closest CRT refresh (100Hz) in order to 
avoid the presentation artefact caused by the electromagnetic pulse of TMS when applied 
mid-frame. Another reason for the BIP being rounded up was because the input provided by 
s-cone stimuli is relatively slow (Bompas & Sumner, 2008; Cottaris & De Valois, 1998; 
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Maunsell, et al., 1999). Hence in order that the BIP that was comparable in terms of its effect 
across stimuli types, a slightly later timing for the BIP (120ms), was used than would have 
been chosen for purely luminance stimuli (110ms, see below).   
 
3.5.2 Single-pulse results 
  
3.5.2.1 Conscious detection 
 
 Active TMS, relative to sham, reduced conscious detection when applied at 10 times 
between 50 and 160ms after stimulus onset. The chance that these were drawn from the same 
population as the sham results is less than 0.2% (2.8782 standard deviations; figure 3.5.2.1).  
 
Figure 3.5.2.1. Conscious detection performance (PrC) in Experiment 3B over the 
range of times where TMS was applied relative to stimulus onset, under both active 
and sham (control) TMS conditions. Yellow points indicate times which significantly 
differ from the mean of the sham detection measure (S).  
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The simplest best fit to the conscious detection data is a Gaussian model expressing a 
‘dip’ (Adjusted R2 = 0.928, F(3,20) =99.314, p<0.001, see figure 3.5.2.3). The model is 
specified in equation 3.1. The fit for a double Gaussian model was not as good (model 
specified in equation 3.2, adjusted R2 = 0.875)  
 
ܻ ൌ ைܻ + a݁
ቈି଴.ହቀ௑ି௑ೀ௕ ቁ
మ
቉
 
     eq 3.1 
Coefficients a =-0.70, b= 55.05, Xo=102.5 and Yo = 0.74 
 
ܻ ൌ ைܻ + a1݁
ቈି଴.ହቀ௑ି௑ೀభ௕ଵ ቁ
మ
቉
+ a2݁
ቈି଴.ହቀ௑ି௑ೀమ௕ଶ ቁ
మ
቉
 
eq 3.2 
Coefficients Yo =0.74 a1 =0.87, b1= 140, Xo1=306.4, a2 =0.81, b2=71.1 and Xo2 = -32.48 
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Figure 3.5.2.3. Conscious detection measure over time fitted with a Gaussian model 
(blue line, eq 3.1). Adjusted R2 = 0.9276, F(3,20) = 99.3136, p<0.001. 
 
3.5.2.2 ‘Unseen’ discrimination 
 
Figure 3.5.2.2. Proportion correct in ‘unseen’ discrimination (PcU) in Experiment 3B 
over the range of times where TMS was applied relative to stimulus onset, under both 
active and sham (control) TMS conditions.  No data points were shown to be 
significantly affected by the active TMS. 
 
The subject displayed above chance ‘unseen’ discrimination ability at all time points 
(2-tailed binomial t(>16)>2.4, p<0.024), all of which survived correction for multiple 
comparisons. The same analysis as was applied to PrC, when applied to PcU ‘unseen’ 
discrimination, revealed no data points that were affected by the TMS according to these 
criteria (figure 3.5.2.2). Curve fitting using the Gaussian models failed to produce reliable fits 
to the ‘unseen’ discrimination data. However, a linear fit indicated a trend indicating lower 
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‘unseen’ abilities when TMS was applied at later times (the gradient of a linear fit being -0.25 
PcU units per second, adjusted R2 = 0.118, F of regression (1,22) = 4.08, p = 0.056). Although 
only marginally significant the trend is worthy of note as it is consistent with and relevant to 
the double-pulse data discussed in the next section (Experiment 3C, section 3.6). 
 
3.5.2.3 Response bias 
 
Analysis of bias was impractical in this experiment as the subject only made 15 false 
alarms (in contrast to 1678 correct rejections) over the 25 time conditions. Attributing effects 
on the basis of the distribution of these 15 trials was considered invalid.  
The Fmax ratio based on contributing trial numbers which compared the variance of 
PrC to PcU across times was 1.09. However, it can be argued that the application of Fmax 
here is not valid, as the variance of PrC is disproportionately increased (reducing the ratio) 
owing to PrC’s susceptibility to the TMS. The alternative comparison of variance, at each 
data point, is not possible.    
 
3.5.3 Single-pulse discussion 
 
This section demonstrates that single pulse TMS can cause an unambiguous 
suppression of conscious detection of stimuli (see figures 3.5.2.1). As with the between-
subjects study, Experiment 3A, this is consistent with the classically reported occipital 
suppression at ~100ms after stimulus onset (Amassian, et al., 1989). Concurrent above 
chance ‘unseen’ discrimination ability was maintained, indicating specificity of the 
suppression to the measure of conscious detection and, thus, a blindsight type effect. 
 This suppression is best described as a ‘single dip’, as all the time points which 
statistically illustrate this suppression are grouped over a single period of TMS interference 
and the fit provided by a single Gaussian model was extremely high. Given this consistency 
in the data pattern, it seems reasonable to suggest that if there were two or more distinct and 
separable periods of TMS efficacy, then this should have been apparent within this data set. 
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Although the conclusions that can be drawn from single subject data are limited, there is a 
degree of inconsistency in the literature over the existence of two or more discrete periods of 
TMS interference, lending weight to this interpretation. What follows is a brief synopsis of 
experiments that have previously claimed to show two or more distinct periods of TMS 
efficacy when applied to visual cortical areas. 
Juan and Walsh (2003) appear to show that TMS applied from 0 to 120ms was 
effective in reducing perceptual abilities (p 0.01-0.05) as was applying pulses at 200 and 
240ms (p=0.053) but they suggest that TMS applied at 140 and 180ms was ineffective. 
However, these results are difficult to interpret mainly because of the absence of statistical 
information that could have supported the claim of two distinct periods. No corrections for 
the multiple comparisons were applied (of which there were at least six capable of informing 
the experimental hypothesis). The 200-240ms intervention did not show a clear suppression, 
and, more importantly, no information was presented regarding any changes due to the 140-
180ms intervention, upon which demonstration of two independent periods rests. 
 
As mentioned there has been a series of experiments, carried out by Corthout and 
colleagues, in which at least four independent periods during which TMS applied to visual 
areas was reported as causing disruption in a letter discrimination task. Some of these periods 
are not relevant here and others seem to be inconsistent across subjects to the extent that their 
existence is questionable. The first of these periods of sensitivity occurred 70 to 50 ms prior 
to the onset of the stimulus (hence irrelevant to this study) and was attributed to TMS induced 
blinks, as this effect was independent of coil position (Corthout, Uttl, Walsh, et al., 1999; 
Corthout, Uttl, Ziemann, et al., 1999). The second and third ‘dips’ are reported as having 
occurred at approximately the same time as the stimuli (-10 to 0ms) and at 20ms post stimuli 
onset. The earliest of these was proposed in the 2003 paper (Corthout, et al., 2003). However 
none of the three participants showed a dip around -10ms to 0ms that was clearly independent 
of either the earliest dip, prior to stimuli onset or the later 20ms dip. The existence of the 
20ms dip appears to be slightly more consistent as it was reported in four separate papers 
(Corthout, et al., 2002, 2003; Corthout, et al., 2000; Corthout, Uttl, Walsh, et al., 1999), 
however it is difficult to assess the extent to which data and participants overlapped between 
papers. The statistical methodology for testing the existence of this ‘dip’ only appeared in one 
of these papers (Corthout, et al., 2002) which applied a t-test to the difference between the 
20ms dip relative to a 50ms period which appeared to be unaffected. Why precisely these 
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periods were chosen for entry into the analysis is unclear, as are the reasons for which the 
authors suggest that the 20ms period is independent of the period of TMS efficacy prior to the 
stimulus onset. Furthermore, across these papers the demonstration of the 20ms dip and two 
independent periods of TMS efficacy was expressed by the data pattern in, at best, three out 
of four subjects (Corthout, Uttl, Walsh, et al., 1999).  In all of these experiments the classic 
~100ms disruption was reported, highlighting the fragility of the demonstration of secondary 
early periods of TMS efficacy in causing suppressions.  
 
Several studies using moving stimuli have demonstrated two distinct periods of TMS 
efficacy, which are difficult to reconcile with the results presented here (Pascual-Leone & 
Walsh, 2001; Silvanto, Cowey, Lavie, & Walsh, 2005; Silvanto, Lavie, & Walsh, 2005; 
Stevens, et al., 2009). For example, Koivisto et al (2010) reported two distinct periods in 
which awareness of moving stimuli was disrupted by TMS applied to early visual areas at 
20ms and at 60ms as well as showing a intervening period at 40ms where TMS applied to 
V1/V2 was ineffective, but was effective when applied to motion sensitive area V5/MT – 
indicating recurrent feedback7. Although there are statistical concerns (regarding the absence 
of reporting effect sizes corresponding to the intervening period), the reproducibility of the 
‘double dip’ when tasks involving moving stimuli are used does support the existence of 
separable periods. 
 
In contrast to studies which have claimed to demonstrate two distinct periods of TMS 
disruption, more studies have shown a single period during which TMS applied to early 
visual areas is effective in causing disruptions replicating the classic study of Amassian et al 
(1989), (e.g. Kamitani & Shimojo, 1999; Kammer, 2007; Kammer, et al., 2005; Koivisto, et 
al., 2012; Koivisto, et al., 2011; Overgaard, et al., 2004; Sack, et al., 2009; Thielscher, et al., 
2010). Most relevant to the data described here are those studies that have used 
discrimination and/or detection of arrows in their demonstration of perceptual abilities and 
have shown a single period of TMS efficacy (Koivisto, et al., 2011; Sack, et al., 2009 ). 
  
                                                            
7 Note: the discrepancy between these times and those reported elsewhere is likely to be due to the use 
of the difference between stimuli offset and the TMS pulse being used to quantify the temporal 
distribution of TMS pulses, as opposed to the more conventional stimuli onset asynchrony. 
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The question this brief discussion of previous experiments was aimed at addressing 
was whether or not there exists more than one period over which perception is susceptible to 
TMS applied to the occipital lobe. The data here, together with the majority of other on-line 
experiments, points to a single period of causal importance in perception, where simple 
detection tasks are employed. However, the performance of other tasks may well involve two 
or more periods of processing in occipital cortical areas (e.g. Chambers, et al., 2012; Heinen, 
et al., 2005), the clearest examples of which are probably the demonstrations of independent 
periods in motion detection tasks, where an initial appraisal of the state of primary areas 
followed by a secondary recurrent monitoring phase might aid task performance (Pascual-
Leone & Walsh, 2001; Silvanto, Lavie, et al., 2005; Stevens, et al., 2009). The overall 
picture, then, is that there likely exists a feedforward phase of processing which is then 
followed by a recurrent phase. However, whether or not TMS is capable of isolating them, 
and indeed, whether or not the two phases are temporally separate and do not overlap 
(Heinen, et al., 2005), is likely to depend upon the task involved. It would seem that simple 
detection and discrimination tasks do not allow for reliable independency to be demonstrated. 
 
Perception lacking consciousness was demonstrated by the above-chance performance 
on ‘unseen’ trials. However, no effects of TMS on PcU were observed at any time period. 
This null effect suggests that the activity upon which the residual perception depends persists 
on the basis of lower levels of activity than are affected by occipital TMS. There was, 
however, a trend toward disruption of ‘unseen’ discrimination as a result of later TMS as 
opposed to earlier TMS. This is potentially weak evidence against the prediction made by 
Lamme (2006b) that TMS should affect unconscious abilities at earlier times and is addressed 
more thoroughly in the next section (Experiment 2C). 
 
The minima of the suppression of conscious detection (at 110ms with a PrC value of 
0.0375) is well within 1 standard deviation of zero (no detection at all). The absence of 
almost any sign of conscious detection, whilst coincident with consistently above chance 
‘unseen’ discrimination ability, can be interpreted as one of the most conservative 
demonstrations of blindsight type abilities in this series of experiments. This time point was 
taken to establish the BIP but rounded up to the nearest stimuli refresh of the CRT display 
(120ms). 
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3.6 Single-subject double-pulse, experiment 
3C. 
 
 The single pulse experiment (3B) established the blindsight inducing pulse (BIP), at 
120ms. This pulse was present in all trials of the double pulse experiment, which allowed us 
to investigate at the roles of different phases of activity within the context of a blindsight type 
effect. Specifically, we sought to address the question of whether the residual, reportedly 
‘unseen’ abilities of TMS-induced blindsight were dependent upon activity prior to the phase 
of conscious processing disrupted by the BIP. As noted, ‘unseen’ abilities of TMS induced 
blindsight have been linked to the early feedforward sweep prior to the recurrent conscious 
phase (Lamme, 2001). Interfering with these periods involved adding pulses in addition to the 
BIP, the prediction being that if the early period is responsible for unconscious / ‘unseen’ 
processing then the application of pulses prior to the BIP should suppress ‘unseen’ 
discrimination to a greater extent than pulses applied after the BIP, (Lamme, 2006b). 
 
3.6.1 Double-pulse methods 
 
 Methods were identical to the single pulse experiment (3B) unless otherwise stated. 
The pulses in addition to the BIP were at 40ms intervals ranging from 0 to 240ms (that is, 
pairs of pulses at [0,120], [40,120], [80,120], [120,160], [120,200], [120,240] ms, see figure 
3.3.1.1). This provided six TMS conditions of pulse pairs that were equivalent in terms of 
inter-pulse interval and balanced across the period prior to the BIP (early) and following the 
BIP (late). The reported effects of early TMS in particular appear to be highly variable (cf. 
Experiment 3A vs. Corthout et al 1999-2002); for this reason, a range of timings was 
covered.  
Blocks consisted of 120 trials, yielding five repetitions of each stimulus and TMS 
condition with each block. The subject completed eight blocks of active TMS and eight 
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blocks of sham TMS on each session. Six sessions were completed on different days, 
separated by at least 24 hours, which produced six data points (one per session) for each 
measure and TMS conditions upon which analysis was based. The order of questions was 
counterbalanced across the six sessions. TMS intensity was again 120% of subjects PT for 
both pulses on every trial. Eye tracking resulted in the removal of 12 out of a possible 5760 
trials. 
Primary analysis of this data involved ANOVAs applied to each measure with TMS 
site (sham vs. active) and time (additional pulses applied before vs. after the BIP) as factors, 
using the individual sessions as data points. This meant there were 18 data points before and 
after the BIP. If time-dependent effects of the TMS were observed, then these were further 
probed with 2-tailed t-tests; comparing active to sham TMS effects, at each of the six time 
points, correcting for these six comparisons with the Holm-Bonferroni method. 
‘Unseen’ discrimination ability relative to chance performance was assessed in two 
ways: single sample t-tests were applied to the data at each of the twelve time points (6 active 
and 6 sham), contrasting PcU performance relative to chance. This mirrored the analysis 
applied to the between-subjects study (3A). Also, a binomial test was applied to the 
correct/incorrect ‘unseen’ choices. This analysis collapsed the discriminations made across 
sessions and matched the analysis applied to the BIP task (3B). 
In addition, the temporal spacing of pulses was analysed using ANOVAs with site 
(active vs. sham) and the three pulse spacings as factors. Pulse spacing here refers 
specifically to the difference between additional pulses and the BIP, i.e. the spacing of the 
40,120ms intervention is 80ms and its comparable pair is 120, 200ms. This temporal spacing 
analysis did not directly relate to the experimental hypothesis, as it addressed whether or not 
pulses closer together were more effective than those further apart, which may be of interest 
in itself. However, entry of this temporal spacing factor (pulse spacing) as a covariate into the 
ANOVAs which compared early vs. late effects allowed us to eliminate variance due to the 
temporal spacing of pulses, the effects of which are reported separately as an ANCOVA 
(3.6.2.4). 
The Bayesian analyses were designed to mirror those of the conventional analysis 
above and followed the methods of the between-subject experiment (3A) in application. This 
meant that Bayesian analysis was applied to this data in two ways to each of the primary 
measures. First, the early effects were compared to the later effects to substantiate any 
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difference between these two periods. A single vector representing this comparison was 
derived using change from sham data and subtracting post-BIP data averaged across the three 
late times from averaged pre-BIP data, the variance of which was taken across sessions (data 
points). Thus the vector was calculated as (Earlyoccipital - sham) – (Lateoccipital - sham). Therefore, 
on this vector a suppression specific to additional early stimulation would result in positive 
values and would be represented by a positive prior. Effects in the opposite direction (i.e. 
later TMS being more effective than earlier) were also tested ((Lateoccipital - sham) – (Earlyoccipital 
- sham)). Second, the effects of the TMS were analysed at each of the six time points. This 
probed the efficacy of the TMS and how it evolved over time. The dependent variable was 
the change from sham data, and the prior represented a uniform suppression of perceptual 
abilities. Priors involving PcU ranged from 0 to 0.5 and those involving PrC ranged from 0 to 
0.6 because threshold levels resulted in those being the maximum reasonable range.  
Outlier rejection was again based on Chauvenet’s criterion applied to each data 
condition, using the variance across the sessions. In the event, no data was shown to be out-
lying in this experiment. 
 
3.6.2 Double-pulse results  
 
3.6.2.1 Conscious detection 
 
Conscious detection was suppressed by the application of the double pulses (site 
effect: F(1,68) =144.301, p<0.001), and although there appeared to be a time dependent effect 
where later pulses resulted in lower detection (time effect: F (1,68) =4.184, p=0.045), this did 
not interact with the type of TMS and so cannot be attributed to the magnetic / cortical effects 
of TMS (site × time interaction: F(1,68) =1.291, p=0.260).   
Bayesian comparison between early and late effects was inconclusive as the Bayes 
factors representing effects being expressed flowing later TMS was weak (B= 0.8495). The 
Bayes factor modelling an earlier effect of TMS, relative to late efficacy, favoured the null 
(B= 0.043), indicating an absence of a difference between the early and later periods on the 
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PrC measure. Bayesian priors which modelled a drop in PrC at each of the time points closely 
represented the data (B ranging from 1396 to 2.712e11, see table 3.6.2.2). 
 
Figure 3.6.2.1. Conscious detection (PrC) as affected by double pulse interventions. 
The vertical dotted line indicates the time at which the BIP was applied relative to 
onset of the visual stimulus. Other timings represent the application of pulses in 
addition to the BIP. Error bars are standard error across session. 
 
3.6.2.2 ‘Unseen’ discrimination 
 
 For ‘unseen’ discrimination the effect of the active TMS was time dependent (site × 
time interaction: F(1,68) =8.681, p=0.004, see figure 3.6.2.2). ‘Unseen’ discrimination was also 
shown to be suppressed by the TMS (site effect: F(1,68) = 19.462, p<0.001). Independent of 
TMS site effects, no effect of when the pulse were applied (early vs. late) were observed 
(time effect F(1,68) =0.014, p =0.907). 
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 The greatest contributions to this effect were made by the two suppressions in PcU as 
a result of TMS applied at [120,160] (t(5) =4.607, p= 0.006)  and [120,200] (t(5) =4.963, 
p=0.004). T-tests which compared active to sham conditions applied to other times were non-
significant (t<1.828, p>0.127). The Bayesian analysis reflected this; first, comparing early to 
later effects indicated strong support for the effect being greatest as a result of late TMS (B = 
7.4×10e5), support for the effect being expressed earlier strongly supported the null 
(B=0.007).  When applied to the individual time points, the analysis favoured the null of 
there being no effect of the TMS during the early period of intervention (B 0.07 to 0.35). 
TMS applied following the BIP, however, was effective in suppressing PcU, particularly 
during the 160,120ms (B=25.48) and 200,120ms (B=46.12) interventions. For the 120,240 
intervention the effect was inconclusive (B=0.58, t(5) =1.828, p=0.127). These analyses are 
summarised in table 3.6.2.2. 
‘Unseen’ performance was consistently above chance as assessed by single sampled t-
tests applied to all 12 data points (6 active and 6 sham)(t(5) >4.63, p<0.006) or binomial 
statistics (all p <0.001). 
 
Figure 3.6.2.2. ‘Unseen’ discrimination as affected by double pulse interventions in 
Experiment 3C. This figure conforms to the same structure as figure 3.6.2.1. 
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Table 3.6.2.2. Bayes factors representing the effects of the double pulse interventions. 
Applied to individual times the Bayes factors represent the strength of support for the 
hypothesis that the TMS caused suppression in measures. When applied to the early 
vs. late analysis the Bayes factor represents the strength of support for TMS being 
effective when applied earlier vs. later, and vice versa.  
Bayes factor (B) 
 Time TMS             
 0,120 40,120 80,120 160,120 200,120 240,120 Early>Late Late>Early 
PrC 1394.626 2.73×10e8 2211.119 4.68×10e8 3.22×10e8 2.71×10e11 0.0434 0.8495 
PcU 0.07151 0.347722 0.317055 25.48766 46.12056 0.582341 0.0071 7.38×10e5 
 
 The Fmax ratio of variance in PcU/PrC was 1.45 based on average contributing trial 
numbers. 
 
3.6.2.3 Response bias 
 
 The subject responded positively less often with active TMS (site effect: F(1,68) 
=12.056, p=0.001). This effect did not interact with whether the additional pulse was applied 
before or after the BIP (site × time interaction: F(1,68) =0.579, p=0.449). Neither was there a 
main effect of pulse timing (time effect: F(1,68) =0.352, p=0.555). The analysis of the temporal 
spacing of pulses indicates that the temporal proximity of pulses affected response criteria 
(TMS site × pulse spacing interaction F(2,66) =4.001, p=0.023). This is potentially suggestive 
of a distracting effect in which temporally close TMS pulses distract more than temporally 
distant ones. However, given the high degree of variability in the sham condition (see figure 
3.6.2.3.) this result should be treated with caution. Here 127 false alarms were made in 
contrast to 3308 correct rejections. 
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Figure 3.6.2.3. Bias in conscious detection as affected by double pulse interventions. 
This figure conforms to the same structure as 3.6.2.1. 
 
3.6.2.4 ANCOVA 
 
 The spacing of pulses indicated that pulses placed closer together were more effective 
in suppressing conscious detection (F(1,67) =7.55, p=0.008). A similar but non-significant 
trend was observed for ‘unseen’ discrimination (F(1,67) =2.178, p=0.145). The addition of this 
as a covariance factor into the main site × time ANOVAs, resulted in an ANCOVA, which 
did not reveal any main effects or interactions not observed in the original analysis. 
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3.6.3 Double-pulse discussion 
 
 Again, the application of occipital TMS produced a blindsight type effect. Conscious 
detection was suppressed to a greater extent than ‘unseen’ discrimination. The ‘unseen’ 
discrimination measure, on the other hand, showed time-dependent effects which were not 
expressed upon the measure of conscious detection. The specificity of different effects to 
both measures can be considered a double dissociation and is therefore the clearest 
demonstration in this series of experiments that the measures used are sensitive to 
independent properties. The demonstration that the PcU measure is sensitive to the 
interventions supports the conclusions that can be drawn from other experimental sections, as 
it suggests that the absence of effects, for example, in reference to the between subjects s-
cone intervention (Experiment 3A), were not a result of insensitivity of the measure, but 
rather arose due to the measure being unaffected by that particular intervention. 
 
 The time-dependent effect of the TMS upon ‘unseen’ discrimination has implications 
for the proposed correspondence between unconscious processing and the early feedforward 
sweep (Lamme, 2001; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). In particular, the observed effects had 
the opposite temporal signature to that which would have been expected; ‘unseen’ 
discrimination was reduced when TMS was applied later, during the more recurrent phase, 
rather than as a result of early TMS. Indeed, no clear effect of the TMS was observed when 
TMS was applied early and was only realised when TMS was added after the BIP.  This 
study can therefore be seen as providing evidence against the idea that the basis of 
‘unconscious’ vision lies in the early feedforward sweep of information through the visual 
system, as it is more likely to depend on activity occurring after 120ms. 
 
 The element of Lamme’s theory that relates conscious awareness to later recurrent 
processing is well supported by evidence. However, there is relatively little direct evidence in 
Lamme’s theory to support the early-unconscious claim. In terms of evidence for the theory, 
he cites the preservation of fast collicular routes (collicular input being early to arrive) in 
classic blindsight (Lamme, 2001) - evidence which the s-cone interventions applied here 
contradict. In addition, he discusses electrophysiological evidence, which shows that the 
earliest evoked activations (prior to later recurrent / conscious processing - in reference to 
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which the results here agree) carry information to sensory areas such as orientation selectivity 
in vision (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Super, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2001). 
 
 The current results might be seen as ruling against Lamme’s theory (2001). However, 
rather than ruling against the claim of a correspondence between early processing and 
unconscious processing, it may be possible to reconcile this theory with the current data in 
two ways: by considering the definition of unconscious, and by considering what might 
contribute toward the residual abilities of TMS-induced blindsight. It should be noted that 
what follows is a tentative attempt at reconciliation between the data and the theory. 
 
 What is it that is referred to in Lamme’s theories when he uses the term ‘unconscious’ 
and does this match the forced choice ‘unseen’ abilities demonstrated here? It is possible to 
read Lamme’s use of ‘unconscious’ as referring to something more akin to ‘subpersonal’. 
(Sub-personal is a level of description first expounded by Dennett (1969), which is a way of 
describing processes at the purely physical level, such as neuronal processes, in contrast to 
personal level descriptions which refer to the experience of the subject.) In which case, early  
to arrive activity might therefore be sub-personal and carry information such as orientation 
selectivity. Such activity might be at such a basic level that the TMS was incapable of 
affecting it at the levels applied here (e.g. columnar segmentation). Therefore on the ‘sub-
personal’ reading of Lamme’s theory the TMS applied here did not affect the feedforward 
sweep and the theory is maintained. 
 
 It is also possible that what is measured by the forced choice discrimination of arrows 
when reportedly ‘unseen’ is neither unconscious nor subpersonal. It is possible that what it is 
(the perception) that is referred to by the PcU measure actually depends on or is facilitated by 
the reactive (Ericsson, 2003) processes caused by the posing of the question. That is, when 
subjects are asked in which direction the arrow was pointing, they consciously reflected upon 
this question and although the activations caused by the stimuli were insufficient to elicit a 
categorical ‘seen’ response, it was the reflection itself that supported the discrimination 
decision, to the extent that it was above chance over a number of trials. The later conscious 
reflection, then, was the target of the perturbation caused by later TMS and the reason for 
which reportedly ‘unseen’ abilities were diminished at these later times. In which case, this 
experiment simply may not confront Lamme’s theory. This argument is expanded upon in 
Chapter 4. 
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 It is important to note that this entire discussion may reflect an over-interpretation of 
the data, and implies that we have not targeted purely ‘unconscious’ processing (or 
phenomenal consciousness in Block’s sense (Block, 1995), discussed in Chapter 4.6). Even 
so, what does appear to have been tracked by this measure is perception which is less 
conscious than when the subject acknowledges veridical awareness (Cohen & Dennett, 
2011). This difference is all that is required to make the contrast which reveals our target of 
conscious awareness, upon which the majority of the conclusions drawn here have been 
based. 
 
3.7 Single-subject s-cone intervention, 
experiment 3D. 
 
 The aim of this experiment was to probe the pathways that contribute to processing in 
the context of TMS-induced blindsight. The principal question was whether or not the 
preserved abilities critically depend upon input via the superior colliculus. In doing so it 
made use of the same s-cone intervention as the between-subjects study (3A) and applied the 
BIP to reveal blindsight type responses. 
 
3.7.1 S-cone intervention methods 
 
 Unless otherwise stated, procedures and equipment are the same as in previously 
described experiments. Prior to commencing these experiments the subject’s tritan line and 
point of equiluminance were ascertained using the method described in Experiment 3A. The 
subject’s tritan line was found to be at an angle of 9o in MacLoed-Boynton (1979) space with 
an equiluminance point of 24.7 cd/m2. The colour used in CIE1931 coordinates was 0.256, 
0.230, 17.62. Eye tracking resulted in the elimination of 26 trials from a possible 1920. 
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 Single pulses of TMS were applied at the BIP (120ms) in either active or sham coil 
orientation. Stimuli were either s-cone or luminance. This yielded four conditions that were 
acquired in separate blocks over the course of a single session, the order of which was 
randomised. The subject completed 6 sessions, each involving the use of a different question 
order of presentation. Each block consisted of 80 trials and resulted in a single data point per 
block entered into the subsequent analysis. 
The primary analyses applied ANOVAs to each measure with TMS site (active vs. 
sham) and stimuli type (s-cone vs. luminance) as factors. Analysis of above-chance 
performance on ‘unseen’ trials was performed both with a single sample t-test (matching the 
between subject study, 3A) and binomial tests of unseen abilities (matching the double pulses 
section, 3B), including Holm-Bonferonni correction for multiple comparisons.  
The Bayesian analysis again made use of the variance across sessions. It was first 
applied to the change from sham data for each stimulus type and measure separately. Then, 
using the change from sham data and taking away the s-cone data from the luminance data, a 
vector was produced that, if positive, would represent the benefit bestowed by the additional 
input provided by luminance stimuli from RM pathways. The Fmax ratio between the PrC 
and PcU measures was 0.98. 
 
3.7.2 S-cone intervention results 
 
3.7.2.1 Conscious detection 
 
 Conscious detection was suppressed by the application of TMS (TMS site effect: 
F(1,20) =129.1, p<0.001), but this effect did not depend on the type of stimuli used (site × 
stimuli interaction: F(1,20) =0.572, p=0.458), nor was there a discernible difference between 
detection of stimuli types independent of TMS effects (stimuli effect: F(1,20) =2.553, p=0.126), 
see figure 3.7.2.1 . BrC was not analysed for this section due, again, to the low numbers of 
false alarms (19 false alarms across all conditions, compared to 578 correct rejections).  
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Figure 3.7.2.1.  Conscious detection and ‘unseen’ discrimination in the presence of s-
cone and luminance stimuli in active (BIP at 120ms) and sham conditions. Error bars 
are standard error.  
 
3.7.2.2 ‘Unseen’ discrimination 
 
Changes in ‘unseen’ discrimination mirrored those found for conscious detection. 
PcU was suppressed by the TMS (TMS site effect F(1,20) =10.26, p=0.004) and showed no 
dependency upon stimulus type (site × stimuli interaction: F(1,20) =1.724, p=0.204, and 
stimulus effect: F(1,20) =0 .150, p=0 .702). 
Binomial tests indicated that ability to discriminate above chance when stimuli were 
reportedly ‘unseen’ was only clearly preserved for luminance sham condition (p<0.001), and 
was completely absent for the active luminance condition (p=0.689). Conscious detection 
being around zero for luminance stimuli (see figure 3.7.2.1) implies that all perception was 
eliminated at this data point. For s-cone stimuli in the active and sham conditions, above 
chance performance was only demonstrable relative to an uncorrected alpha level of 0.05 
(sham p= 0.029, active p= 0.048). These values do not withstand correction for multiple 
comparisons. The same pattern of above-chance responses was also observed using the single 
sample t-test method with above-chance performance for luminance stimuli in the sham 
condition (t(5)= 5.385, p=0.003) but not others (s-cone sham t(5)=3.044, p=0.029, s-cone 
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active t(5) =2.152, p=0 .084, luminance active t(5) =0.804, p=0.458, again relative to alpha of 
0.0167).  
 
3.7.2.3 Bayesian analysis 
 
The Bayesian analysis indicated that TMS suppressed conscious detection for both 
stimulus types (s-cone B=4.26×10e16 , luminance B=5.19×10e5). ‘Unseen’ discrimination was 
also suppressed for luminance stimuli (B=1.62×10e5) but not in the presence of s-cone 
stimuli (B=0.63). The direct comparison of stimulus types, using of change from sham data, 
revealed no conclusive support for more pronounced suppression in the presence of s-cone 
stimuli compared with luminance stimuli (For PrC B=0.44, PcU B=0.14). In fact, the 
opposite effect, of ‘unseen’ ability being suppressed to a greater extent when the additional 
input provided by the luminance stimuli is present, was more strongly supported by the data 
(B=0.93).  
 
3.7.3 S-cone intervention discussion 
 
 The conclusions that can be drawn from this experiment are limited. The absence of 
above-chance performance for ‘unseen’ trials in three out of four conditions means that it 
cannot be claimed that these data represent a form of blindsight. 
 A point worth highlighting is that ‘unseen’ performance dropped to a greater extent in 
the presence of luminance stimuli than it did for s-cone stimuli; an effect in the opposite 
direction to that which would have lent weight to the principle of collicular support for 
‘unseen’ abilities (Schmid, et al., 2010). Alternatively, it could be argued that the absence of 
‘unseen’ above chance performance in the s-cone sham condition could be taken as evidence 
that all ‘unseen’ abilities in this subject (irrespective of occipital disruption) operate via the 
superior colliculus (e.g. Fuchs & Ansorge, 2012). However, this seems improbable, as the 
reason for which ‘unseen’ performance in this condition was not considered above chance 
was the correction for multiple comparisons, and performance here was at 70% correct. 
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Additionally in the between-subjects study (3A) this subject’s performance in the s-cone 
sham condition was at 68%. Therefore insufficient statistical power appears to be the primary 
reason for failing to demonstrate above-chance performance, and therefore failure to reveal 
TMS-induced blindsight.  
  
3.8 General on-line conclusions  
 
 The experiments have demonstrated dissociations where conscious detection was 
suppressed by TMS applied at ~100ms while ‘unseen’ discrimination was preserved; 
corresponding to previous reports of TMS-induced blindsight (e.g. Boyer, et al., 2005). There 
are two aspects of these demonstrations that can be seen as contrary to prevailing views as to 
the neural basis of blindsight. First, the residual unconscious abilities of blindsight do not 
depend upon input via the superior colliculus. Second, neither do they appear to depend upon 
the early feedforward sweep of activity; rather, later interference suggests a later causal basis. 
 If, however, the unconscious abilities associated with blindsight are more nuanced 
than an early-collicular-unconscious relationship, then the data presented here might not 
contradict previous descriptions of the neural basis of blindsight. This might be the case if 
different tasks that fall under the banner of the unconscious abilities of blindsight call upon 
different resources. Some demonstrations might show collicular dependency (Leh, Mullen, et 
al., 2006) while others may not (here and Schmid, et al., 2010). Likewise, some early 
information that facilitates ‘unseen’ abilities might be at such a basic level of partition (e.g. of 
columnar segregation) or may directly pass to unaffected regions, that it is resistant to the 
early TMS intervention. Late conscious reflection upon the percept, on the other hand, which 
could mediate the residual abilities, may have been what it is that is susceptible to late TMS.  
 These issues of task dependency and, in particular, the problem that the reportedly 
‘unseen’ abilities could be mediated by a conscious reaction to the task, suggests that a more 
indirect task may be preferable in demonstrations of blindsight type effects. This is because 
tasks involving, e.g. attentional cueing effects (see for review Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 
2010; Shipp, 2004) might be thought of as less susceptible to this problem of reactivity (the 
posing of the question itself affecting the processing under analysis, see Ericsson, 2003; 
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Gagne & Smith, 1962, and section 4.3). Such attentional cueing tasks, especially those 
involving peripheral cues, are also more likely to illustrate independence of anatomical 
function (Ansorge, 2003; Leh, Mullen, et al., 2006; Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010), (but 
also see Bompas, et al., 2008). Indeed, comparisons of cued measures to overt forced choice 
paradigms are promising avenues for research.  
However, what is gained by the use of indirect measures might not outweigh what is 
lost through the rejection of overt forced choice measures. What is lost is the proximity of the 
contrast used to reveal conscious processing. That is, for the contrast to be maximally 
informative, it is required that the difference between the two states / tasks be as minimal as 
possible in all respects, other than the difference of interest (ceteris paribus ,Chalmers, 1996). 
If a contrast state were to be chosen that is known to operate via a different set of pathways to 
consciousness under all conditions then the informative nature of the contrast is weakened. 
For example, we demonstrated R/M – potentially collicular – dependent effects upon the 
measure of conscious detection. If we had chosen a task to demonstrate the preserved abilities 
that are supported by the SC irrespective of interventions (as with Leh, Johansen-Berg, et al., 
2006; Tamietto, et al., 2010), such as unconscious attentional cueing task (Mulckhuyse & 
Theeuwes, 2010; Shipp, 2004), then it may not have been possible to show that these 
pathways also play a role in specifically conscious processing. This would be because both 
‘unseen’ abilities and conscious detection would presumably demonstrate s-cone dependent 
effects. In such a circumstance it would only be possible to claim that perception in general is 
supported by collicular and/or magnocellular input. 
 There is therefore no contradiction between the data presented here and previous work 
other than in prior claims of necessity (e.g. Ro, et al., 2004). Rather this work furthers our 
understanding by demonstrating that conscious processing, in particular, benefits from R/M 
input during early and late phases of occipital activity. Moreover, consciousness is more 
susceptible to direct interference of occipital cortical areas than are ‘unseen’ abilities, which 
can persist on the basis of presumably lower levels of input provided by a variety of routes 
that are likely to be task-dependent. 
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Chapter 4.  
General discussion 
 
4.1 Overview of experimental findings 
 
 These experiments sought to probe the neuronal processes involved in visual 
consciousness. The strategy developed for doing so involved deriving a measure that referred 
to subjects’ conscious experience of arrow stimuli and to compare variation in this measure 
with a measure of perception where consciousness was lacking. The variations were the result 
of the direct causal intervention of TMS. Similar paradigms have previously been used to 
demonstrate the phenomena of blindsight (Boyer, et al., 2005; Lau & Passingham, 2006; 
Sanders, et al., 1974; Weiskrantz, 1986). 
 The ‘off-line’ experiments applied repetitive TMS (cTBS), which caused suppression 
in cortical excitability (Franca, et al., 2006; Huang, et al., 2005) while, increasing subjects’ 
conscious detection of stimuli (Experiment 2A). This effect on conscious detection was 
replicated (Experiment 2D) and a number of other experiments were developed to probe this 
effect. Experiment 2B confirmed that the regions affected by the cTBS became less 
susceptible to direct stimulation. This was further consistent with the demonstration cTBS 
increased concentration of the inhibitory neurotransmitter GABA, as measured by MRS in 
Experiment 2C. The replication of the behavioural experiment was conducted in conjunction 
with MEG. Late evoked responses to stimuli, as measured by MEG, can be seen as 
representative of conscious signals (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2007; Sergent, et al., 2005). There 
was no clear evidence that occipital cTBS altered the passage of such signals. Instead effects 
were observed in the oscillatory alpha band. The alpha band is thought to play an important 
role in the gating and segmentation of percepts (Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; Pfurtscheller, et 
al., 1983; Varela, et al., 1981). In particular, the alpha ERD can be seen as representative of a 
gating mechanism, where a shift occurs from a period in which the power / inhibitory 
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influence of the alpha oscillation is high to a desynchronised, disinhibited state following the 
presentation of the stimuli. The rate of onset of this ERD became steeper following the 
application of the cTBS. Collectively, these experiments suggested that the facilitation of 
conscious detection observed may have been the result of a potentiation of the mechanisms 
involved in the formation of conscious percepts through gating of representations. The 
interpretation offered is that discrete conscious percepts are brought into relief by inhibitory 
processes, involving GABA and the ERD, and it is this function that benefited from the 
application of occipital cTBS. 
 The ‘on-line’ experiments addressed a long running debate in the blindsight literature 
as to whether conscious vs. unconscious processes map functionally onto anatomically 
distinct pathways via the LGN and SC (Cowey, 2010; Lamme, 2001, 2006b). Contrary to this 
correspondence, Experiment 3A showed that the residual, reportedly ‘unseen’ abilities of 
TMS-induced blindsight, can persist when informative input via the SC was removed. This 
experiment also confirmed previous demonstrations (e.g. Amassian, et al., 1989) that the 
critical period for TMS efficacy, when applied to visual areas, operates from ~100ms after 
stimulus onset. It has also been previously suggested that the level of activity in early visual 
cortical areas when the first feed-forward sweep of input arrives can determine whether or not 
stimuli are perceived (Romei, et al., 2010; van Dijk, et al., 2008). Experiment 3A extends our 
understanding of what this period may involve by showing that TMS applied around the same 
time as the stimuli (0-40ms) might add additional activity upon which early input, from the 
faster R/M pathways (Bompas & Sumner, 2008; Cottaris & De Valois, 1998; Maunsell, et al., 
1999; McKeefry, et al., 2003) can be boosted (Schwarzkopf, et al., 2011). It was also shown 
that the latest (280-320ms) period of recurrent processing targeted may benefit from input 
from these pathways, which may first pass information to more frontal regions, before re-
entry.   
 The single-subject single-pulse study (Experiment 3B) revealed that conscious 
detection was supported by a single disenabled period of processing in occipital cortex, 
consistent with previous demonstrations (Amassian, et al., 1989; Koivisto, et al., 2011; Sack, 
et al., 2009 ). This was perhaps the clearest demonstration of TMS-induced blindsight 
throughout these experiments. The findings of Experiment 3C appear contrary to previous 
suggestions that the early feedforward phase is the basis of ‘unconscious’ processing and that 
the later recurrent period corresponds to the conscious phase of processing (Lamme, 2001; 
Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). Although a correspondence between later activity and 
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conscious processing was consistent with the data, TMS applied at later times suppressed 
reportedly ‘unseen’ abilities to a greater extent than did its earlier applications, indicating a 
later recurrent basis for the activity that supports ‘unseen’ abilities. It is, however, possible to 
reconcile this data with previous models (Lamme, 2001) if the measures of ‘unseen’ 
discrimination do not correspond to the intention behind  Lamme’s use of ‘unconscious’ 
and/or the ‘unseen’ measure is in some way mediated by conscious processing. Such 
discrepancies in the interpretation of these measures and the conceptual problems 
encountered in experiments directed at consciousness are the focus of this chapter, 
particularly sections (4.3-4.4). Before addressing the conceptual problems, some of the 
practical limitations of these experiments are first considered (4.2). Sections 4.5 to 4.8 
discuss three of the influential positions in the literature that relate to these conceptual 
concerns, interpretation of the data and status of subjective reports. This is followed by a 
brief overview of some potential directions for future research (4.9). 
 
4.2 Practical concerns with the experiments 
described 
 
 If the experiments were to be repeated or extended, there are two important changes 
to procedures that should be made. 
1. Following each subject’s participation in the experiments, informal discussions were 
conducted. This involved discussing with subjects how they approached they approached the 
experiments and explored any adverse reactions to TMS they may have experienced (see 
Maizey, In Press). In retrospect, these informal discussions should have been formalised and 
recorded beyond the recording of adverse reactions. This is because the discussions 
influenced the derivation of the PrC and BrC measures in the on-line experiments (Chapter 3) 
in accordance with the neurophenomenological position adopted (see section 1.2.1 and 4.8). 
That is, the way in which response patterns were allocated to signal detection classes was 
influenced by these discussions. Responding ‘Yes’ to the ‘something?’ question and ‘No’ to 
the ‘arrow?’ question, in the presence of a non-arrow, can logically be assigned as either a 
‘hit’ (in terms of the non-arrow stimulus) or a ‘correct rejection’ (in terms of the arrow 
stimulus). The majority of subjects reported that this response profile should not count as 
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seeing the target (a hit), as detection of the arrow was their primary concern. Therefore, this 
response pattern was classed as a ‘correct rejection’ (see table 3.2.2.1). Also, subjects 
acknowledged that responding positively to the ‘something?’ question, when nothing had 
been presented, was incorrect, hence classed as a ‘false alarm’, although it could also 
logically have been classed as a ‘correct rejection’ of the arrow’s presence. These allocations 
were established prior to the analysis of the data and followed the logic of the task 
instructions (appendix A4). Therefore, although these influential discussions should have 
been recorded as a matter of scientific rigour, the way in which the discussions influenced the 
analysis should not detract from the experimental findings. 
 
2. There are statistical limitations to these experiments which may have been alleviated 
through increased trial or participant numbers. These limitations are most apparent in three 
aspects of the experiments. First, it may be thought desirable to combine the two main 
measures involved in the demonstration of TMS-induced blindsight (PrC and PcU) in a single 
analysis or to derive a combined measure from the two, representing the extent to which 
reportedly ‘unseen’ discrimination outpaces conscious detection8. The derivation of such a 
measure or the application of a combined analysis, would add an additional factor to the 
analysis, increasing the likelihood of a type II error (Smith, Levine, Lachlan, & Fediuk, 
2002). This is especially the case here, where the highest order interaction would be most 
sensitive to a cross-over interaction (double dissociation); whereas the prediction made on the 
basis of the definition of TMS-induced blindsight is a single dissociation (statistically 
conforming to a reduction in PrC and absence of effect on PcU, section 1.3.3). The absence 
of a higher order interaction would prevent analysis of the lower order effects (as probed by 
the analyses implemented here), which may more accurately describe the hypothesis. The 
cost of the additional factor of ‘measure’ may be overcome through additional power in the 
analysis (Smith, et al., 2002), but because these experiments were designed only to be 
capable of illustrating effects on measures independently, such an analysis was not 
implemented. It should also be noted that none of the previous studies which have clearly 
                                                            
8 A combined measure could be derived by taking one measure (e.g. PrC) away from the other (e.g 
PcU). Alternatively, the two measures could also be treated as factors where the interaction terms 
involving ‘measure’ might describe dissociations between the measures. If so, then any interaction 
term using a difference score would be mathematically identical to the higher level interaction term 
involving ‘measure’. These two options are therefore considered as equivalent. 
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claimed to demonstrate TMS-induced blindsight have exploited a factorial / combined 
measure (Boyer, et al., 2005; Christensen, et al., 2008; Jolij & Lamme, 2005; Ro, et al., 
2004). In the demonstration that cTBS reduced metacognitive confidence when applied to the 
prefrontal areas, Rounis et al (2010) derive a combined measure of meta-d’ – d’ (see 
appendix A6 for further details). However, p-values they reported were halved, because their 
hypothesis was unidirectional (Rounis, et al., 2010). This is questionable, as it seems likely 
that they would have reported effects with the opposite directionality had they arisen, as 
described in the off-line experiments (Lombardi & Hurlbert, 2009). The derivation of 
combined measures or a factorial approach across measures is not required to demonstrate 
blindsight, as an acceptable statistical definition (section 1.3.3) is adequately served by 
analysis of the two measures independently.  However, derivations of such measures are 
certainly a promising avenue for future research. 
 The second concern related to statistical power pertains to the replication in the off-
line experiments only (section 2.6, Experiment 2D). The replication employed two control 
conditions (iTBS and sham). The inclusion of all three TMS conditions in the corresponding 
ANOVA would again have led to increased type II error rates (Smith. et al., 2002). This 
reduced capacity of such an analysis to demonstrate effects of interest would be exacerbated 
if a single 3-level ANOVA were to test the differences between all three TMS conditions. 
This is because the hypothesis of interest is described by a pairwise difference between cTBS 
and the other conditions. Because differences between the three TBS conditions may be of 
interest, they are described in appendix A3. It is, however, worth emphasising that analyses 
described in appendix A3 are multiple comparisons and therefore should be treated with 
caution.  
 Finally, the capacity of any form of SDT to dissociate sensitivity from response 
criteria is severely limited if no ‘false alarms’ are produced. This is discussed further in 
section 4.4.1. Across the between subjects experiments there were 188 out of 686 cells (data 
points) containing no false alarms. Increasing the number of trials may have reduced this 
problem.  
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4.3 Problems encountered in directing 
experiments at consciousness 
 
 Many psychologists have been sceptical about questions related to conscious 
experience (e.g. Skinner, 1965). This failure to confront consciousness stems from 
differences concerning the epistemic status of subjective reports, which is the focus of this 
section. However, a contributing factor in the avoidance of consciousness as a topic of 
enquiry may be the misconception within psychology that there are broader philosophical 
reasons which directly block its investigation. While the metaphysical nature and epistemic 
strategy for the investigation of consciousness are by no means settled, there has to some 
extent been a consensus reached within modern philosophy of mind, to the point where it is 
possible to say that regardless of the status of consciousness, its empirical investigation can 
be informative and should be of use. Disparate points of view as to what constitutes an 
investigation of consciousness, and what consciousness is, can be to some extent reconciled 
in the agreement that consciousness is a legitimate target for investigation (e.g. compare  
Lutz, (2003) and Dennett, (2003)). There is the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness which 
suggests there may be something further to explain than purely objective science is capable of 
(Chalmers, 1996), discussed in section 4.7. But even Dave Chalmers, who established the 
notion of the ‘hard problem’, advocates the application of empirical methods to 
consciousness as a fruitful endeavour. 
 The central criticism of phenomenologically led approaches, and a reason why 
behaviourism was adopted by many psychologists, can be to some extent reduced to one of 
response bias. That is, any response to an introspective probe may not reflect the state to 
which the probe was targeted, but instead correspond to the response criteria of the subject, to 
which such probes are often responsive (Nisbett, 1977; Wilson & Nisbett, 1978). This 
questions the status of subjective reports as being capable of referring to conscious 
experiences of the subject, which is fundamentally problematic for the research presented 
here.  
 The central dilemma is that it is possible that there are differences between being 
aware, knowing you are and reporting that it is so. If there are such differences, then any 
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instance of a report may not correspond to its referent in the experience, because the criteria 
for awareness may be met, yet the subject may have no access to this awareness upon 
reflection and thus incapable of forming a report that reflects the original conscious percept 
(Nisbett, 1977). The construction of a report being additional to, and dependent upon, 
different substrates, than the conscious experience at which the experiments were directed, 
limits the conclusions that can be drawn. This is because the report and experience are 
intertwined in the responses provided by the subject, and there appears to be a limit to 
obtaining measures that refer to the experience of the subject independently of the report 
process. This problem may cut even deeper than the conflation between report process and 
the conscious experience of the subject. There is also the possibility that the requirement for a 
behavioural response may itself affect the experience, again preventing any measure based on 
subjective reports as referring directly to an instance of conscious (or even unconscious) 
experience (Gagne & Smith, 1962), this is also known as the ‘observer paradox’, (Labov, 
1972). This problem of the report aspect of behavioural responses being additional to the 
experience itself is not trivial as it prevents these experiments from directly referring to their 
target of internal subjective states of the subject. The problem of there being additional 
elements related to report has been described as the problem of ‘reactivity’ (Ericsson, 2003), 
which is the term I will use to refer to it in the following discussion of some of the strategies 
that can and have been deployed to reduce the impact of this issue on this research. 
 
4.4 Attempts at solutions 
 
4.4.1 Signal detection theory and response allocations 
 
 The motivation for the development of the two principal measures, applied here, was 
primarily to obtain measures of subjects’ conscious experience of stimuli and their perceptual 
ability which lacked conscious awareness; thus revealing consciousness through the contrast 
between them (Baars, 2005; Dretske, 2000). The secondary objective was to derive measures 
that were robust to the influence of potential confounds. This section will discuss how these 
measures were developed with respect to the problems encountered. The measure of 
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conscious detection is first discussed (4.4.1.1), followed by the ‘unseen’ discrimination 
measure (4.4.1.2). Finally, I discuss the issues of interpretation with respect to measures used 
to quantify blindsight more generally (4.4.1.3).  
 
4.4.1.1 The conscious detection measures 
 
 Reactivity limits the extent to which measures can be attributed to their intended 
referent in conscious experience and it provides a source of potential confounds. As the 
previous section suggests, if any intervention (e.g. a disruption caused by TMS) is effective at 
the level of the report process, rather than upon the intended target of conscious awareness, 
then the effect in terms of the subject’s response is the same – a negative report is produced, 
hence conflating the report and the conscious experience. The application of signal detection 
theory (SDT) was intended to help alleviate this problem by delineating measures of 
sensitivity and response criteria. By taking into account the state of the stimuli it is possible 
to reduce the conflation between the two processes. If TMS is effective in reducing the 
subject’s conscious experience of the stimuli then the TMS should cause negative responses 
when the stimuli are presented. If, on the other hand, it is the report process that was targeted 
by the intervention then we might also expect a negative report, but we have no reason to 
think that such an occurrence of negative report should depend upon the stimuli’s presence or 
absence (N.B. the same structure of argument applies to the production of positive reports). 
Hence, response criteria / bias as the propensity to acknowledge awareness independently of 
what was presented (Macmillan & Creelman, 1990) has been linked to changes at the level of 
reports, while sensitivity-based measures have been used to reflect subjects’ conscious 
experience of the stimuli. 
 The principal experimental confounds in the on-line TMS experiments (Chapter 3) 
were the auditory and tactile artefacts accompanying TMS discharge, independent of direct 
neuronal effects. Additionally, there were differences in the extent to which the noise of the 
stimuli may have been attributed by the subjects across the two stimuli classes (S-cone or 
luminance stimuli9). In the off-line experiments (Chapter 2) the effect of fatigue and 
                                                            
9 Because the two stimuli classes were not independently calibrated in terms of response criteria, the 
noise of the stimuli may have appeared to more closely resemble the s-cone target than it did the 
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expectation10 may have been the primary causes of uninformative changes in the data. That 
many of these factors were also present in the control conditions provides the first line of 
defence in drawing secure conclusions. However, subtraction from baseline may not fully 
alleviate the influence of these factors, particularly when the magnitude of the confound 
differs between experimental conditions. This was the case for the stimuli class difference in 
the on-line experiments and the potential expectation difference in the off-line experiments. 
Both of these can be considered aspects of the problem of reactivity and may be reduced 
through the application of SDT. If a subjects’ expectations are such that they expect to see 
stimuli less often (or more often) following the application of active TMS relative to control 
TMS, then they should respond ‘no’ (or ‘yes’) more often under the active TMS condition 
irrespective of the stimuli’s status, and hence express the expectation confound as a 
fluctuation in the measure of bias rather than sensitivity. This may explain the initial 
observation (section 2.2.3) and subsequent trend (section 2.6.1) for an increased propensity to 
respond positively in the off-line experiments. Likewise, if subjects are more likely to 
attribute the stimulus noise to the presence of s-cone arrows than they are to the presence of 
luminance arrows, then this difference also should be expressed upon the measure of bias, not 
sensitivity, as was observed (see figure 3.3.3.3).  
 The segregation of bias and sensitivity in reported conscious awareness, additionally 
aided the experiments as the variability between subjects in terms of their criteria was 
removed from the primary measure of interest (Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). Subjects may 
approach the task with differing levels at which they acknowledge awareness of the stimuli, 
which in turn could result in differences in their susceptibility to the interventions; this would 
then limit the extent to which the experiments are able to demonstrate significant differences 
of interest. Again, such differences, across subjects, constitute differences in criteria and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
luminance target. This led to increased ‘false alarm’ rates for s-cone stimuli and an imbalance of 
criteria across stimuli conditions, see section 3.3.3. Furthermore, owing to the insensitivity of BrC to 
fluctuations in the stimuli noise (see below), apparent during piloting, it is questionable whether it 
would have been possible to calibrate response bias across stimuli classes.  
10 Subjects were almost certainly aware of the difference between control/sham and active TMS in the 
off-line experiments, and therefore may have expected the TMS to have an effect upon their 
performance, resulting in a general adjustment of response criteria. The same difference (between 
active and sham TMS) does not apply to the same extent in the on-line experiments because the 
effects of interest were also time-dependent, resting upon differences between TMS epochs as small 
as 40ms. It is highly unlikely that subjects were capable of distinguishing and subsequently reacting 
to, such differences. 
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should be expressed upon the measure of bias, from which the primary measure of interest 
(sensitivity, PrC) is effectively independent. 
 The application of SDT may reduce this problem of reactivity but does not eliminate 
it, for three reasons. First, because of the causal aspect to the problem of reactivity – that the 
requirement for report could actively change the experience in question – the problem is to 
some extent unavoidable when SDT measures are acquired (hence its description as a 
paradox; Labov, 1972). Second, the elimination is not complete because the measure of 
sensitivity may not cover the full extent of conscious experience; that is, there are conscious 
experiences of the task whose occurrence will result in fluctuations in the measure of bias, 
but not sensitivity. For instance, misrepresentation of the noise of the stimuli grouped into 
arrow-like percepts would lead to an increase in bias, not sensitivity, and can easily be 
understood as a form of conscious awareness. It has even been suggested that a key to 
understanding what it is to be an intentional agent is the ability to misrepresent information 
(see Dretske, 1986). This means that the connection made between conscious awareness and 
the measure of sensitivity is limited to veridical awareness of actual stimuli. Therefore 
differences in the measures of bias may express report level and/or confound differences (as 
described above), but the measures of bias may also fluctuate in accordance with certain non-
veridical aspects of the subject’s conscious experience of the task, such as those occurring 
during misrepresentation.  Consequently, the separation of changes in conscious awareness 
and changes in reactive report might not perfectly match the division between sensitivity and 
bias measures. Even so, acknowledgement of the division and practical segregation of the 
two facets seems preferable to the alternative (Weiskrantz, 2001), being a measure of 
reported awareness which derives from subjects’ reports irrespective of the stimuli status. 
Such a measure would conflate the veridical awareness with response criteria and, therefore, 
may be more susceptible to experimental confounds such as the expectations of the subjects. 
Third, as acknowledged in section 1.3.2.2 and 4.2, false alarm rates were low, often 
approaching floor levels. The capacity of any form of SDT to dissociate response criteria 
from sensitivity is severely hampered by such floor effects. 
 All applications of SDT applied here have been non-parametric, owing to the 
violation of the central assumptions of classic parametric SDT. These assumptions are: “(1) 
The signal and noise distributions are both normal, and (2) the signal and noise distributions 
have the same standard deviation” (pp140 Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Although it is often 
unclear as to what exactly it is that is referred to by these distributions, I take the noise 
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distribution to refer to the information provided on stimulus-absent trials, and the signal 
distribution to be representative of stimulus-present information. Due to imbalances in the 
number of stimulus-absent and stimulus-present conditions in both experimental behavioural 
sections (see 2.6.1.1 methods and 3.2.1 methods) the distributions of the two may not be 
equal (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999; Swets, 1986). Furthermore, false alarms were relatively 
rare, limiting the applicability of classic SDT. This can be interpreted as the result of the 
subjects’ criteria for this task being situated toward the tail end of the noise distribution 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 1990; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). In development of the stimuli, 
an attempt was made to increase the rate of false alarms by increasing the range of luminance 
noise; however, this was found to have little effect in piloting experiments. Although the 
range of the luminance noise for the stimuli used in the final experiments was relatively high, 
the false alarm rates were still relatively low (the range of noise displayed here was 10-15 
cd/m2, in a previous comparable study the range was 3.6 cd/m2; Sumner, et al., 2002). By 
contrast, hit rates appeared to be highly sensitive to fluctuations in the luminance of the 
target, as differences in hit rates over a range of target intensities drove the psychometric 
functions used to calibrate task performance. The insensitivity of false alarm rates to changes 
in stimulus noise, relative to the sensitivity of hit rates, further indicates that the distributions 
of the noise and the signal may not have been comparable. 
 Subjects typically adopt conservative criteria in forced choice yes/no tasks 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 1990), even over a range of noise presentations. Why should this 
be? It may be a characteristic of higher cognitive processes, such as consciousness, that 
agents are unlikely positively to report seeing a stimulus when no stimulus is presented. If 
part of what it is to be conscious is to have a higher order process that monitors the content of 
first order representations, then such a mechanism should act to minimise the incidence of 
false alarms. This is the ‘higher order thought’ position discussed in section 4.5 below and 
follows the proposition that “a conscious mental state is a compound of two things: the 
mental state, which itself is not conscious and one’s being transitively conscious of it” (pp 
738 Rosenthal, 2002). Such a mechanism would compare the information received with a 
higher order representation and produce a positive response only if a match is achieved, with 
the default response in the absence of a match being negative. The structure of this 
monitoring/meta-cognitive relationship is therefore such that it limits positive responses when 
information is limited. It has also been suggested that minimising false alarms is precisely the 
type of function consciousness has evolved to perform (Millikan, 1984). 
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 The non-parametric versions of SDT adopted here make no such assumptions in 
relation to noise and signal distributions and therefore do not suffer from the problems caused 
by low false alarm rates which hinder classic SDT to the same extent. For the Pr and Br 
measures used, Pr simply reflects the extent to which subjects correctly identified the 
presence of the stimuli, whereas Br reflects the subjects’ propensity to identify the presence 
of the stimuli irrespective of what was actually presented (Corwin, 1994, see section 1.3).  
 
4.4.1.2 Reportedly ‘Unseen’ discrimination 
 
 In addition to the Pr and Br measures, the other measure of interest in these 
experiments was subjects’ forced choice discrimination ability when they reported not having 
seen the stimuli (PcU). Both PrC and PcU are measures of sensitivity and operate over the 
same range. This ensures that the difference between the two principal measures is as 
minimal as possible (section 1.2-3), with the key difference being that the PcU measure 
applies when the subject is not reportedly consciously aware of the stimulus presented. 
Section 1.3.2 discussed the reasons for using ‘unseen’ trials only in the derivation of this 
measure (ensuring that the perceptual ability under consideration was lacking in 
consciousness and was not directly influenced by variation in reported awareness, during 
which discrimination ability was at ceiling level). In the on-line TMS experiments, which 
developed from the off-line experiments, the PcU measures were derived from trials when the 
subject reported ‘unseen’ to both ‘arrow?’ and ‘something?’ questions, allowing more 
confidence to be placed in the concurrent processing lacking consciousness. Even so, this did 
not alleviate the problem of reactivity in reference to PcU: while the content of experience 
with respect to the exposure to stimuli may lack consciousness, the report process is unlikely 
also to lack consciousness. This conscious reflection upon the trial, required to produce the 
report, could mediate residual visual abilities.  As described, this could be the cause of the 
late effects in Experiment 3C (the double-pulse single-subject case study, section 3.6). 
 However, before endorsing such an interpretation, it is worth highlighting some 
characteristics of the negative report. First, the problematic awareness under consideration 
and the cause of the problem of reactivity with respect to PcU, is awareness of the question. 
Awareness of the arrow is still lacking in trials that contribute to the PcU measure. Second, 
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awareness of the question is contingent upon a number of factors (e.g. subjects not becoming 
habituated to the questioning through practice, see section 4.8.2). In contrast, the presence of 
conscious awareness when the arrow was presented and the subject responding positively to 
‘Did you see the arrow?’ is far less open to question. Awareness may or may not be present 
on trials which contribute to PcU, but it is almost certainly present in trials which contribute 
positively to PrC. Therefore, the difference between the two measures exemplifies a 
difference specific to conscious awareness of the stimuli, and this difference is sufficient to 
make the contrast revealing of consciousness. 
 
4.4.1.3 Blindsight and criteria  
 
 One of the major criticisms of blindsight as a distinct neurological phenomenon is the 
possibility that it reflects an extreme response criterion where subjects do not ‘acknowledge’ 
awareness and blindsight is therefore not fundamentally distinct from degraded normal vision 
(Campion, et al., 1983)11. Such an argument can comprehensively describe blindsight without 
referring to there being an absence of conscious awareness. As possibly the chief proponent 
of the phenomenon of blindsight, Weiskrantz has argued that the degraded normal vision 
interpretation is not viable (Weiskrantz, 1986, 2001, 2009). He argues that the discrepancy 
between subjects’ reported experience of stimuli and their forced choice performance 
represents a double dissociation, as both have been perturbed independently, indicating that 
blindsight is a deficit largely specific to consciousness (Kentridge, et al., 1999; Weiskrantz, 
1986 chapter 16 and 19 ). The single dissociation of blindsight is simply that conscious 
awareness is affected by the lesion while the residual abilities remain. The double 
dissociation has been demonstrated by effects on the residual abilities independent of the 
subjects’ conscious knowledge: for example, reportedly ‘unseen’ responses can be modulated 
by the presence of cues (Kentridge, et al., 1999). Furthermore, recent work has indicated that 
                                                            
11 Informal conversations with blindsight researchers have also raised an additional related criticism of 
classic blindsight: some subjects’ know that their participation in, and payment for potential future 
experiments rests upon their not acknowledging any awareness of stimuli presented to their blind 
field. This could result in their maintenance of extreme response criteria independent of experience. 
Fortunately, this was not a consideration here as subjects were not paid according to experimental 
conditions.   
 
149 
 
a well-studied blindsight subject (DB) has greater sensitivity to stimuli, within a two 
alternative forced choice task, in his impaired classically blindsighted field, than in his 
reportedly sighted field (Trevethan, Sahraie, & Weiskrantz, 2007). This makes it difficult to 
see how degraded normal vision could support the residual vision of blindsight. The 
application of SDT here was therefore partly intended to circumvent this criticism via the 
derivation of measures that could evince blindsight (PrC and PcU) and operate independently 
of subjects’ criteria (BrC). 
 Nevertheless, it is also possible to formulate an explanation of blindsight based on 
extreme response criteria that does not detract from its being a distinct phenomenon, and 
which also results in an absence of – or inability to access – consciousness. This is Ko and 
Lau’s SDT based explanation of blindsight (Ko & Lau, 2012). They regard blindsight as a 
failure of frontal areas to update criteria according to the information available to them, 
owing to the lesions of the primary visual cortex. The blockage of reciprocal processing, 
leads to the failure to modulate extreme response criteria by frontal regions that are 
responsible for the initiation of the report. This highlights an important feature of the 
discussion of response criteria, bias and signal-to-noise ratio in general: that there are many 
different meanings to the applications of these terms and they may not all correspond to one 
another, as discussed further in appendix A2. The Ko and Lau model is a ‘subpersonal’ 
(Dennett, 1969)12 mechanistic description, where failure to update criteria leads to an absence 
of higher order consciousness, hence does not detract from blindsight as illustrating a specific 
lack of consciousness. The meaning of criteria / bias in the criticism of blindsight (Campion, 
et al., 1983), in contrast, applies at the ‘personal’ level (Dennett, 1969) of the subject where 
changes in the data may not reflect the presence / absence of consciousness, but instead 
fluctuate according to changes in the report process and strategy. Because the uses of criteria 
in these two interpretations of blindsight differ, they may not contradict or even inform one 
another.  
 However, because the SDT explanation of Ko and Lau and the gating-by-inhibition 
hypothesis put forward in Chapter 2 each apply at the ‘sub-personal’ level they can be 
                                                            
12 The personal / sub-personal distinction was introduced by Dennett (1969) which pertains to 
different levels of explanation. The personal level applies at the level of the subject as a whole, to 
their sensations and reported responses. The sub-personal level is the mechanistic physical level 
describing the brain and nervous system. Dennett emphasises that descriptions offered at each level 
may not be directly applicable or comprehensible when applied to the other level. 
 
150 
 
interpreted as mutually consistent. In the off-line TMS experiments described here, the signal 
provided to frontal regions, as quantified by the ERF, was not significantly influenced by 
cTBS, whereas the gating mechanism that potentially reflected the criteria (expressed by the 
ERD and changes in GABA) was facilitated in the presence of enhanced conscious 
awareness, mirroring the mechanism described by Ko and Lau (2012). 
 The conflation between levels of description provides a reason why a deliberate 
attempt was made to avoid discussing the gating-by-inhibition hypothesis in terms of Signal-
to-Noise Ratio (SNR), even though it is acceptable to interpret it as a suppression of neuronal 
noise, leading to increased SNR. The difficulty in framing the hypothesis in terms of SNR is 
that neuronal SNR cannot easily be extricated from the SNR of the imaging techniques 
themselves used to assess the neuronal processes (detailed in appendix A2). 
 Discussing gating-by-inhibition in terms of SNR also suggests a relationship with the 
SDT based behavioural measures, which straddles levels of explanation and is also 
potentially misleading. For example, increased gating could potentially be expected to result 
in a decrease in the measure of bias (BrC), following the application of cTBS. This would be 
because the mechanisms that govern entry into consciousness (and which set the criteria) 
become facilitated and the increased active inhibition might lead to a suppression of 
superfluous representations, thus reducing false alarms. Although superficially compelling 
this argument is flawed. This is because the incidence of false alarms (produced at the 
personal level) might increase following the suppression of noise at the subpersonal level. 
This would be because the neuronal representations of the stimulus noise may be facilitated 
relative to the representation of stimuli background, leading to increased misrepresentation of 
the stimulus noise as a target and increasing false alarms. Hence two predictions are made 
which are incompatible if an attempt is made to forge an explanation based on SNR that runs 
across levels of explanation. 
 The work of Ko and Lau highlights the point that differences in criteria may have 
implications for the mechanistic basis of changes in conscious awareness, and are therefore of 
interest. Yet, in part because of the potential for confusion over the definition of ‘criteria’, 
and more importantly because of the susceptibility of the bias measures to confounds 
(described above in section 4.4.1.1), fluctuations of bias in the current experiments are of 
secondary interest. 
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 Another criticism of the experimental paradigm developed here, and blindsight more 
generally, is the use of a forced choice question procedure in relation to conscious awareness, 
particularly the two alternative “Yes/No?” detection question of the off-line experiments. The 
procedure itself could potentially be the source of any dissociation between the measures. 
This would be due to the bifurcation of consciousness enforced by the questions used not 
accurately describing the likely graduated nature of consciousness (Overgaard, Rote, 
Mouridsen, & Ramsoy, 2006). Within a more graduated model of awareness, there may be a 
non-categorical ‘grey area’ where there is sufficient consciousness for performance on 
‘unseen’ trials to exceed chance levels, yet insufficient to elicit a categorical ‘yes’ response. 
This is consistent with the work of Overgaard et al (2008) who showed that a blindsighted 
subject (GR) admitted no awareness of the stimuli when asked ‘Did you see it? Yes or No?’ 
but would nonetheless demonstrate some degree of awareness using a questioning procedure 
with a finer granularity of response options. This possibility motivated the application of the 
‘something?’ question in the on-line experiments (Chapter 3). Subjects’ performance was 
well above chance even when they reported having seen neither the ‘arrow’ nor ‘something’, 
indicating the existence of perception when consciousness was lacking. Furthermore, recent 
work using the perceptual awareness scale developed by Overgaard et al, has shown that 
although conscious confidence correlates with accuracy, above-chance performance can still 
be demonstrated when subjects use the lowest categories of reported awareness available to 
them (Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010).  
Notwithstanding this defence of the current procedures, I feel this criticism of the 
forced choice method remains because there is clearly a limit to which simple behavioural 
descriptions, to which statistics are applicable, can capture the richness and variety of 
conscious experience (Overgaard, et al., 2006). Although cogent, this criticism does not 
prevent the ‘unseen’ category from referring to experiences that are relatively lacking in 
consciousness compared to when subjects acknowledge veridical awareness, which is the key 
relative difference upon which these experiments have been based (discussed further in 
section 4.8)  
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4.4.2 Other strategies  
 
 Clearly, there is a number of additional simple contingencies that were implemented 
which lessened the problematic possibility of reports not referring to consciousness. For 
example, lying could potentially be a source of confounds in this respect, but subjects are 
unlikely to lie if there is no reason to do so (Roepstorff & Jack, 2004). Similarly, a mismatch 
between experience and report might arise from complexities in the report process, which can 
be minimised by the use of relatively simple tasks (Ericsson, 2003; Gallagher, 2003; 
Hurlburt, 2004). 
 Another way to reduce the problem of reactivity is through the use of additional 
experimental conditions without the requirement for report (Gagne & Smith, 1962; Lau, 
2008). The contrast of the two (with and without report) isolates the additional computation 
associated with the report (Lau, 2008).  This manipulation is more easily applied in imaging 
studies than in TMS studies where the dependent variable is often based on some form of 
report. Because the MEG experiment involved a replication of the behavioural study and was 
time-restricted, this manipulation was not implemented. The capacity of MRS to demonstrate 
functional changes based on visual task differences is far from reliable at this point in the 
development of the technique (Puts & Edden, 2012), so this manipulation was not 
implemented in the MRS experiment either. Since a contrast between conditions requiring 
and not requiring a response was not implemented, it is not possible to extricate changes as a 
result of the experimental manipulation being at the level of the report rather than at the level 
of the conscious experience (or unconscious experience in the double-pulse TMS Experiment 
3C, see section 3.6.7). However, because reports are required on all trials it is possible to 
reduce what may be one of the more difficult aspects of the problem of reactivity: that the 
observed changes are the result of applying a behavioural probe (Dehaene et al., 2001; Gagne 
& Smith, 1962). The probe is also present in the baseline conditions, thus controlling for 
general effects of questioning on performance (Rees, 2007). 
 Clearly whether or not one regards the problems raised above as cogent or straw men 
depends on the position one takes as to the nature of consciousness and reports – i.e. the 
ontology of mind that the investigator chooses to adopt. If one accepts that the reporting 
process of awareness differs from awareness itself, then there is a difficulty in the 
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interpretation of these experiments because it remains unclear as to which is being measured 
by the data. If on the other hand one’s ontologies are such that what it is to be conscious is to 
have full access to content (as the introductory quotation suggests) then the problem 
dissolves, as there are few reasons to believe reported awareness and awareness are 
dissociable in any meaningful way. If so then the PrC measures directly refer to subjects’ 
conscious awareness of the stimuli and PcU is lacking in consciousness. This is essentially 
the interpretation position adopted by higher order thought theorists (e.g. Baars, Rosenthal) 
and is discussed in the next section 4.5. Another, widely cited, way in which this issue has 
been cast has been in terms of a difference between phenomenal consciousness and access 
consciousness (Block, 1995, 2007). This is discussed in section 4.6. Following a brief 
discussion of the ‘hard problem’ (4.7), section 4.8 will then discuss the intermediate 
neurophenomenological approach I have chosen to adopt in these experiments.  
  
4.5 Interpretations under Global Workspace 
and Higher Order Theories. 
 
 There are several versions of higher order thought (HOT) and global workspace (GW) 
theories of consciousness (Carruthers, 2007; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 1993). This 
section will briefly summarise some of the principal treatments of these theories and their 
correspondence to the measures and results. Because the predictions made by both these 
theories (see Lau & Rosenthal, 2011 for review) appear to be equivalent in terms of the data 
presented here, they are described in a single section. 
 The basic premise, common and defining of HOT theories, is that what makes a state 
conscious is that there is a primary level representation (e.g. sensory information), call it X, 
and that there is a secondary level, contemporaneous, representation whose content is of 
being in X. Mental states are conscious by virtue of there being a higher order state which 
represents the primary state: “...a mental state’s being conscious consists in one’s being 
conscious of being in that state” (pp 209 Rosenthal, 1993).  
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 Under HOT theories, being aware, knowing you are aware, and being able to report 
that it is so, are intertwined. Being aware and knowing one is aware, are to some extent, 
constitutive of what it is to be conscious. Although the report aspect does not have to be 
present, there should be no objections to reports when they occur in veridical cases (see 
4.4.1.1 and 4.4.2) referring to higher-order / conscious processes, because the requirement for 
monitoring upon which the report depends is the same requirement as is made of processes 
for them to be conscious. The impact of the problem of reactivity on the interpretation of 
these experiments is therefore nullified because accessing percepts and forming reports are 
not considered additional to conscious awareness under HOT theories. Therefore, the 
measures of conscious detection employed here refer directly to conscious awareness, and the 
corresponding interpretation of reportedly ‘unseen’ abilities would be that they correspond to 
first order processing that is lacking in consciousness (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001).  
 Like HOT theories GW theories are based on operational definitions which originate 
from the premise that consciousness has limited capacity (Baars, 1988; Baars, 2007). 
Representations gain access to a GW which is likely to involve thalamo-cortical complexes 
(Baars, 2007). Such information is then available and can be broadcast throughout such 
complex networks (Baars, 2007). In this way consciousness can be seen as involving 
unconscious representations that are gated and selected for entry into the GW (Baars, 1988; 
Baars, 2007), which is consistent with the interpretation of the off-line TMS experiments 
reported here. This is particularly the case with respect to the ERD results (section 2.6.4), as 
Baars has linked similar alpha band changes to such a gating mechanism (Baars, 2007). In 
terms of the interpretation of the current experimental paradigm, as a whole, the PrC measure 
can be interpreted as tracking representations of task-relevant stimuli that gain access to the 
GW and become broadcastable / conscious. BrC can be seen as the criteria set for entry into 
the GW, and PcU as corresponding to the overflow in unconscious processing that fails to 
gain entry to the global network.     
 In contrast to PrC, the interpretation of ‘unseen’ abilities, particularly under HOT 
theories, is complicated by the problem of reactivity. ‘Unseen’ measures are based upon trials 
in which the subject reports ‘No’. Do the questions applied (both ‘left/right?’ and ‘yes/no?’) 
and responses collected require second order representations (Sahraie, Hibbard, Trevethan, 
Ritchie, & Weiskrantz, 2010)? If they do, then it is difficult to use data collected when 
subjects report stimuli as ‘unseen’ to draw conclusions that equate this response type with an 
absence of consciousness. Indeed, it might be that the second order-conscious reflection on 
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the question that was the target of the disruption of ‘unseen’ abilities caused by the TMS 
applied at later times in Experiment 3C (section 3.6), i.e. first order processes may not have 
been tracked by the ‘unseen’ measure.  
 As with the interpretation offered in 3.6.3, the proposition that ‘unseen’ abilities are 
mediated by the conscious requirement for report may be an over-interpretation of that data 
set and is not consistent with the conclusions offered by proponents of HOT theories to 
similar data sets (Rosenthal, 2012). For the HOT theorist, the requirement for report can be 
seen as evoking an additional third order relationship which may be conscious (of the form of 
‘Did I see anything?’), but the second order relationship that is the target of the question is 
not conscious by virtue of there being no primary representation which is discernible to the 
second order process (Rosenthal, 2012).  
 An additional consideration in the interpretation of these experiments under HOT 
theories is that it is possible that the measures of criteria / bias (BrC) could refer to higher 
order processing (Dienes, In Press; Ko & Lau, 2012; Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, & 
Cleeremans, 2012). This prompts the question: should BrC also be considered a measure of 
higher order / conscious thought, and thus be treated as a measure of central interest in these 
experiments? Within the context of these experiments the ‘Did you consciously see the 
arrow?’ question was targeted at secondary level sensitivity in its construction. So here it is 
perhaps more appropriate to relate the measure of sensitivity to the conscious processing 
which is the target of this investigation (Dienes, In Press). Bias / BrC can be seen as 
corresponding to third order relationships, which may be conscious, but whose content is 
more likely to involve the reactive process mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 
Additionally it has been demonstrated that the criteria subjects apply to a task can be 
manipulated even when the subject is unaware of the stimuli to which the criteria refer 
(Kentridge & Heywood, 2000). That is, criteria can change independently of the presence of 
conscious awareness. Such changes have been reported within the context of classic 
blindsight where there is a loss of awareness (Kentridge & Heywood, 2000). Therefore, 
because it appears that criteria can fluctuate in the absence of awareness, the PrC measure is 
perhaps the safer referent for second order – conscious – processing than are changes in BrC. 
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4.6 Interpretations under a distinction between 
phenomenal and access consciousness 
 
 This section will consider the distinction between phenomenal and access 
consciousness (Block, 1995, 2007). In addition to describing this distinction, the data 
produced over the on-line experiments in particular affords us the opportunity to test a 
prediction, made by Block, that informs the validity of the differentiation. One interpretation 
of the distinction (Block, 2007) suggests the derivation of an additional measure not 
previously described, the analysis of which can be found in appendix A5.  
 What it is that the measures described and responses to tasks refer to is always open to 
interpretation. The assumption made here has been that PrC corresponds to conscious 
awareness and PcU corresponds to perception that is distinctly lacking in conscious 
awareness. These assumptions were adopted because they were felt to be broadly consistent 
with many, if not the majority of contemporary models of mind (HOT,GW, 
Heterophenomenology (see Dennett, 1991; Dennett, 2003), Neurophenomenology (see 
section 4.7 and Varela, 1996; Varela, et al., 1991) and previous interpretations of similar data 
(Boyer, et al., 2005; Holt, 2003; Lamme, 2006b; Ro, et al., 2004; Weiskrantz, 1986, 1996)). 
Additionally, the measures themselves were adjusted according to reports collected from the 
subjects following their experience of the experiments, placing the epistemic referents of the 
measure upon the subjects themselves (Dennett, 2003; Varela, 1996). 
 One notable exception to this consistency is the theory put forward in a series of 
influential articles by Ned Block. The basic differentiation made by Block is between 
phenomenal and access consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness (p-consciousness) is 
commonly associated with the ‘what it is like’ (Nagel, 1974) or ‘qualia’ (Lewis, 1929) aspect 
of experience (pp 230 Block, 1995). Block clarifies this by defining p-consciousness as 
having content, as in the difference between seeing red and green (Block, 2005). Access 
consciousness (a-consciousness) on the other hand is that which the subject has full, 
reportable reflective access to – thus associated with the mechanisms of report (Block, 1995, 
2005, 2007). In terms of evidence, Block cites blindsight as a case in which phenomenality 
has greater capacity or overflows conscious access, indicating their disjunction (Block, 1995). 
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Because blindsight subjects differentiate between contents of stimuli, they express p-
consciousness, but because they are not reflectively aware of whether or not stimuli were 
presented, they lack a-consciousness (Block, 1995). 
 The a-consciousness side of Blocks’ argument is relatively uncontroversial and can be 
seen as represented by the PrC measure, PrC varying in accordance with the extent to which 
subjects have reportable / accessible awareness of the stimuli. The on-line experiments 
(Chapter 3) therefore show that a-consciousness is primarily supported by recurrent late 
processing, as it was most susceptible to disruption when TMS was applied at later times. 
Additionally, a-consciousness may also receive support from R/M pathways practically 
during the very early and very late stages of visual processing. The off-line experiments 
(Chapter 2) could be interpreted as displaying a potentiation of a-consciousness, and it may 
be the mechanisms governing which representations become accessed and which benefit 
from the application of occipital cTBS. The more controversial side of Block’s argument is 
the existence of, and the way in which, p-consciousness can be understood.  
 The problem Block’s theory raises for this series of experiments and their 
interpretation is that what has been classed as lacking in consciousness might actually be a 
form of consciousness (p-consciousness). According to this interpretation, the experimental 
contrast between the two measures fails to reveal anything about consciousness per se but 
rather highlights a difference between different forms of consciousness. My aim in this 
section is not to show that Block’s interpretation of the phenomenon of blindsight is incorrect 
(for arguments of that type see peer comments in Block, (1995, 2007) and Cohen & Dennett, 
(2011)). Rather, Block makes a prediction which some of the findings of these experiments 
may inform. 
 The prediction made by Block, which is tractable in these data sets, is that 
phenomenal consciousness will be accompanied by recurrent processing (pp 498 Block, 
2007). The ‘on-line’ experiments disrupted what can be regarded as recurrent processing, 
therefore was concurrent phenomenal consciousness suppressed? In order to tackle this, the 
additional question must be posed: What responses made by the subjects should be associated 
with presence of phenomenal consciousness?  
 The attribution of phenomenally and access consciousness status to any of the 
measures is open to interpretation. In earlier writings of Block (circa 1995) p-consciousness 
is associated with ‘unseen’ discrimination ability (PcU) as Block cites blindsight as a case for 
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p-consciousness. If so, then the previous discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 can be framed in 
terms of the p- / a- consciousness disjunction (reading in p-conscious for reportedly ‘unseen’ 
abilities, PcU) and support for Block’s theory can be found. Although the multiple subject 
study (Experiment 3A) did not support (or refute) the correspondence between recurrent 
processing and p-consciousness / PcU, Experiment 3B and 3C did. In particular, Experiment 
3C showed that when TMS was applied over later rather than at earlier times, disrupting 
recurrent processing, suppression in PcU / p-consciousness was observed (see figure 3.6.2.2), 
mirroring Block’s prediction (Block, 2007). This same pattern and support for Block’s theory 
is also suggested by the trend for TMS to be disruptive of PcU when applied over later times 
in Experiment 3B (see figure 3.5.2.2).   
 In later writings (Block, 2007, 2011) Block appears subtly to shift his position by 
emphasising the way in which experiments such as those of Sperling (1960)13 express 
phenomenal consciousness in the form of a vague feeling or gist-like quality. This is perhaps 
in response to criticisms made by many authors (see peer responses in both Brain and 
Behavioural Science articles (Block, 1995, 2007) and (Cohen & Dennett, 2011)) along the 
lines of what defines blindsight (which Block in earlier writings cites in support of p-
conscious) is a lack of consciousness, not the presence of phenomenal consciousness. This 
has been interpreted as ‘phenomenal consciousness lite’ (pp 520 O’Regan and Myin in Block, 
2007). One interpretation of this later position could be that this ‘phenomenal consciousness 
lite’ corresponds to a subject’s responding positively to the ‘something?’ question, as 
opposed to their explicit veridical awareness of the ‘arrow’ (PrC) which might be thought of 
as representative of their conscious access. 
 The rate of positive responses to the ‘something?’ question at each data point was 
computed. This measure compiled the number of ‘yes’ responses to the ‘something?’ 
question only (i.e. when the subject did not acknowledge awareness of the arrow) relative to 
the number of opportunities for such a response. If responding positively to the ‘something’ 
question can be attributed to the presence of p-consciousness, which involves recurrent 
                                                            
13 The Sperling experiments (Sperling, 1960) involved showing subjects arrays of up to 4×3 letters or 
numbers. When an attentional cue was provided the subject could report any sub-set of the content of 
the array – i.e. they had access. When no cue was provided they reported a gist-like impression of all 
the characters, yet were only able to report correctly a reduced sub-set of what had been presented. 
Block discusses this pattern of results as an illustration of p-consciousness outpacing a-consciousness 
(Block, 2007).  
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processing, then the resulting hypothesis would be that the rate of reporting of ‘something’ 
(in trials without a ‘yes’ to the ‘arrow?’ question) should be suppressed by TMS applied at 
later times, disrupting recurrent processing. There are of course many more potential ways in 
which the phenomenal / access difference can be understood in terms of allocation of 
responses to measures. However the use of rate of reporting ‘something’ seems to fit the 
descriptions offered Block and makes a minimal number of assumptions. The analysis of this 
measure is described in appendix A5; no clear evidence was obtained for a correspondence 
between subjects’ acknowledging awareness of ‘something’ and relatively late occipital 
TMS. 
 The question posed in this section was whether or not p-consciousness was 
accompanied by recurrent processing, following Block’s prediction (Block, 2007), if one 
were to adopt an allocation of response patterns to the p- / a- distinction offered in earlier 
writings (Block, 1995), then the data may be consistent with Block’s differentiation. That is, 
the residual abilities of blindsight have been linked with p-consciousness (Block, 1995) and 
here, when recurrent processing was disrupted by later TMS so too were residual ‘unseen’ (p-
conscious) abilities, matching Block’s prediction. 
 If, on the other hand, the measures of ‘something’ represents p-consciousness, then 
the data shows no correspondence with the disruption of later recurrent processing (see 
appendix A5). Hence, this measure does not provide evidence in favour of Block’s later 
interpretation. A further distinction offered by Block in later writings, is the 
acknowledgement of the existence of ‘unconscious’ processing in addition to the p- / a- 
distinction (Block, 2011), under this, unconscious processing might be seen as represented by 
the PcU measure. If so, the disruption of PcU’s at later times (Experiment 3C) relative to the 
absence of later disruption of the ‘something’ measure can be seen as evidence against 
Block’s theory. This is because the data here suggests that ‘unseen’ / unconscious abilities are 
more sensitive to (therefore more likely to be dependent upon) the disruption of recurrent 
processing than is the ‘gist-like’ (phenomenal) acknowledgement of seeing ‘something’.  
 Perhaps the more widely acceptable interpretation of the data and measures here (that 
is consistent with both earlier and later writings of Block and Lamme’s interpretation of the 
p-/a- distinction (see peer review responses pp 511 Block, 2007)), is that the PcU measure, 
rather than corresponding to a form of consciousness directly, is indirectly supported by 
access consciousness. That is, conscious reflection upon the question to which the subject has 
160 
 
conscious access mediates the reportedly unseen abilities. The TMS applied at later times 
being effective upon the conscious reflection on the question, which itself is likely to involve 
recurrent processing (section 3.6.3). Therefore, the PcU measure simply does not reflect p-
consciousness. Furthermore, the option is available to Block and his proponents to argue that 
the reason for which the ‘something’ measure failed to demonstrate a correspondence with 
the later intervention was that it simply failed to capture the intention behind Block’s 
description of p-consciousness. 
 Overall, if one chooses to adopt Block’s differentiation, then the data do not refute 
that belief, particularly if the understanding is based on the early description of p-
consciousness. The later differentiation appears to be less well supported by the data. 
However it should be noted that this discussion has largely focused on the single subject’s 
data and the conclusions that can be drawn from case studies must always be tentative. 
Therefore further to elucidate Block’s theory, a between-subjects replication of the single-
subject double-pulse study (3C) would be required. The task might also be developed more 
closely to reflect Block’s differentiation, possibly via the adaptation of a task similar to the 
Sperling experiments, but in conjunction with event related / on-line TMS. As it stands, it 
remains possible to interpret these experiments as exemplifying a difference between two 
forms of consciousness rather than a difference between consciousness and a lack thereof.  
 
4.7 The hard problem 
 
 The ‘hard problem’ places limitations on the strength of conclusions that can be 
drawn from research such as that which has been presented here. No novel attempt will be 
made to surmount the ‘hard problem’ here. Rather a brief overview of the problem will be 
given. The next section will then point the reader towards literature that has claimed to 
neutralise the problem and has been used as the epistemic basis for this research. 
 The hard problem of consciousness is essentially that it is entirely possible that all the 
neuronal architecture that we describe as the physical basis of consciousness could occur in 
the absence of consciousness. This is the basis of Chalmers’ ‘zombie’ argument: creatures 
with all the physical attributes of anyone but are devoid of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996). 
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The hard problem places limits on the extent to which physically orientated science can 
explain consciousness.  It can be attributed to a derivation of Cartesian dualism, but, more 
specifically, is based on Kripke’s demonstrations (1980): regardless of the description of the 
neural basis of pain the designation of the physical processes to pain will never be as rigid or 
necessary as, say, water = H2O. This is because it is possible that there are creatures that 
experience pain but which share none of the physical attributes of the original designation.  
 A closely related element of the argument is the ‘explanatory gap’(Levine, 1983), 
which is probably most clearly expressed in Nagel’s demonstration that regardless of our 
state of scientific knowledge as to bats’ echo location we might still never know ‘what it is 
like to be a bat’ (Nagel, 1974). The doubt raised by these arguments is that there is something 
further to explain in phenomenal first person experience than any explanation rooted in pure 
third person objective science can achieve (this notion of third person objective science is 
most clearly captured in Dennett’s heterophenomenology; see Dennett, 1991; Dennett, 2003).  
 
4.8 The relative position and 
neurophenomenology 
 
 The goal of understanding the relationship between consciousness and its 
physiological underpinnings is one of the greatest challenges in modern science (Miller, 
2005) and philosophy (Metzinger, 1995).The strategy initially adopted and outlined in 
Chapter 1 seeks to explore the coupling between physiology and phenomenology, and is 
known as neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996; Varela, et al., 1991). This section starts by 
discussing one of the key contentions in consciousness research which places limitations on 
what can and cannot be said in this type of research: the use of ‘necessity’ in the ‘hard 
problem’ (Chalmers, 1996; Chalmers, 2000) and the search for the ‘neural correlates of 
consciousness’ (Koch 2004) (4.8.1). The neurophenomenological position is then clarified 
and discussed with respect to some of the other problems encountered (4.8.2). How 
neurophenomenology relates to the other two positions (HOT/GW and the differentiation 
between p- and a- consciousness) is discussed in the final section (4.8.3). 
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4.8.1 The use of necessity 
 
 A key move in the development of the hard problem is the rigidity or necessity of 
some relationships in science (e.g. water = H2O) in contrast to others involving phenomenal 
consciousness (Chalmers, 1996; Kripke, 1980). My opinion, derived from the work of 
Varela, is that it is the call for necessity that is the cause of the intractability of the hard 
problem. Necessary relations are notoriously easy to refute, which is particularly the case in 
such a massively parallel system such as the brain.  
 The search for the ‘Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC)’(Chalmers, 2000) is 
often framed in terms of identifying the ‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient14’ conditions under which 
consciousness exists (e.g. Koch, 2004). This use of necessity sets the bar for classification of 
NCC’s too high, as claims are too easily refuted. For example, Ffytche and Zeki (Barbur, 
Watson, Frackowiak, & Zeki, 1993; Ffytche, Guy, & Zeki, 1996; Ffytche & Zeki, 2011; Zeki 
& Ffytche, 1998) claim that the primary visual cortex and its involvement in recurrent 
processing is not necessary for consciousness, as has been previously claimed (Lamme, 2001; 
Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001; Silvanto, Cattaneo, Battelli, & Pascual-Leone, 2008; Silvanto, 
Cowey, et al., 2005; Silvanto, Lavie, et al., 2005; Tong, 2003). They show that subjects with 
lesions to their primary visual cortex can express a markedly reduced form of visual 
awareness when they are presented with moving stimuli and the authors attribute the residual 
awareness to pathways which parallel the main striate projections, directly innovating areas 
such as MT (Riddoch  syndrome e.g. Ffytche & Zeki, 2011). Whilst this reasoning does 
appear valid (negating previous claims of necessity), it does not follow that the primary 
visual cortex could not be the site at which many of the changes occur that are causally 
                                                            
14 The other element to the search for the NCCs involves the requirement that the description covers 
all ‘sufficient’ conditions. As noted previously (1.2.1) this is not particularly useful in the 
development of criteria for determining what is involved in consciousness, unless it is qualified by the 
use of ‘minimally sufficient’ (Chalmers, 2000) as here, i.e. uncontroversial. This is because, for 
example, a circulatory system is required as a sufficient condition for the conscious system to operate, 
yet its function contributes little to our understanding of consciousness. Furthermore, it is entirely 
possible that what constitutes some conscious processes extends beyond the body boundary into the 
world (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) further reducing the utility of relying upon sufficiency as a criterion. 
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constitutive of consciousness15. This is especially relevant in cases where the form of 
consciousness under consideration is the everyday veridical visual experiences that were not 
displayed by the subjects in the Ffytche and Zeki experiments, but which were the target of 
the experiments developed here. The data presented here suggests a prominent role for early 
visual areas such as V1 in consciousness.  
 The on-line experiments also took advantage of the relative ease with which claims of 
necessity are refuted. Ro et al (2004) claimed the superior colliculus to be necessary for the 
residual abilities of TMS-induced blindsight and it was demonstrated here that such residual 
abilities can operate via projections in the geniculate stream. Importantly, no claim was made 
that the superior colliculus is not involved in the performance of some related tasks. For 
example, tasks involving saccadic eye movements seem likely candidates for the involvement 
of the superior colliculus (Ro, et al., 2004; Walker, Fitzgibbon, & Goldberg, 1995). By 
avoiding a reliance upon claims of necessity it is possible to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of brain processes and consciousness, where different pathways contribute 
different inputs, the content of which – and the contribution made by each – is dependent 
upon the content of the experience caused by the task requirements.  
 What then is the alternative to calling upon necessity? John Campbell has offered the 
interventionist approach, which discusses relations in terms of causally constitutive 
conditions and emphasises that the way in which these relations should be explored is via 
interventional techniques, such as TMS (see Campbell, 2007; Campbell, 2008). This has been 
one of the strategies adopted here (also see Chambers & Mattingley, 2005). Perhaps more 
pertinent to the current concerns regarding the hard problem and claims of necessity are the 
arguments and strategies developed by Varela et al, in terms of it being the relative difference 
between states that is of critical importance in the development of understanding of the nature 
of consciousness (Varela, 1996; Varela, et al., 1991). If our notion of water and H20 arise in 
relation to one another and neither of them is fundamentally grounded beyond co-dependent 
observation, then we have no reason to think the relationship between water and H20 is set 
under all possible conditions, and therefore all such relations are to some extent contingent 
(Varela, 1996; Varela, et al., 1991). This both implies that the use of necessity as a rigid fixed 
                                                            
15 The same structure of argument applies to Crick and Koch’s statement that the visual cortex is not 
necessary as the neural realiser of consciousness (Crick & Koch, 1995). See also Block (1996) for a 
similar argument in reference to Crick and Koch’s claims. 
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designation is ill-advised, and that relations between brain processes and phenomenal 
experience is not as fundamentally intractable as the hard problem suggests. The dualist 
arguments of Kripke and Chalmers rest upon their bringing into question the necessity of the 
relationship between consciousness and physiology. If the emphasis is placed on this 
relationship, rather than the attempt to maintain claims of necessity, then the hard problem 
does not seem quite so intractable. 
 
4.8.2 Neurophenomenology 
 
 Neurophenomenology has been presented as a methodological solution to the hard 
problem (Varela, 1996). Neurophenomenology is fundamentally an epistemic strategy which 
regards neither the level of subjective phenomenal conscious experience nor objective 
physical architecture as fundamentally grounded (Varela, et al., 1991). Rather they arise in 
relation to one another16 and therefore the coupling between the two (1st and 3rd person 
perspectives) is where we should focus our research efforts. It is epistemic in that it accepts 
that the subject and the experimenter have different information available to them17 and 
refocuses enquiry on the relations and coupling between the two. 
 Central to the neurophenomenological approach is the understanding that properties 
such as consciousness are relational, i.e. properties only exist in relation to other properties. 
Such a position lessens the impact of problems such as reactivity on the interpretation of 
experiments. Because the emphasis is placed upon the differences between states, the 
difference between the measures of acknowledged awareness and perception when the 
                                                            
16 In terms of acknowledging the historical derivation of neurophenomenology, it owes much to the 
continental phenomenological traditions of Husserl and Merlo-Pontey, from which the notion of 
epoché (see section 1.3.2.3) is taken and an emphasis is placed on the physical embodiment of the 
subject. The methodology is also consistent with and indebted to elements of Buddhist scripture, in 
particular the notion of co-dependent arising and baselessness (Varela, et al., 1991), from which are 
derived the notion that neither the physical nor the phenomenal are fundamentally grounded (exist in 
isolation or are the basis for existence) and that the extent to which they do exist is in relation to one 
another (Varela, 1996; Varela, et al., 1991).  
 
17 To have an optimal understanding of the investigation we would have to be both experimenter and 
subject in the investigation (contra Dennett, 2003), in order to acquire both first person experiential 
knowledge and objective knowledge. It follows that I was a subject in the original TBS experiments. 
However, I was excluded from the on-line studies owing to my colour blindness. 
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subjects do not acknowledge awareness, is critical to the investigation. The fact that both 
measures may require some form of reflection in order to produce a response is secondary, 
reducing the problem of reactivity. 
 The high levels of practice / familiarity obtained by subjects, particularly during the 
calibration phase of the experiment, together with the simplicity of the task, further reduced 
the problem of reactivity. This aspect of the task follows suggestions made by proponents of 
neurophenomenology that the distinction between being aware and knowing you are (and 
consequentially being able to report that it is so) is reduced through practice and repetition as 
the report aspect becomes habituated (Dapraz, 1999; Gallagher, 2003; Lutz, 2003; 
Vermersch, 1999). 
 
4.8.3 The middle level 
 
 The position of neurophenomenology in relation to HOT/GW theories and first order 
theories (such as Block’s) has been described as ‘intermediate’. Functionally intermediate 
theories describe the level at which consciousness arises as being at the level of grouping of 
elements into individual percepts (Jackendoff, 1987; Prinz, 2007). For example, in reading, 
low-level information such as edge detection may not be conscious (e.g. Marr’s primary 
sketch, section 3.3.4, Marr, 1982), neither are high-level grammatical rules, which we have 
learned and have become habituated to. What we are conscious of is the intermediate level of 
processing of the words and their meaning (Jackendoff, 1987).  
 This intermediate position is neatly summarised by the introductory quotation, which 
is consistent with the view put forward by Varela et al, particularly in the embodied mind 
(Varela, et al., 1991) in the description of the ‘middle way’, and various other works 
describing neurophenomenology (Lutz, 2007; Varela, 1996; Varela, 1999).  
 The intermediate position expresses some of the attributes of both first order and 
higher order theories. Both first order theories (Block 2007, 1995) and intermediate theories 
consider the primary level at which consciousness arises to involve content and the other 
element to be access to that content. Both theories also accept there is an issue with the 
demonstration of phenomenal aspect of consciousness.  For Block the difficulty lies in the 
demonstration of a form of consciousness which by definition can only be observed, in 
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isolation, in the presence of a negative report or absence of a positive report. Under 
neurophenomenology the difficulty in the demonstration of the phenomenal aspect is due to 
the epistemic structure of the investigation. Phenomenology tends to refer specifically to one 
side of the explanation – the contribution made by the subject. This hinders its interpretation 
from the third person perspective.  Although the first order and intermediate positions are 
therefore related they are not completely comparable.   
 Intermediate theories such as neurophenomenology are probably more closely related 
to HOT theories (Baars, 2003; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011) than to first order theories. Varela et 
al., describe a theory of radical embodiment in which conscious phenomenology is embodied 
in the large-scale temporal dynamics of the brain (Thompson & Varela, 2001). More 
specifically, phase synchronisation of oscillations offers a mechanism for the large scale 
integration of information over multiple brain regions, thus providing a mechanistic and 
embodied framework for the implementation of properties such as awareness (Varela, 
Lachaux, Rodriguez, & Martinerie, 2001). These principles are similar to those of GW 
models in particular. Within this framework, alpha rhythms play an important role in the 
governance of perception via its segmentation. In one of the last articles Varela wrote, he 
suggested this is a promising avenue for research, noting that alpha “rhythms could provide 
the slower temporal framing for successive cognitive moments of synchronous assemblies” 
(pp 273 Varela, et al., 2001). This is consistent with the finding in Experiment 2D that the 
ERD in the alpha band was facilitated, coincident with the increase in conscious detection 
and with the interpretation of the ERD more generally as performing a gating function. 
 
 How this neurophenomenological strategy differs from HOT and GW theories is that 
HOT/GW theories are essentially third person descriptions only. Neurophenomenology, on 
the other hand, accredits the first person perspective with a domain of knowledge vital in the 
development of the enquiry. This places the first person and third person perspectives on 
equal footing in terms of the investigation as a whole (this directly contradicts the strategy 
outlined by Lamme (Lamme, 2006a) and Dennett (Dennett, 1991, 2003)).  
 First person subjective experience is part of the explanation offered by 
neurophenomenology: only the embodied subjects know precisely what is meant when any 
instance of report is made (Clark, 1997; Varela, 1996; Varela, et al., 1991). The strategy has 
been to couple the subjects’ experience with a third person objective understanding, through 
the measures (Varela, 1996; Varela, et al., 1991). By acknowledging the epistemic structure 
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of enquiries oriented towards consciousness the possibility that there will always be 
something further to explain (4.6) may be rendered less problematic. 
 
4.9 Future directions 
 
 This section is restricted to a list of potential developments from the findings and 
protocols specifically established here, rather than a general discussion of the future of this 
type of research.   
 
4.9.1 Off-line experiments 
 
- The intensity at which the cTBS is applied could determine under what conditions the cTBS 
protocol was inhibitory or facilitatory. Applying cTBS over a range of intensities may lead to 
a more highly differentiated understanding of its effects. This could aid its application in a 
clinical context (e.g. Kindler, et al., 2012) and allow for the use of cTBS in the improvement 
of other cognitive abilities. 
- Application of the same TMS protocol over a range of tasks and questioning procedures 
might further elucidate the nature of the effect caused by the cTBS and its applicability to 
other domains. More specifically, is the increase in conscious detection only observable when 
the task in question involves the isolation of a target from a background noise? Is the increase 
in detection reflected by an increase in reflective confidence potentially measured by 
Overgaard’s PAS scale or post-decision wagering (Sandberg, et al., 2010)? 
- The ERD’s involvement in the gating of awareness and the method of quantifying the ERD 
according to its gradient of onset are promising avenues for future research. The change in 
the ERD in relation to a psychometric function representing conscious detection across a 
range of stimuli intensities might be a relatively informative and simple initial experiment.   
- Differences in the MEG data in terms of the contrast between reportedly ‘seen’ and 
‘unseen’ yet correct trials should, theoretically, be capable of revealing processes involved in 
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consciousness specifically. This contrast was not implemented here because the division of 
the data between analysis blocks and TMS conditions meant that there was relatively low 
power (number of trials) for each condition (‘seen’ and ‘unseen’ correct). Additionally the 
power of each condition was determined by the behavioural changes in that block, which 
would have made it difficult to claim that any change in the MEG data was not driven by this 
power difference. Experiments specifically directed towards this difference between ‘seen’ 
and ‘unseen’ conditions may also reveal reactive processes. 
- A common assumption in neuroimaging, particularly functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), is that an increase in activity (as indicated by blood oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) response) relates to increased processing (Logothetis & Pfeuffer, 2004). The claim 
here is that, following cTBS, active suppression is potentiated and conscious detection is 
facilitated.  Might this therefore result in a decrease in basic BOLD signal in the affected 
region (Allen, Pasley, Duong, & Freeman, 2007), where increased processing is apparent 
through other measures? Could different analysis techniques (e.g. mass univariate vs. 
multivoxel pattern analysis, Kamitani & Tong, 2005) be compared within the context of such 
a change? Such a result might inform our understanding by attenuating the link between 
BOLD changes and functionality.  
 
4.9.2 On-line experiments 
 
- The finding that both very early and very late activity in visual areas, related to visual 
consciousness, appear to be supported by input from the retinotectal and/or magnocellular 
routes was made without an a priori hypothesis. Confirmation of this result through 
replication is therefore desirable. 
- Finer granularity of pulse timings in the between subjects study would further elucidate the 
temporal dynamics of information-flow through the early visual system. Through the addition 
of a second TMS coil (e.g. Silvanto, Cowey, et al., 2005), potentially over frontal areas such 
as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Lau & Passingham, 2006), the recurrent and frontal 
dependency of such processing might be further understood.  
- A key demonstration of Experiment 3A was that the residual abilities of TMS induced 
blindsight did not require input from the retinotectal pathways. However, this leaves open the 
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question as to whether the retinotectal pathway contributes to the residual abilities required to 
perform other tasks that are illustrative of TMS-induced blindsight. The task here might be 
easily adapted to include a peripheral cue or saccadic response, both of which are more likely 
to involve input from the superior colliculus (Ansorge, 2003; Leh, Mullen, et al., 2006; 
Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010).  
-The main finding of Experiment 3C, that ‘unseen’ discrimination abilities were susceptible 
to pairs of TMS pulses applied at later times, was an intriguing finding which requires 
confirmation in a larger cohort. However, it is possible that there may be difficulties in 
recruiting a large group of participants that can tolerate the high levels of TMS which may be 
required to produce such effects. 
- It is possible to develop an automated task and calibration system, similar to that presented 
here, which could operate over the internet. This would allow us to probe the extent to which 
reportedly ‘unseen’ abilities are above chance across a large population and range of criteria 
differences. Such a potentially large data pool might also be able to probe the contribution 
made to perception when subjects report stimuli as ‘unseen’, made by different pathways as 
probed by chromaticity differences. Not only would such a design be capable of probing such 
questions, it would also provide an ideal opportunity for public engagement with 
consciousness research.  
  
4.10 Closing remarks 
 
 This research has attempted to contribute to our understanding of consciousness. To 
some extent, this has been achieved. Results confirmed that visual awareness, specifically, is 
supported primarily by activity in early visual areas from ~100ms post stimulus onset. 
Additionally, activity prior to this period also appears to contribute to consciousness, possibly 
via the provision of a pedestal of activity originating from the fast retinotectal and/or 
magnocellular pathways. Furthermore, some input from these pathways may first pass to 
more frontal regions and then contribute to later re-entrant conscious processing. In contrast, 
perception lacking in consciousness may operate via geniculate pathways, as well as the 
previously demonstrated collicular projections (e.g. Leh, Mullen, et al., 2006). The increase 
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in specifically conscious detection following the application of the cTBS is also a novel 
finding. The cTBS protocol was also associated with a sharpening of the ERD gating 
response and an increase in the levels of the inhibitory neurotransmitter GABA. These results 
collectively suggest a prominent role of early visual areas in the formation of conscious 
percepts involving selection and gating by inhibition.  
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Appendix 
A1. Cross correlation  
 
A1.1 The relationships between measures 
 
A1.1.1 Introduction  
 
 The multiple measures employed in Chapter 2 allowed us to probe the relationships 
between the processes measured. For example, do changes in the gradient of the ERD predict 
the increase in conscious detection? Further, can causal relationships between such variables, 
in terms of moderation and mediation, be established (Baron & Kenny, 1986)? The claims 
made in reference to the gating-by-inhibition explanation would clearly be greatly 
strengthened by the demonstration of such interrelations. This section offers a tentative 
exploration of these relationships. 
 The relationships between processes measured can be described by correlations, 
making use of the variability in effect size, across subjects. The previously demonstrated 
differences between TMS conditions contributed to the gating-by-inhibition explanation, and 
can also be described as correlations between TMS conditions. This involved treating active 
vs. control TMS as a dichotomous discrete variable, entry of which into a Pearson’s linear 
correlation being equivalent to an unpaired two tailed t-test between conditions (denoted as 
the ‘TMS’ variable in figures). Partial analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) involves the removal 
of the variance of one variable from a correlation that describes the relationship between 
another pair, thereby assessing the role of the third variable in mediating the relationship 
between the original pair. For example, we have demonstrated that the increase in conscious 
detection and the ERD appear to result from the application of TMS. If this significant effect 
of TMS on PrC is eliminated by the removal of the variance observed in the ERD, but 
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removal of the variance in PrC from the analysis that demonstrated a change in the ERD had 
no effect, then the shift in conscious detection would appear to be dependent upon (and 
linearly mediated by) the alpha band ERD. That is, the effect of the TMS upon conscious 
detection would be explained through the changes in the ERD as a result of the TMS. Under 
such conditions the effect of the TMS upon the ERD and the subsequent partialling out of the 
variance of the change in conscious detection would be required to assess the causal direction 
of influence. This section implements such a partial analysis strategy and additionally 
describes the relationships between measures as affected by the TMS by depicting the 
correlation of effect sizes (change from control TMS condition) observed for each subject 
across the measures of interest.  
 The partial analyses and correlations of measures were restricted to data from those 
subjects who participated in multiple experimental sections. The dependent variable for each 
measure entered into the partial analysis comprised of a single vector, baselined to pre-TBS 
levels, collapsed across post-TBS blocks. The partial analysis was applied to the following 
pairs of measures which have contributed to the gating-by-inhibition explanation: conscious 
detection (PrC) with the gradient in the ERD (A1.1.2), PrC with the change in GABA 
concentration (A1.1.3) and the change in the ERD with the change in GABA concentration 
(A1.1.4). All of these partial correlations were studied in relation to the presence of active vs. 
control ‘TMS’ (the independent variable). A further analysis is also applied (A1.1.5) which 
takes the change from control data for all three dependent variables (PrC, ERD and GABA) 
and applies a partial analysis to these change from baseline (pre-TBS) measures. Because 
only three subjects participated in the phosphene threshold experiment who had participated 
in the other experimental sections the cross correlation involving this measure was not 
computed. Outliers in terms of the correlation were identified, using Cooks distance and 
excluded from the corresponding analysis (Cook, 1977). Because of the relatively low power 
of these analyses, they should be treated as exploratory and tentative. 
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A1.1.2 Analysis: PrC and ERD 
 
 Seventeen subjects’ data was available for entry into the partial analysis, as one 
subject was shown to be outlying in terms of the change in the ERD. The partial analysis of 
these measures is summarised in figure A1.1.2.1. No correlation representative of the 
difference between TMS conditions was observed. Therefore, removal of variance in other 
measures cannot be interpreted.  Furthermore, no relationship between the size of the changes 
in conscious detection and gradient of the ERD following the application of the cTBS were 
observed (see figure A1.1.2.2., R2 = 0.07, p=0.30, RS =0.196, p=0.45). 
 
 
 Figure A1.1.2.1 Summary of partial analyses applied to the measures of conscious 
detection, gradient of the ERD and the effect of the TMS. Red lines correspond to the 
bivariate Pearsons correlation between two measures and the blue lines correspond to 
the same correlation following the removal of the variance of the third variable from 
the partial analysis. Subsequent partial analyses conform to this structure of 
presentation. 
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Figure A1.1.2.2 Linear correlation (blue line) between change in conscious detection 
(PrC, SDT derived units) and change in event related desynchronisation (ERD, Units 
tesla per second ×10-14). Data points are individual subject’s data baselined to pre-
TBS levels, then to control conditions, collapsed across post TBS blocks. Note: The 
more negative the change in the ERD the greater the shift or the steeper the gradient of 
the ERD.  
 
A1.1.3 Analysis: PrC and GABA 
 
 12 subjects participated in the behavioural and MRS sections to these experiments, 
one of whom was excluded from the correlation analysis on the basis of being an outlier 
according to Cook’s criteria. In order to match the data between the measures, only the first 
three post-TBS analysis blocks were collapsed across to form the vector representing the 
change in PrC (i.e. since there were three MRS acquisitions post-TBS). Three subjects 
participated in both original and replication behavioural experiments for which the relevant 
data was averaged across repetitions. 
 No significant primary relationships between the variables was revealed by the 
correlation analysis (see figure A1.1.3.1-2). 
175 
 
 
Figure A1.1.3.1 Summary of partial analyses of the relationship between the 
measures of conscious detection, GABA concentration, and application of the TMS.  
 
Figure A1.1.3.2  Linear correlation (blue line) between change in conscious detection 
(PrC, SDT derived units) and change in GABA concentration ([GABA], institutional 
units). No correlation was observed between the changes in these two measures 
following the TBS (R2 = 0.03, p=0.94, RS =0.091, p=0.79).  
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A1.1.4 Analysis: ERD and GABA 
 
 Nine subjects participated in both the MEG and MRS experiment and so were entered 
into the partial correlation analyses. No significant correlations were observed. 
 
 
 
 Figure A1.1.4.1 Summary of partial analyses applied to the relationships between the 
measures of the gradient of the ERD, GABA concentration, and application of the 
TMS.  
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Figure 2.7.1.4.2. Linear correlation (blue line) between change in GABA 
concentration ([GABA], institutional units) and change in event related 
desynchronisation (ERD, Units tesla per second ×10-14) following application of cTBS 
(R2 = -0.089, p=0.820, RS=-0.050, p=0.898). 
 
A1.1.5 Analyses of change in PrC, ERD and GABA 
 
 Nine subjects participated in all experimental sections so could be entered into this 
analysis. Each dependent variable here is a vector of the change in that measure, for each 
subject, from control levels. No significant correlations were demonstrated. 
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 Figure A1.1.5. Summary of partial analyses applied to changes in the conscious 
detection PrC, ERD gradient and GABA concentration, from control levels. That is 
the between-subjects correlations between dependent variables and the effects of 
removing the variance of the third variable from these relationships. 
 
A1.1.6 Discussion  
 
 Because no statistically demonstrable relationships were shown, no conclusions as to 
the interdependence between the processes targeted by the measures can be drawn here. This 
was not altogether unexpected for three reasons. First, there seems to be little theoretical 
reason to suppose that the relationship between the properties measured might be in any way 
linear: if other factors (such as individual differences in rates of metabolic turnover) 
intervene, between, for example, the change in the ERD and the change in GABA 
concentration, then we have no reason to think that a potentiation in one might predict a direct 
increase in the other.  
 Second, these analyses were lacking in sufficient statistical power. Primarily, this was 
limited by the availability of subjects to participate in experiments conducted over the course 
of roughly 2 ½ years. In an attempt to improve the power of these partial analyses we 
conducted the replication experiment on 18 subjects (the last 4 of whom were available for 
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both MRS and MEG acquisitions), whereas, a direct replication of the original experiment 
and strict enforcement of a stopping rule (see Dienes, 2008) might have meant the use of 16 
subjects. The relatively low power of these analyses is likely to be the main cause of failure to 
demonstrate the TMS-related effects previously shown.  
 The final contribution made to this failure to demonstrate effects which had 
previously been shown was that the correlation method makes use of the variability between 
subjects. In the repeated measures analysis applied in previous experimental sections, this 
source of variance was effectively removed, improving the reliability of the repeated 
measures analysis. Therefore were this set of analyses to be perused further, a mixed-model 
approach should be adopted (e.g. West, Welch and Galecki, 2006).  
 
A1.2. Correlation with Motor Threshold 
 
A1.2.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this section is to address the question of whether the effect of cTBS on 
awareness is intensity-dependent, with relatively small levels of inhibition facilitating 
awareness while larger inhibitory levels are disruptive. 
The mechanism proposed for the increase in conscious detection involves a 
facilitation of the mechanisms that select through inhibition. Because this mechanism is 
centred upon inhibition, it follows that were the levels of inhibition to have been increased 
further, beyond functionally optimal levels, then more pervasive suppression of 
representations, including conscious processing, may be expected. Consistent with such an 
effect are previous demonstrations of reversals of TMS effects, where lower levels of TMS 
can facilitate processing, whereas higher levels are shown to be suppressive (Abrahamyan, et 
al., 2011). Here, facilitation was displayed and the intensity at which the TMS was applied 
was relatively low, compared with previous demonstrations of suppressions; 42% of total 
output compared to 46% in the Franca et al., study (2006). This may be due to the method 
used here for obtaining the TMS intensity being based on motor threshold (via the observed 
resting contraction across hand muscles) which is one of the most sensitive threshold 
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measures and thus results in relatively low thresholds (Hanajima et al., 2007; Varnava, et al., 
2011).  
TBS applied to occipital regions has been described as being capable of reducing 
metacognative abilities, indicative of TMS-induced blindsight (Rahnev, et al., 2010). This has 
the opposite directionality to the effect described here. If lower intensity applications 
facilitate abilities whereas higher intensities are suppressive then the findings of Rahnev et al, 
and those presented here may be reconciled if the intensity they used was relatively high. The 
analysis of this section was designed to test this possibility. However, the description of the 
experiment by Rahnev et al (2010) has only appeared in abstract form, so it is very difficult 
directly to compare studies. The suggestion being made here is that the TMS intensity used 
here is likely to be less than those of the Rahnev et al, study or Rahnev et al, found the 
efficacy of the cTBS to be inconsistent over a range of intensities. The same principal 
investigator has published a more extensive account of the application of cTBS to the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which again reduces reports of meta-cognitive / 
conscious awareness of stimuli that dissociate from forced-choice ability (Rounis, et al., 
2010). However the difference in target area, together with the absence of information about 
stimulator output levels again makes comparison difficult (Stokes, et al., 2005). 
Subjects’ motor thresholds18 vary according to individual differences in cortical 
excitability. This limits the extent to which differences in the motor threshold can be expected 
to correlate with effect size differences in the dependent measures, if they are dependent on 
cortical excitability. However, because there appears to be no (Stewart, et al., 2001) or only 
weak (Deblieck, Thompson, Iacoboni, & Wu, 2008) correlation between motor and visual 
                                                            
18 The reason TBS was applied as a fraction of motor threshold, here as opposed to phosphene 
threshold (which would be more likely to track occipital cortical excitability) was that phosphene 
thresholds are higher than motor thresholds. Mean phosphene threshold collected over experiment 2C 
= 71.1% stimulator output ±15.3 SD (based on all 12 subjects), mean motor threshold = 51.9% 
stimulator output , ±6.2 SD (based on 12 randomly chosen subjects from the behavioural experiment); 
this is consistent with (Stewart, Walsh, & Rothwell, 2001). Applying cTBS at this lower intensity 
reduced the risk of adverse reactions to the TBS and was essential to ensure that the stimulation fell 
within international safety guidelines (Maizey, In Press; Rossi, Hallett, Rossini, & Pascual-Leone, 
2009; Wassermann, 1998). Furthermore, a high proportion of subjects simply cannot perceive 
phosphenes within the range of TMS intensities applicable. This also was the reason why only three 
subjects participated in both the phosphene experiment (2C) and the behavioural experiments (2 A and 
D). Additionally, phosphene thresholds are less consistent across subjects (Stewart, et al., 2001). For 
these reasons, motor threshold was used to determine the intensity of stimulation, which resulted in 
relatively low intensities at which the TBS was applied. 
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cortical thresholds for excitation and there are several additional sources of variation in the 
determination of motor threshold (e.g. subtle irregularities in angular coil placement 
(Kammer, Beck, Thielscher, Laubis-Herrmann, & Topka, 2001)), there is a degree of 
variability in the range of TMS intensities applied. This might reflect differences in the 
efficacy of the TBS when applied to the occipital lobe. Such variability might be sufficient to 
demonstrate correlations between the intensity of TMS applied and dependent measures, 
which might inform experimental hypotheses.  With regard to the central question of this 
section: if the cTBS applied here increased conscious detection through a mild increase in 
inhibitory processes, then stronger potentiation of inhibition caused by higher intensity cTBS 
might lead to a reduction in conscious perception.  
In order to probe this possibility two post-hoc analyses were applied which correlated 
the intensity at which TMS was applied with subjects’ change in conscious detection. If 
relatively small increases in inhibition bestowed a benefit upon conscious detection, whereas 
larger increases in inhibition are suppressive, then a negative correlation between stimulator 
output (motor threshold) and the increase in conscious detection is predicted. The alternative 
method for describing this relationship was a median split, based on motor threshold. The 
hypothesis being that subjects in the group of lower motor thresholds would be more likely to 
express the increase in conscious detection than members of the higher TMS intensity group.  
This method of correlation using motor threshold was not applied to the other 
dependent measures (ERD and GABA) for three reasons: i) such an analysis might constitute 
unnecessary multiple comparisons, ii) the difficulties with the correlations described in 
section A1.1.5 apply here, and, additionally iii) there is the limitation upon such a correlation 
owing to motor threshold’s reflecting individuals’ cortical excitability (mentioned above). 
 The analysis of the relationship between TMS intensity and the effect of the cTBS 
upon conscious detection made use of the data collected over both the original and replication 
results. Outlier rejection was performed according to Cook’s distance (Cook, 1977) applied to 
the concatenated group and resulted in the elimination of 1 subject. With respect to subjects 
who participated in both behavioural experimental sections (4 subjects), the variables used 
applied an average across the two experiments. This resulted in the inclusion of 29 subjects in 
this analysis. Since cTBS was applied at 80% of motor threshold, the subjects’ motor 
thresholds were correlated with a variable representing subjects’ change in conscious 
detection. This variable comprised change from pre-TBS baseline in the PrC data, and was 
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subtracted from control data and averaged across post-TBS blocks. The correlation was a 
least-means-square linear correlation.  
 Additionally, a median-split analysis based on motor threshold was applied to the 
behavioural change in PrC. The median split divided the group into two (13 subjects) 
according to the subjects who received higher and lower levels of TMS. Because three 
subjects’ motor threshold was at the median level (53% of total output), they could not be 
allocated to one or other of the groups so were excluded from the median split analysis. 
 
A1.2.2 Results and discussion of correlation between change 
in PrC and motor threshold 
 
 
Figure A1.2.2. Correlation between motor threshold (the determinate of the intensity 
at which TBS was applied) and the change in conscious detection following the 
application of cTBS relative to controls. Blue line is the linear correlation where R = - 
0.238, Adjusted R2 =0.021, F(1,28) =1.61, p=0.216. The red line indicates the position 
of the median split. 
 
The correlation between the intensity at which the TMS was applied and the benefit in 
conscious detection was not significant (R = - 0.238, Adjusted R2 =0.021, F(1,28)=1.61, 
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p=0.213), but it was in the negative direction, which suggested that increased conscious 
detection may be more likely to result from applications of cTBS when the intensity used is 
relatively low. Consistently, a significant increase in conscious detection was only observed 
in the group of subjects where a lower intensity was applied (F(1,12) = 10.08, p =0.008), 
whereas the group for whom the intensity applied was higher, no clearly significant effect of 
the cTBS was observed (F(1,12)=3.35, p=0.092).  
These analyses tested the hypothesis that lower levels of cTBS might facilitate 
reported awareness, whereas higher levels of TMS might lead to suppressions. The 
conclusions that can be drawn in relation to this question are limited. The correlation between 
the TMS intensity applied and the change in conscious detection was not significant and 
caution should always be applied when attempting to draw conclusions from p values around 
0.1, as with the absence of effect in the median split analysis of the higher intensity group. 
However, the direction of the potential correlation suggests that the benefit bestowed by 
cTBS might be greater when the intensity used is relatively low. This would be consistent 
with the gating-by-inhibition hypothesis, where increased facilitation of gating might be 
brought about by relatively lower levels of increased inhibition; whereas higher levels are 
likely to lead to more pervasive suppression of vision.  
The absence of a definitive answer to this question suggests that future 
experimentation may be profitable. Such an experiment could fruitfully include a range of 
TMS intensities to the same group of subjects using the behavioural paradigm in Experiment 
2A. 
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A2. Additional MEG Analysis 
 
 Several analyses in addition to those described in the main experiment were 
undertaken. This section discusses them and the reasons for their exclusion from the main 
experimental discussion.  
 In the planning of the follow-on experiments (following section 2.3) we initially 
described the effect that we thought the TBS might have in terms of signal-to-noise ratio 
(SNR). That is, cTBS might increase signal-to-noise ratio via a suppression of neuronal noise 
leading to increased conscious detection (Waterston & Pack, 2010). On the grounds of 
simplicity, this description of effects at the neuronal level may be considered more appealing 
than the gating-by-inhibition description, although it is worth noting that the two explanations 
(SNR and gating-by-inhibition) do not necessarily contradict one another and are to some 
extent different ways of describing the same process. 
 The reason for reducing the emphasis placed upon an SNR-based explanation was the 
potential for confusion about which SNR is referred to by any particular measures. The 
problem is that there is an unavoidable conflation between neuronal SNR and SNR of the 
imaging technique itself. This means that when neuroimaging techniques are directed towards 
the investigation of the SNR explanation, the interpretation is potentially misleading. For 
example, gamma frequency (~40-80Hz) oscillations might be taken as representative of the 
carriers of signals (Bressler, 1990), therefore affording us the opportunity to probe the 
alternative hypothesis that it is increased signal (represented by a general increase in 
oscillatory power in the gamma band following cTBS) rather than suppression of noise that 
leads to the increased SNR. However, if neuronal noise is reduced, this too should lead to an 
increased ability to detect gamma frequency oscillations, irrespective of changes in the 
gamma band. The two competing hypotheses therefore make the same prediction. Likewise, 
the general levels of oscillatory power in the alpha band might be interpreted as a correlate of 
active suppression of noise.  However, the observed increase in alpha power (figure A2.1) 
cannot dissociate any actual change in alpha power from increased ability to detect alpha 
oscillations. This difficulty in interpretation is the reason SNR was not emphasised as central 
to the explanation of the cTBS effect in question. 
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Figure A2.1. Alpha (6-12Hz) power changed over the course of Experiment 2D. 
Alpha power was not statistically dependent upon the application of the cTBS (site 
effect: F(1,17) =1.940, p=0.182, site × time interaction: F(3,51) =1.490, p=0.240). 
However it did increase over the course of the experiment (time effect: F(3,51) =8.033, 
p=0.004), which is suggestive of increased fatigue (Steriade, McCormick, & 
Sejnowski, 1993).  
 The evoked and induced measures used did not suffer from this problem (of increased 
fidelity conflated with change in question) to the same extent as did the measures based on 
general oscillatory power (described above in the alpha and gamma bands). This is because 
the baseline for induced and evoked responses are taken within trial following the cTBS. 
Hence any increased fidelity as a result of reduced noise will be present prior to the stimuli 
presentation – hence removed from the data. 
 Induced gamma band responses to stimuli at around 100ms have previously been 
suggested as conveying conscious information (Crick, 1990; Fries, 2009).  As such, they can 
be considered representative of conscious signals and therefore could have been incorporated 
into the experiment in a manner similar to that of the late evoked responses. Although a 
subset of subjects did display such gamma band responses to the stimuli, such responses were 
not by any means apparent across subjects and experimental blocks. Therefore the analysis of 
induced gamma in response to the stimuli was abandoned.  
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 An additional way in which the SNR hypothesis was probed was via the derivation of 
a measure based on the variance at the sensor level, which might be representative of 
neuronal noise. This quantified levels of noise via the application of a simple root-mean-
square analysis of variance to raw DC offset sensor data. Higher variance corresponding to 
increased noise. The SNR based explanation of the effect cTBS has would therefore predict a 
reduction in this measure. However, it displayed the same modulation as a measure of raw 
oscillatory power across frequency bands and – most importantly – it followed the general 
pattern of changes in the dominant alpha band (cf. figure A2.1 and A2.2). Given that 
oscillatory power as quantified via Hillbert transforms is based on such variance and the 
relative influence the alpha band has upon the sensors, this should have been expected. The 
result is that, again, it was not possible to dissociate competing hypotheses on the basis of this 
measure. Increases in the variance measure can be interpreted as increased noise and 
increased alpha suggests increased suppression of noise, yet the two correlate.  
 
Figure A2.2. Root mean square analysis of variance applied to sensor level data. No 
significant effects of the TMS were observed (site: F(1,17) =0.012, p=0.916, site × time 
interaction: F(3,51) =0.130, p=0.913) but the variance did increase over the course of the 
experiment (time effect: F(3,51) =5.541, p=0.009). Because of the correspondence 
between this and the alpha / oscillatory analysis, no conclusions can be drawn from 
these effects. 
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A3. Analysis of iTBS and sham control 
conditions in off-line experiment 2D 
 
 For completeness, this section reports the results for each of the three TMS conditions 
in Experiment 2D: cTBS, iTBS and sham. These analyses should not be interpreted as part of 
the main experiment as they incorporate multiple unnecessary comparisons. 
 
Figure and table A.3.1. Change in conscious detection (PrC) in the three TMS 
conditions (cTBS,iTBS and sham) of Experiment 2D, calculated relative to the 
session-specific pre-TBS baseline and plotted over the course of the experiment. Error 
bars are the within-subject standard error (Loftus & Masson, 1994; Masson & Loftus, 
2003). Table provides F and p values from repeated measures ANOVAs applied in the 
same way as described for the experiments in Chapter 2, but contrasting all the 
possible combinations of TMS conditions. Subsequent plots and tables in this section 
all conform to this structure. 
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Figure and table A.3.2. Change in ‘Unseen’ discrimination (PcU) form pre-TBS 
baseline in Experiment 2D. 
 
Figure and table A.3.3. Change in response criteria/Bias in conscious detection 
(BrC) form pre-TBS baseline in Experiment 2D. * denotes analysis in which a single 
outlier was rejected according to Chauvenet’s  criteria. Resultant degrees of freedom 
for corresponding site effects are 1,16 and for comparisons involving time it is 3,48. 
Graphs make use of data with this outlier excluded.  
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Figure and table A.3.4. Change in pupil diameter (arbitrary units) form pre-TBS 
baseline in Experiment 2D. 
. 
 
Figure and table A.3.5. Change in ERF peak amplitude form pre-TBS baseline in 
Experiment 2D.  * denotes analysis in which a single outlier was rejected according to 
Chauvenet’s criteria. Resultant degrees of freedom for corresponding site effects are 
1,16 and for comparisons involving time it is 3,48. Graphs make use of data with this 
outlier excluded. 
 
Figure and table A.3.6. Change in ERD gradient form pre-TBS baseline in 
Experiment 2D. * denotes analysis in which a single outlier was rejected according to 
Chauvenet’s criteria. Resultant degrees of freedom for corresponding site effects are 
1,16 and for comparisons involving time it is 3,48. Graphs make use of data with this 
outlier excluded. 
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A4. Participant instructions  
 
You will be shown arrows (figure. PI 1) that appear very briefly against a noisy 
background (figure. PI 2). Sometimes the arrow will not appear. Your task is to decide if you 
saw the arrow and which direction it was pointing in. You will be asked 3 questions about 
this:  
Did you see the arrow?   Yes/No. 
Which direction was it pointing in?  Left/Right. 
Did you see something?   Yes/No. 
 
It is important for the purpose of this study that you give your best guess for the 
direction discrimination question (Left/Right?), even when you don’t see the arrow, i.e. do 
not simply press the same button when you think no stimulus has been presented. 
Sometimes you will see something that might have been an arrow but you cannot be 
sure; this is why we ask the extra question: ‘Did you see something?’. If you have the 
impression that you saw something which might have been the arrow, but cannot be sure, you 
should say ‘Yes’ to this question and ‘No’ to the ‘Did you see the arrow?’ question.  You 
should say ‘Yes’ to the arrow question if you were consciously aware of the arrow. Also, we 
sometimes show non-arrows (figure PI 3). If you see this or think you might have, you should 
answer ‘Yes’ to the something question. If you saw nothing but the noise you should answer 
‘No’ to both the arrow and the something questions. 
The order of the questions will change from testing session to session. At the start of 
each session you will be given some practice trials to get you familiar with the order of the 
question and refresh your memory of the task.  
So you will be asked 3 questions: ‘Was the arrow pointing left or right?’ which will 
appear on the screen as ‘L/R’, ‘Did you see the arrow?’ which will appear as ‘Arrow Y/N’ 
and ‘Did you see something?’ which will appear as ‘something Y/N’. Responses will be 
taken on the keyboard number pad using the 1,3,4 and 6 keys (see figure PI 4). The buttons 
on the left (1 and 4) are for responding ‘Left’ and the ones on the right (2 and 6) are for 
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‘Right’. The upper buttons (4 and 6) are for responding ‘Yes’ and the lower ones (1 and 3) 
are for responding ‘No’. If at any point you enter the wrong response please tell the 
experimenter immediately so that she/he can make a note of it. 
 Sessions will involve four blocks of testing, each consisting of 80 trials. Two of these 
blocks will involve s-cone (purple) stimuli and two luminance (black and white) stimuli. To 
complete the experiment, you will complete 6 sessions over the course of 3 to 6 days, plus 
calibration days. 
Calibration days will involve establishing thresholds for the task. This means we will 
vary the ease of the task so that we can get a stable level of performance, which we will then 
use in subsequent sessions. This will probably involve about 16 blocks of 80 trials and some 
of 40 trials. There will also be one of these shorter blocks at the start of each normal testing 
session to check that levels of performance are constant, and adjust them if necessary.  
During the first days we will be assessing your susceptibility to phosphenes. 
Phosphenes are apparent flashes of light caused by the TMS. The experimenter will go 
through this with you in more detail during the first session. Also, during these calibration 
days we will also go through a series of tasks to calibrate the ‘purple’ colour stimuli. Again 
the experimenter will explain this. 
 If you have any questions, please ask. 
 Thanks for reading this and participating in our experiments. 
       
Figure PI 1.     Figure PI 2.    Figure PI 3. 
The arrow that you will   The noise in the absence  The non-arrow. 
be looking for.    of an arrow. 
   
192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7  8  9 
4  5   6 
2 1  3 
Yes 
No 
Right
Left
Figure PI 4. 
The layout of the button responses on the 
number pad of the keyboard. 
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A5. Analysis of the ‘something’ – p-
conscious measure 
 
 The rate at which subjects reported awareness of ‘something’ is the measure derived 
to represent Blocks discussion of phenomenal (p-) consciousness (Block, 2007, 2011), 
discussed in section 4.6. Block makes the prediction that p–consciousness will be 
accompanied by recurrent processing (Block, 2007). This analysis tested the hypothesis that 
the application of TMS at relatively late times would lead to the disruption of recurrent 
processing and suppression in the frequency at which subjects reported ‘something’. The 
three experiments capable of addressing this were those which applied TMS over a range of 
times relative to stimuli onset (Experiments 3 A,B,C). The analysis applied the same 
statistical methods as described in chapter 3 to the additional measure. The measure 
quantifies the incidence of subject’s responding positively the ‘something?’ probe and 
negatively to the ‘arrow?’ question over the number of opportunities for such a response. The 
results are reported below, the discussion and interpretation of which can to be found in 
section 4.6. 
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Figure A.5. Depiction of the main sections of the ‘on-line’ experiments with respect to the 
‘something’ measure. The ‘something’ measure is the number of positive reports of 
‘something’ only, over the number of trials at any given data point.  
A. Rate of report of ‘something’ over the course of Experiment 3A. Error bars are the 
standard error across subjects according to (Loftus & Masson, 1994).  
B. Rate of report of ‘something’ over the course of the single-subject single-pulse study 
(Experiment 3B).  
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C.  Rate of report of ‘something’ over the course of the single-subject double-pulses study 
(Experiment 3C). Error bars are standard error across experimental sessions. 
 
Experiment 3A, Between-subject study: 
 The critical effect in terms of relating p-consciousness (as measured by rate of reports 
of ‘something’) to recurrent processing would be a site (TMS vs. sham) effect that interacts 
with time, via a later suppression. See figure A5.1.A. No such effects or interactions were 
observed (site × time: F(3,45) =0.329, p= 0.762, site effect: F(1,15) =0.260, p=0.617). There were 
however significant effects involving time (F(3,45) =9.383, p<0.001), again indicating the 
sensitivity of the measure and auditory distracting effects. Also, there was a significant effect 
of stimuli type (s-cone or luminance) (F(1,15) =13.315, p=0.002), which simply indicates that 
subjects were more likely to respond positively to the ‘something?’ question in the presence 
of the s-cone stimuli. Since the s-cone and luminance stimuli were not independently 
calibrated in terms of propensity of the subjects to report ‘something’, this likely reflects a 
difference at the level of the stimuli rather than at the level of the pathways that the s-cone 
intervention can isolate. For this reason, together with the fact that no predictions were made 
in terms of s-cone dependency of the ‘something’ measure, the single subject s-cone 
experiment (3D) was not analysed in terms of this measure. 
 It is worth noting that there is a correspondence between the effects observed in the 
measure of ‘something’ and bias (BrC), which is due to the overlap between the attributions 
of responses over the two measures (both increase when subjects responded positively to the 
‘something?’ question more often irrespective of stimuli presented). As these measures are 
applied to independent hypotheses, this form of auto-correlation is acceptable. 
Experiment 3B, Single-subject, single-pulse study: 
 Based on the equivalent statistical tests applied to PrC and PcU measure in this 
experimental section 3.5.2 (which compared each data point in the active condition to that of 
the variance observed over the sham condition), no data points showed a significant effect of 
the TMS (Z < 1.79, p>0.037 relative to Bonferroni alpha of 0.002). See figure A5.1.B 
Experiment 3C, Single-subject, double-pulse study: 
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 The comparison of interest is the interaction between TMS site (active vs. sham) and 
time (early vs. late). The hypothesis supporting Block’s theory is that there should be a later 
suppression of reports of ‘something’ if there is a correspondence between p-consciousness 
and recurrent processing. This analysis is of the same structure as applied to PrC and PcU 
measures, in section 3.6.2 and is depicted in figure A5.1.C.  
 The ANOVA indicated that there was no site × time interaction (F(1,1) = 0.63, p=0.43), 
no significant effect of the TMS (F(1,1) = 3.41, p = 0.07), but a significant effect of the time at 
which TMS was applied (F(1,1) = 10.46, p = 0.002). The non-significant trend for suppressed 
reports of ‘something’ in the presence of active TMS suggests that the TMS may have been 
effective in suppressing p-consciousness. However, the absence of a time-dependent 
interaction does not support the links between p-consciousness – awareness of ‘something’ – 
and any particular stage of processing, such as recurrence. The effect over time illustrates the 
sensitivity of the measure. Because this drop occurred over the later interventions and is 
expressed to a similar extent in the sham TMS condition as the active TMS condition, the 
effect is most easily attributable to an auditory distracting effect (e.g. Terao et al., 1997). 
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A6. An alternative response attribution 
 
 This section outlines an alternative way in which behavioural response could have 
been allocated to measures based on previously described experiments (e.g. Rounis, 
Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010).  
 
 The principal dependent variables in these experiments have been conscious detection 
and ‘unseen’ discrimination. These two measures approximate to non-parametric versions of 
type-2 and type-1 measures in the SDT literature, respectively (Clarke, Birdsall, & Tanner, 
1959; Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003; Pollack, 1959). Type-1 decisions 
corresponding to the information the subject can objectively display in forced choice tasks. 
Type-2 (also known as meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012)) abilities correspond to the 
confidence that subjects place upon their primary discussion or their subjective judgment 
(Galvin, et al., 2003; Pollack, 1959). Independent differences between these two measures of 
task performance (type-1 and-2) have been used to demonstrate blindsight type phenomena 
(Dienes & Berry, 1997; Rounis, et al., 2010). 
  
  The match between type-2 / type-1 abilities and the detection / ‘unseen’ 
discrimination measures applied here is incomplete and was not pursued in these experiments 
for the following reason: the ‘Did you consciously see the arrow?’ question is a detection task 
which refers to presence / absence of subjects’ conscious experience under presence / absence 
truth conditions. In contrast, the truth conditions under which type-2 probes are commonly 
tested is the discrimination difference (e.g. left/right) not the detection judgment (Galvin, et 
al., 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Combining the two (detection and discrimination) in 
order to form a type-2 measure with these data sets is possible (see table A6.1), but it would 
result in the measure no longer tracking the conscious detection question posed, but rather a 
combination of responses to both questions, rendering interpretation difficult.  
 
 Two further, interrelated, practical concerns also limited the feasibility of applying 
type-1/2 style analysis to the data sets produced over these experiments: first, as described in 
section 1.3.2.3, the number of trials which the subject reported as being ‘seen’ yet the 
direction decision was incorrect was extremely low. As this response profile contributes to 
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produce meaningful type-2 measures (Galvin, et al., 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) this 
paucity of trials presents a significant practical limitation. Second, the construction of type 1 
measures commonly use all discrimination judgments in their derivation (Galvin, et al., 2003; 
Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). As such they conflate ‘seen’ and ‘unseen’ trials. Because ‘seen’ 
performance is invariably at ceiling levels, changes in conscious awareness will be reflected 
in the type 1 measure (as discussed in section 1.3.2.3).  
 
Table A6.1 Table of SDT classification for the task in order to produce a meta-d’ / 
type-2 measure. Type-1 measure would consist of all forced choice discrimination 
(left/right) decisions.  
        Hit False alarm Correct rejection       Miss 
Response     ‘seen’       ‘seen’        ‘unseen’     ‘unseen’ 
  ‘left’ ‘right’ ‘left’ ‘right’   ‘left’  ‘right’ ‘left’ ‘right’ 
Stimulus left right right left    left   right right   left 
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